§2-4
Wittgenstein suggests that although the Augustinian picture does not capture the essence of language it could correctly describe a simple/primitive language. In §2 he describes such a language (the block/slab language).
But is the Augustinian picture true even of this language?
- Is the meaning of the expression 'slab' something that you might place on scales and weigh? (The object for which the word stands)
- Does the 'language' described in §2 really amount to a language?
Question:
Does 'slab' mean the same as 'bring a slab!'. (It has the same use)
In §4 Wittgenstein describes a script in which letters stand for sounds and are also used for emphasis and punctuation.
If you said that this is a script in which letters stand for sounds you would not capture the essence of the script. - Similarly Augustine's picture ignores many aspects of language.
I had the same worry as you about the s2 language. Why do we want to call it a language at all? And more specifically, why should we say the words 'slab' and 'block' are names at all, given that they can't be used to say anything about the objects they refer to?
ReplyDeleteI'm not even sure that 'slab' is the same as 'bring a slab', without more detail about their behaviour: are people punished for not bringing a slab? I want to say that it's more like a causal connection, the way you can train a dog to sit when you say 'sit'.
Also, what if Augustine responds that, though some features are left out of his picture, they're inessential to language? The way someone might say that using letters for sounds is the essence of the script, and the use of them for punctuation is parasitic on the main use.
-Manish
Yes. - That makes me think of accounts of language that make propositions fundamental and then incorporate force operators on top of that. - I don't think that Augustine could make a plausible case that he captures the essentials of language. It isn't clear that ostensive definitions are in any way fundamental or that 'names' of one sort or another are essential whereas other elements of language are not.
ReplyDeleteI've been reading on today and Wittgenstein has some kind of an answer to the question I raised (about whether 'slab!' and 'bring a slab!' are equivalent.) I think that's probably the reason I raised the question - that I'd got a vague memory of the question being raised in some context before. I'll write up some comments on later passages over the weekend.
ReplyDeleteHacker has an interesting point to make on this in his analytical commentary:
ReplyDelete"...describes a language for which Augustine's description (as W. interprets it) of the way he learnt to speak Latin (viz. 'I gradually learnt to understand what objects [the words] signified, and... I used [the words] to express my own desires') is apt. The words are indeed all names. The building materials severally correspond to the names. To understand a name is to know what object corresponds to it. The speaker uses one of the four expressions to express his desire for one of the materials. The assistant responds with understanding (cf. PI 6) in handing the speaker the right object. Note that it is not contended that the Augustinian conception of the nature of language (i.e. the conception rooted in Augustine's picture) is right for this proto-language".
So the answer to my question - is the Augustinian picture true of this language? - is 'no'. - And that isn't a problem. Wittgenstein didn't say it was.
As for the question of whether it amounts to a language. - Wittgenstein has something to say about various objections to it counting as a language later on. - I'm not sure if his answers are conclusive - that they prove that it is a language - but he certainly gives reasons not to reject the possibility that it is a language.