§30

§30 continues where §29 left off. In §29 Wittgenstein claimed that using terms like 'number' or 'colour' in an ostensive definition might help to clear up misunderstandings. BUT they can only be helpful if one already knows or is clear about what these words mean. Wittgenstein is also referring back to the problem raised in §28 about possible misinterpretation of ostensive definitions. - The problem is that in pointing to a (red) apple and saying 'this is red' you could be interpreted to be saying that this is one apple, or that this is an apple.

Being able to ask what something is called presupposes that one is able to do something. What is it exactly that we're supposed to be able to do? - Recognise that something belongs to a certain category? Recognise that different kinds of 'items' in the world belong to different categories (properties, colours, numbers, things/substances etc.)?