§189
Wittgenstein does not want to deny that, "the steps are determined by the formula..." makes sense. He just asks how the expression is used. His method, I assume, is to get rid of conceptual confusion by drawing attention to uses of the expression which make sense.
Training/education is mentioned here. Would it be correct to say that the right way to continue the series is the way that people with the right sort of education would continue? Presumably not - people educated in mathematics might make mistakes. But there is the connection with mastery of a technique here - gaining the appropriate abilities.
Wittgenstein suggests that we might say that "for these people [trained to take the same step at the same point] the order '+3' completely determines every step from one number to the next". But this doesn't sound right. Surely it would be correct for someone to write '1006' after '1003' even if they hadn't shared in the training of the relevant group. Or is Wittgenstein's point that another group might have different concepts similar to our number concepts?
"'y = x(squared)' determines a number y for a given value of x' is a grammatical truth - so it's unclear what to make of the question 'is y = x(squared) a formula which determines y for a given x?'
What was incorrect in the interlocutor's view? - It is a mistake to think that the formula makes certain steps correct (as if there is some intermediary between formula and application) a given step is correct - in accord with the rule.
Monday, 20 May 2013
§188
At the end of §187 Wittgenstein asked what was wrong with the interlocutor's (A's) idea. What was the interlocutor's idea? - That in meaning the order A had already taken all the various steps- "In meaning it your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one" - meaning something anticipates reality.
In §188, as far as I can tell, Wittgenstein does not say what was wrong with the interlocutor's idea - he just spells out what the idea was.
In 'Accord with a rule' - in the analytical commentary vol.2 - Hacker compares the problem here with 'the mystery of negation'. The problem is that (iii) seems to conflict with (i) and (ii) in the following triad of propositions:
(i) What a true proposition depicts is what is the case.
(ii) What a false proposition depicts is not what is the case.
(iii) What a proposition depicts is the same, no matter whether it is true or false.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had 'solved' this mystery by saying that what a proposition depicts is a state of affairs - which is a possibility, not an actuality. States of affairs mediate between propositions and facts.
Similarly in the case of following a rule meaning the steps in the extension of the series is mediate between the rule and the applications of it - it is what connects the two (this is the confused view of the interlocutor).
At the end of §187 Wittgenstein asked what was wrong with the interlocutor's (A's) idea. What was the interlocutor's idea? - That in meaning the order A had already taken all the various steps- "In meaning it your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one" - meaning something anticipates reality.
In §188, as far as I can tell, Wittgenstein does not say what was wrong with the interlocutor's idea - he just spells out what the idea was.
In 'Accord with a rule' - in the analytical commentary vol.2 - Hacker compares the problem here with 'the mystery of negation'. The problem is that (iii) seems to conflict with (i) and (ii) in the following triad of propositions:
(i) What a true proposition depicts is what is the case.
(ii) What a false proposition depicts is not what is the case.
(iii) What a proposition depicts is the same, no matter whether it is true or false.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had 'solved' this mystery by saying that what a proposition depicts is a state of affairs - which is a possibility, not an actuality. States of affairs mediate between propositions and facts.
Similarly in the case of following a rule meaning the steps in the extension of the series is mediate between the rule and the applications of it - it is what connects the two (this is the confused view of the interlocutor).
§187
Wittgenstein agrees with the interlocutor that it makes sense to say that, "I already knew that B should write 1002 after 1000 when I gave the order". Philosophical/conceptual confusion can arise if this is misconstrued, however.
To say that you meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' when you gave the order '+2' does not mean that you thought of the step when you gave the order.
The interlocutor says that, "if I had been asked what number he [B] should write after 1000 I would have replied '1002'". Wittgenstein says that he doesn't doubt this. Does this mean that meaning something means having certain dispositions?
--Philosophical problem: would it mean that you'd have to have had an infinity of dispositions? - If you were asked what number B should write after 5,016 is it clear that you'd have replied '5,018'? And 10,314 after 10,312 etc. etc.
Wittgenstein wants to get away from the confused idea that knowing something is an event that occurred simultaneously with giving the order (the interlocutor says 'I..knew, at the time when I gave the order...'). Wittgenstein has already made the point, in §150, that the grammar of the word 'know' is closely related to 'can' and 'is able to'.
When Wittgenstein says that it would be correct for A to say, "if I had then been asked what number he should write after 1000, I would have replied '1002'" he says so because he does not doubt that A has mastered basic mathematics - that A is able to add 2 to any number (not because A thought of this case at the time of giving the order).
Wittgenstein agrees with the interlocutor that it makes sense to say that, "I already knew that B should write 1002 after 1000 when I gave the order". Philosophical/conceptual confusion can arise if this is misconstrued, however.
To say that you meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' when you gave the order '+2' does not mean that you thought of the step when you gave the order.
The interlocutor says that, "if I had been asked what number he [B] should write after 1000 I would have replied '1002'". Wittgenstein says that he doesn't doubt this. Does this mean that meaning something means having certain dispositions?
--Philosophical problem: would it mean that you'd have to have had an infinity of dispositions? - If you were asked what number B should write after 5,016 is it clear that you'd have replied '5,018'? And 10,314 after 10,312 etc. etc.
Wittgenstein wants to get away from the confused idea that knowing something is an event that occurred simultaneously with giving the order (the interlocutor says 'I..knew, at the time when I gave the order...'). Wittgenstein has already made the point, in §150, that the grammar of the word 'know' is closely related to 'can' and 'is able to'.
When Wittgenstein says that it would be correct for A to say, "if I had then been asked what number he should write after 1000, I would have replied '1002'" he says so because he does not doubt that A has mastered basic mathematics - that A is able to add 2 to any number (not because A thought of this case at the time of giving the order).
Friday, 17 May 2013
§186
In §186 Wittgenstein raises the possibility (in the voice of an interlocutor) that a new intuition is needed at each step to carry out the order correctly. I'm not clear about what is meant by 'intuition' here. In §186 Wittgenstein uses 'intuition' as if it is equivalent to 'insight' (according to the Hacker/Schulte translation). Later on, in §213 Wittgenstein talks about intuition as an 'inner voice'. My dictionary says 'quick and ready insight' or 'hunch'. Is intuition also used to mean something like knowing/feeling sure but without evidence?
If intuition is an 'inner voice' is it your voice? - Presumably there are similar sceptical worries about what you mean by the words which make up your thoughts. - If there are sceptical worries about rule following then there are presumably also sceptical worries about what we mean by our words/what our words mean (because an explanation of the meaning of a word plays the role of a rule for the use of that word).
In §213 Wittgenstein scotches the suggestion that an intuition is needed at each step: "If intuition is an inner voice - how do I know how I am to follow it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong."
In §186 it seems that Wittgenstein also wants to reject the possibility that the correct way to go on is the way that A intended:
(1) ...because if A meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' then A presumably also meant for 'B' to write '15,544' after '15,542' and '89,012,018' after '89,012,016' - but this would mean that A intended an infinity of steps at once, which is impossible.
(2) If A were to respond by saying that they didn't mean an infinity of sentences but rather they meant "that B should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this stage by stage, all those sentences follow." then it seems reasonable to respond that this is not satisfactory either - because if there are worries about '+2' then there are also worries about the sentence in italics.
This does sound as if Wittgenstein is setting up a sceptical problem. But it could be that Wittgenstein is presenting the philosophical problem in a form that those with the relevant vexations/confusions would recognise before he goes on to dissolve the problem - lay out the conceptual terrain in a surveyable representation.
In §186 Wittgenstein raises the possibility (in the voice of an interlocutor) that a new intuition is needed at each step to carry out the order correctly. I'm not clear about what is meant by 'intuition' here. In §186 Wittgenstein uses 'intuition' as if it is equivalent to 'insight' (according to the Hacker/Schulte translation). Later on, in §213 Wittgenstein talks about intuition as an 'inner voice'. My dictionary says 'quick and ready insight' or 'hunch'. Is intuition also used to mean something like knowing/feeling sure but without evidence?
If intuition is an 'inner voice' is it your voice? - Presumably there are similar sceptical worries about what you mean by the words which make up your thoughts. - If there are sceptical worries about rule following then there are presumably also sceptical worries about what we mean by our words/what our words mean (because an explanation of the meaning of a word plays the role of a rule for the use of that word).
In §213 Wittgenstein scotches the suggestion that an intuition is needed at each step: "If intuition is an inner voice - how do I know how I am to follow it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong."
In §186 it seems that Wittgenstein also wants to reject the possibility that the correct way to go on is the way that A intended:
(1) ...because if A meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' then A presumably also meant for 'B' to write '15,544' after '15,542' and '89,012,018' after '89,012,016' - but this would mean that A intended an infinity of steps at once, which is impossible.
(2) If A were to respond by saying that they didn't mean an infinity of sentences but rather they meant "that B should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this stage by stage, all those sentences follow." then it seems reasonable to respond that this is not satisfactory either - because if there are worries about '+2' then there are also worries about the sentence in italics.
This does sound as if Wittgenstein is setting up a sceptical problem. But it could be that Wittgenstein is presenting the philosophical problem in a form that those with the relevant vexations/confusions would recognise before he goes on to dissolve the problem - lay out the conceptual terrain in a surveyable representation.
§185
In §185 Wittgenstein returns to the example from §143 - the language game of A issuing orders to B and B then writing down a series/continuing a series according to a rule.
In sections §§143-184 Wittgenstein clarified the grammar of 'understand'. He raised the question: how can it be that what we understand/grasp in an instant (the meaning of an expression) is its use (which is extended in time)? - This could be understood as a rhetorical question meant as an attack on the claim that meaning is use. Wittgenstein said in those passages that it was a mistake to think that understanding an expression was a mental state from which correct use flowed. Understanding is not a mental state. Unlike mental states it lacks genuine duration.
Now, in §185 he commences a discussion concerning what counts as accord with a rule and what counts as following a rule. His discussing of rule-following parallels his discussion of meaning and understanding from earlier. An explanation of meaning is a kind of rule (it sets a standard of correctness) and a criterion for understanding an expression is correct application. Being able to give a correct explanation of the meaning of a word is also a criterion for understanding it. However, it seems clear that someone might satisfy one criterion but not the other (they might give a correct explanation of meaning and yet go on to use the word in question incorrectly). What are we to say about this?
Similar to the kind of case just mentioned is someone stating a formula (a kind of rule - parallel to an explanation of meaning - both give a standard of correctness and can be used to justify/criticise actions) and someone applying the formula (which parallels someone using a word correctly or incorrectly). So his discussion of rule-following bears upon his discussion of meaning and use.
In §185 the pupil (B) is asked to continue the series '+2' from 1000 upwards. B has previously demonstrated the ability to add 2 to numbers below 1000. B continues the series '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012'. When challenged about this ('you should have added 2!') B says 'I did add 2. - I went on in the same way.' What can we say to B to convince them that they did not go on in the same way? It seems that repeating what has already been said in the course of instructing B would be pointless. They think that they've gone on in the same way despite having had that training. Does the rule 'add 2' determine a correct way to go on in every instance? - It seems that Wittgenstein wants to say 'yes'. 'x + 2 = y' would count as a formula which determines a number, y, for a given value of x according to §189. What Wittgenstein wants to do is to clear up any confusion surrounding what this (the formula determining a value in each case) might amount to.
Some have found in these passages (§185 onwards) a sceptical argument leading to the paradoxical conclusion that "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (§201) i.e. Kripke. - It could be that B interpreted '+2' to mean 'add 2 up to 1000, then add 4 up to 2000, and add 6 up to 3000 and so on'. Is there anything in the rule '+ 2' that rules out this way of interpreting it? A could respond by saying that the correct way to interpret the rule was the way that he (A) meant it. But did A, when giving the rule mean that B should write '1002' after '1000'? - This kind of sceptical concern is examined by Wittgenstein but it isn't clear that what Wittgenstein does is to raise sceptical worries and then proffer a sceptical solution. More likely, I think, is that Wittgenstein wants to expose nonsense and dissolve philosophical problems rather than offer a traditional/Humean solution to them.
Question: Would this be another way of posing the sceptical problem? -- Given that continuing the series '1002, 1004, 1006, 1008' and '1004, 1008, 1012, 1016' are both possible ways of interpreting '+2' how are we to decide which is the correct way of continuing the series?
In §185 Wittgenstein returns to the example from §143 - the language game of A issuing orders to B and B then writing down a series/continuing a series according to a rule.
In sections §§143-184 Wittgenstein clarified the grammar of 'understand'. He raised the question: how can it be that what we understand/grasp in an instant (the meaning of an expression) is its use (which is extended in time)? - This could be understood as a rhetorical question meant as an attack on the claim that meaning is use. Wittgenstein said in those passages that it was a mistake to think that understanding an expression was a mental state from which correct use flowed. Understanding is not a mental state. Unlike mental states it lacks genuine duration.
Now, in §185 he commences a discussion concerning what counts as accord with a rule and what counts as following a rule. His discussing of rule-following parallels his discussion of meaning and understanding from earlier. An explanation of meaning is a kind of rule (it sets a standard of correctness) and a criterion for understanding an expression is correct application. Being able to give a correct explanation of the meaning of a word is also a criterion for understanding it. However, it seems clear that someone might satisfy one criterion but not the other (they might give a correct explanation of meaning and yet go on to use the word in question incorrectly). What are we to say about this?
Similar to the kind of case just mentioned is someone stating a formula (a kind of rule - parallel to an explanation of meaning - both give a standard of correctness and can be used to justify/criticise actions) and someone applying the formula (which parallels someone using a word correctly or incorrectly). So his discussion of rule-following bears upon his discussion of meaning and use.
In §185 the pupil (B) is asked to continue the series '+2' from 1000 upwards. B has previously demonstrated the ability to add 2 to numbers below 1000. B continues the series '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012'. When challenged about this ('you should have added 2!') B says 'I did add 2. - I went on in the same way.' What can we say to B to convince them that they did not go on in the same way? It seems that repeating what has already been said in the course of instructing B would be pointless. They think that they've gone on in the same way despite having had that training. Does the rule 'add 2' determine a correct way to go on in every instance? - It seems that Wittgenstein wants to say 'yes'. 'x + 2 = y' would count as a formula which determines a number, y, for a given value of x according to §189. What Wittgenstein wants to do is to clear up any confusion surrounding what this (the formula determining a value in each case) might amount to.
Some have found in these passages (§185 onwards) a sceptical argument leading to the paradoxical conclusion that "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (§201) i.e. Kripke. - It could be that B interpreted '+2' to mean 'add 2 up to 1000, then add 4 up to 2000, and add 6 up to 3000 and so on'. Is there anything in the rule '+ 2' that rules out this way of interpreting it? A could respond by saying that the correct way to interpret the rule was the way that he (A) meant it. But did A, when giving the rule mean that B should write '1002' after '1000'? - This kind of sceptical concern is examined by Wittgenstein but it isn't clear that what Wittgenstein does is to raise sceptical worries and then proffer a sceptical solution. More likely, I think, is that Wittgenstein wants to expose nonsense and dissolve philosophical problems rather than offer a traditional/Humean solution to them.
Question: Would this be another way of posing the sceptical problem? -- Given that continuing the series '1002, 1004, 1006, 1008' and '1004, 1008, 1012, 1016' are both possible ways of interpreting '+2' how are we to decide which is the correct way of continuing the series?
Sunday, 21 April 2013
§184
Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.
It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".
Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.
It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".
§182
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
§181
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
§179
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
§178
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
§176
There is a temptation, having been guided in some activity, to say that what is essential about the experience of that is that it is an 'experience of being influenced' - 'an experience of the because'. But on the other hand one is reluctant to say that something/a phenomenon is an 'experience of the because'.
There is a temptation, having been guided in some activity, to say that what is essential about the experience of that is that it is an 'experience of being influenced' - 'an experience of the because'. But on the other hand one is reluctant to say that something/a phenomenon is an 'experience of the because'.
Monday, 8 April 2013
§174
Is there a particular experience of doing something deliberately? We might be tempted to think so because (i) doing something deliberately is different from (ii) the same thing happening but not deliberately. This difference isn't in the movements or gestures so it seems it must be something inner. But what? - This isn't clear.
Is there a particular experience of doing something deliberately? We might be tempted to think so because (i) doing something deliberately is different from (ii) the same thing happening but not deliberately. This difference isn't in the movements or gestures so it seems it must be something inner. But what? - This isn't clear.
Sunday, 7 April 2013
§172
Could it be that what distinguishes reading from looking at doodles and uttering a sentence is that in the case of reading one is guided by signs?
- There is no single experience of being guided. There is no one experience in common between
(i) being guided by someone whilst blindfolded and responding to their tugs...
(ii) being guided in a dance...
(iii) being guided by a track in a field.
Could it be that what distinguishes reading from looking at doodles and uttering a sentence is that in the case of reading one is guided by signs?
- There is no single experience of being guided. There is no one experience in common between
(i) being guided by someone whilst blindfolded and responding to their tugs...
(ii) being guided in a dance...
(iii) being guided by a track in a field.
§171
We're especially drawn to the idea of being influenced if we read slowly with the intention of working out the essence of reading.
If one reads normally one does not have 'experiences of unity' between sound and word or 'experiences of being influenced'.
We might think we get a more accurate picture by reading slowly but, "If I'm supposed to describe how an object looks from far off [the case of normal paced reading] I don't make the description any more accurate by saying what can be noticed on closer inspection [the case of reading slowly and attending to accompanying experiences]".
We're especially drawn to the idea of being influenced if we read slowly with the intention of working out the essence of reading.
If one reads normally one does not have 'experiences of unity' between sound and word or 'experiences of being influenced'.
We might think we get a more accurate picture by reading slowly but, "If I'm supposed to describe how an object looks from far off [the case of normal paced reading] I don't make the description any more accurate by saying what can be noticed on closer inspection [the case of reading slowly and attending to accompanying experiences]".
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)