§59

Wittgenstein suggests that those who claim that names each only signify an element of reality are captivated by a certain picture/model.
Wittgenstein suggests that we do not experience these elements ("...experience does not show us these elements."). What is Wittgenstein's point here? - Is it that we don't encounter redness, as an element, - only red things?

We can see constituent parts, say, of a chair. We can also see a whole (chair) destroyed while its constituent parts remain unchanged (the back and legs might be removed from a chair). "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality", Wittgenstein says. I'm not quite sure what he's getting at here. I assume that the 'picture' he's referring to is something like the Tractarian metaphyics and philosophy of language. We get to this picture by reflecting on cases like the chair case, I suppose. We think of things like chairs being made up of constituents that might survive their destruction. Is Wittgenstein's suggestion that we then extrapolate from this that reality is made up of things which are complex and destructible and that these things are made up of parts/elements which are ultimately indestructible (must be). How do we get to this?