§63
Wittgenstein imagines that the defender of analysis might claim that the person who is given the second order (for broomstick-and-brush) is being given more - something more fundamental. The person who is given the 'unanalysed' order (for the broom) lacks the analysis. But you could perhaps say that the person given the 'analysed' order lacks something too (the perspicuity presented to the person ordered to bring a broom?)
Wednesday, 20 February 2013
§62
Wittgenstein presents us with an imagined situation in which the two orders ((i) for broom (ii) for broomstick and attached brush) are given. In this situation the person has a table coordinating names ('brush', 'broomstick', 'broom' etc.) and pictures. Does the person do the same when he carries out each order?
- 'Yes and no' Wittgenstein says.
You might say 'yes' because in both cases the person does as instructed and brings the broom (or the broomstick with brush attached, which amounts to the same thing).
You might say 'no' because in one case the person looks for the word 'broom' and finds the corresponding picture whereas in the second case they look for two words - 'broomstick' and 'brush' - and find (different) pictures correlated. We do not use the words 'the same' in the same way always and everywhere.
Wittgenstein presents us with an imagined situation in which the two orders ((i) for broom (ii) for broomstick and attached brush) are given. In this situation the person has a table coordinating names ('brush', 'broomstick', 'broom' etc.) and pictures. Does the person do the same when he carries out each order?
- 'Yes and no' Wittgenstein says.
You might say 'yes' because in both cases the person does as instructed and brings the broom (or the broomstick with brush attached, which amounts to the same thing).
You might say 'no' because in one case the person looks for the word 'broom' and finds the corresponding picture whereas in the second case they look for two words - 'broomstick' and 'brush' - and find (different) pictures correlated. We do not use the words 'the same' in the same way always and everywhere.
§61
Wittgenstein grants that the order for a broom and the order for a broomstick-and-attached-brush 'come to the same thing' but seems to hesitate to say that the second is an analysed form of the first. Does he hesitate because he wants us to recognise that relationships between concepts (conceptual/logical) aren't like relationships between bits of objects (or between objects)?
I think, in §61, Wittgenstein wants to bring our attention to context's role in deciding whether two sentences play the same role/mean the same thing (see §62 too).
Wittgenstein grants that the order for a broom and the order for a broomstick-and-attached-brush 'come to the same thing' but seems to hesitate to say that the second is an analysed form of the first. Does he hesitate because he wants us to recognise that relationships between concepts (conceptual/logical) aren't like relationships between bits of objects (or between objects)?
I think, in §61, Wittgenstein wants to bring our attention to context's role in deciding whether two sentences play the same role/mean the same thing (see §62 too).
§60
People like Russell and Frege think that they are making language more clear/perspicuous by presenting us with 'analyses' of sentences which 'break down' denoting expressions into constituent parts which are isomorphic with the reality referred to. BUT Wittgenstein suggests that it is no more clear - in fact a bit odd/obscure - to say, "bring me the broomstick with the brush which is fitted to it" rather than "bring me the broom".
Wittgenstein asks the (rhetorical) question, "the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of constituent parts?". I assume his answer to this is 'no'.
So he is making two claims here:
(1) That analysis, which aims at clarity, actually leads to obscurity in at least some instances. It might help to think about the purpose of ordering someone to bring a broom here. Simply saying, "bring me the broom" serves one's purpose whereas saying, "bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it!" is likely to confuse people. The 'analysed' sentence is more obscure/strange.
(2) It's a mistake to think in terms of language and reality being isomorphic in the first place anyway.
People like Russell and Frege think that they are making language more clear/perspicuous by presenting us with 'analyses' of sentences which 'break down' denoting expressions into constituent parts which are isomorphic with the reality referred to. BUT Wittgenstein suggests that it is no more clear - in fact a bit odd/obscure - to say, "bring me the broomstick with the brush which is fitted to it" rather than "bring me the broom".
Wittgenstein asks the (rhetorical) question, "the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of constituent parts?". I assume his answer to this is 'no'.
So he is making two claims here:
(1) That analysis, which aims at clarity, actually leads to obscurity in at least some instances. It might help to think about the purpose of ordering someone to bring a broom here. Simply saying, "bring me the broom" serves one's purpose whereas saying, "bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it!" is likely to confuse people. The 'analysed' sentence is more obscure/strange.
(2) It's a mistake to think in terms of language and reality being isomorphic in the first place anyway.
§59
Wittgenstein suggests that those who claim that names each only signify an element of reality are captivated by a certain picture/model.
Wittgenstein suggests that we do not experience these elements ("...experience does not show us these elements."). What is Wittgenstein's point here? - Is it that we don't encounter redness, as an element, - only red things?
We can see constituent parts, say, of a chair. We can also see a whole (chair) destroyed while its constituent parts remain unchanged (the back and legs might be removed from a chair). "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality", Wittgenstein says. I'm not quite sure what he's getting at here. I assume that the 'picture' he's referring to is something like the Tractarian metaphyics and philosophy of language. We get to this picture by reflecting on cases like the chair case, I suppose. We think of things like chairs being made up of constituents that might survive their destruction. Is Wittgenstein's suggestion that we then extrapolate from this that reality is made up of things which are complex and destructible and that these things are made up of parts/elements which are ultimately indestructible (must be). How do we get to this?
Wittgenstein suggests that those who claim that names each only signify an element of reality are captivated by a certain picture/model.
Wittgenstein suggests that we do not experience these elements ("...experience does not show us these elements."). What is Wittgenstein's point here? - Is it that we don't encounter redness, as an element, - only red things?
We can see constituent parts, say, of a chair. We can also see a whole (chair) destroyed while its constituent parts remain unchanged (the back and legs might be removed from a chair). "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality", Wittgenstein says. I'm not quite sure what he's getting at here. I assume that the 'picture' he's referring to is something like the Tractarian metaphyics and philosophy of language. We get to this picture by reflecting on cases like the chair case, I suppose. We think of things like chairs being made up of constituents that might survive their destruction. Is Wittgenstein's suggestion that we then extrapolate from this that reality is made up of things which are complex and destructible and that these things are made up of parts/elements which are ultimately indestructible (must be). How do we get to this?
Monday, 18 February 2013
§58
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is saying here. He suggests that we might want to say that 'red exists' does not make sense. Is the reason for this that propositions that make sense must be bipolar and 'red exists' is not bipolar (because 'red', as a simple object, must exist)? - This sounds as though Wittgenstein is attacking the 'metaphysical' claims of the Tractatus.
(Here's Hacker's summary of the argument of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in §58: "The argument is that one cannot say 'red exists', since one cannot assert its negation 'red does not exist', because if red didn't exist, one could not speak of it in order to say that it does not exist.)
Wittgenstein suggests that this isn't far from being correct but in fact the reason we're tempted to say this is that red things play the role of samples - and so belong to language (am I getting him right here?).
All we're saying when we say that 'red exists' is that there are things with that colour.
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is saying here. He suggests that we might want to say that 'red exists' does not make sense. Is the reason for this that propositions that make sense must be bipolar and 'red exists' is not bipolar (because 'red', as a simple object, must exist)? - This sounds as though Wittgenstein is attacking the 'metaphysical' claims of the Tractatus.
(Here's Hacker's summary of the argument of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in §58: "The argument is that one cannot say 'red exists', since one cannot assert its negation 'red does not exist', because if red didn't exist, one could not speak of it in order to say that it does not exist.)
Wittgenstein suggests that this isn't far from being correct but in fact the reason we're tempted to say this is that red things play the role of samples - and so belong to language (am I getting him right here?).
All we're saying when we say that 'red exists' is that there are things with that colour.
§57
Someone might claim that red things can be destroyed (e.g. a fire engine might be blown up by a bomb) but red cannot be destroyed. This is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing. - This sounds like someone trying to cling on to some version of the Augustinian theory - where words have a meaning because they refer to some 'object' (in a broad sense - incorporating properties/universals) - but not to particular instances of some property (e.g. the redness of a fire engine).
Wittgenstein (kind-of) agrees - he says that it make no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded into bits. But presumably Wittgenstein would want to say that this is a grammatical point rather than, say, a comment on the nature of redness. - He's not doing metaphysics here.
Wittgenstein nonetheless wants to claim that a name (such as 'red') might lose its meaning if all of the red things were destroyed and we forgot which colour the word referred to (amongst the colours that we could bring before our minds). In that case what has happened is that we've lost a paradigm. - We've lost a sample that played a role in the language game (i.e. it functioned as something like a rule - a standard by which we could decide whether something was red).
In §57 then, Wittgenstein is challenging metaphysical claims about simple objects being indestructible things which guarantee that a word has a meaning.
Someone might claim that red things can be destroyed (e.g. a fire engine might be blown up by a bomb) but red cannot be destroyed. This is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing. - This sounds like someone trying to cling on to some version of the Augustinian theory - where words have a meaning because they refer to some 'object' (in a broad sense - incorporating properties/universals) - but not to particular instances of some property (e.g. the redness of a fire engine).
Wittgenstein (kind-of) agrees - he says that it make no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded into bits. But presumably Wittgenstein would want to say that this is a grammatical point rather than, say, a comment on the nature of redness. - He's not doing metaphysics here.
Wittgenstein nonetheless wants to claim that a name (such as 'red') might lose its meaning if all of the red things were destroyed and we forgot which colour the word referred to (amongst the colours that we could bring before our minds). In that case what has happened is that we've lost a paradigm. - We've lost a sample that played a role in the language game (i.e. it functioned as something like a rule - a standard by which we could decide whether something was red).
In §57 then, Wittgenstein is challenging metaphysical claims about simple objects being indestructible things which guarantee that a word has a meaning.
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