§184
Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.
It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".
Sunday, 21 April 2013
§182
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
§181
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
§179
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
§178
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
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