§80
Wittgenstein suggests that certain 'thought experiments' in which we search for the boundaries of a concept should not be taken to show that a concept has such-and-such boundaries or that it is nonsensical/unusable. If we saw something that appeared to be a chair disappear and reappear repeatedly would we say it was a chair? - This hasn't been decided given our current rule-governed use of the term 'chair' - but this doesn't mean that something has been missed.
Is this just a repetition of the point made earlier about concepts not being unsatisfactory in some way just because they are not everywhere bounded by rules (just like the fact that tennis is just fine as a game despite having no rules concerning how high a ball is to be thrown when serving)?
I think this has some implications for philosophizing too. It suggests that things like Parfit's 'teletransporter' example, or imaginary brain-transplants, shouldn't be taken to show that our everyday concept of personal identity is unusable. The fact that we don't have rules ready for outlandish cases doesn't entail that the concept is somehow flawed.
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