§34
Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that "...neither the expression 'to mean the explanation in such-and-such a way' nor the expression 'to interpret the expression in such-and-such a way' signifies a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of an explanation."
It seems to me that 'meaning' here means something like 'intending'. You intend to point to the shape of the object rather than to the colour of the object. What is the relationship between intending and semantic meaning? - If Wittgenstein wants to draw a conclusion about semantic meaning (meaning as use) then it seems he is equivocating here.
- It's like cases of Freudian slips - where you meant to say 'cop' but you said 'cock' or something like that. - In this case what you are talking about is what you intended to say.
Rob, could you say a bit more about what you mean by semantic meaning and intending?
ReplyDeleteI think in this section Wittgenstein is talking about meaning in the sense of "what I meant by that word" rather than the sense of "what that word means in English". But I don't think he's talking about slips or errors (like if you refer to John as Joe) but rather intentional uses of words. Like if there are two guys in the distance wearing red hats and I say "look at that guy in the red hat!" There's an answer about which one I was referring to, and we could say it's an answer to who I meant by 'that guy'.
Now, someone might want to say that the reference of 'that guy' is determined by who my eyes were focused on when I said it - or, alternatively, by me having an image of the guy in my head while I said it.
Wittgenstein seems to be saying that you could hear my utterance, look at the same one as me, have the same image in your mind, but still misunderstand - if, e.g. you went on to say things which made it clear you were referring to the other guy.
I suppose 'circle' is a bit different, as its reference doesn't vary in the same way with context. But could we maybe say that the semantic meaning of 'circle' is due to a shared, standing intention to use it to refer to circles? Then the same issues would arise about what this intention consists in.
The distinction you made is the distinction I was thinking of. "What I meant by that word" means, roughly "what I intended to convey by that word". - The kind of meaning he is talking about is the 'what I intended' kind. But what is offered in opposition to that is meaning as use - and in that case he's talking semantics - right?
ReplyDeleteI talked about slips because someone might correct themselves after a slip and say 'I meant...' - in which case they'd be saying something like 'I intended to say...'. 'Means' here is being used in much the same way as in the sentence 'John means to keep his promise' - and this clearly isn't semantic meaning. 'John' - if it means anything at all, does not mean 'to keep his promise'. -- And it is the first sense of 'means' (non-semantic) that is used in cases like 'I meant to bring your attention to the shape rather than the colour' (which means something like 'I intended to bring your attention to the shape rather than the colour')
ReplyDelete(I agree that Wittgenstein wasn't talking about slips and errors - hopefully the comments above will make it all a bit clearer!)
ReplyDeleteOkay, I see what you mean now. I'm wondering about the relationship between speaker's meaning ("By X, I meant Y") and semantic meaning ("A means B"). Here, Wittgenstein seems to be talking about speaker's meaning, and I think he's suggesting that even in this case, the fact of what you were referring to is not determined by a particular physical gesture or mental process; even speaker's meaning is determined by the circumstances.
ReplyDeleteI think I agree that this isn't the same as talking about semantic meaning. But it would seem weird to me if someone accepted that speaker's meaning is not a matter of some mental process, while insisting that semantic meaning is. Also I suppose that when you teach someone a word ostensively, you're teaching them the semantic meaning but they have to figure out what you mean by it - what you're using it to refer to. Sorry that this isn't very clear!
(And I think there's a distinction between two kinds of cases where you'd say "I meant...". One is the case of slips and mistakes. The other is where a word's semantics are such that its reference is determined by context - words like 'that', 'this', 'him'. With these latter ones, the reference depends on who you intended, but in a rule-governed way; with the former it's not rule-governed.)
Yes. Thanks for that. That does help to make it a bit clearer for me. I hadn't really thought it was a problem for Wittgenstein - but it is interesting to note, nonetheless, that there are different meanings of 'meaning' - and that it isn't always the same one in play, I think.
ReplyDeleteWhere does the term 'speaker's meaning' come from? Is that Grice? - I've forgotten a lot of the philosophy of language stuff because I haven't studied it for quite a while and I don't teach it either.
I suppose Wittgenstein is attacking Lockean kinds of accounts of meaning where words are imbued with meaning through people intending them in some way - which distinguishes people from parrots. I've been reading Hacker on this and it has helped me to get a bit clearer.
Here's a relevant quote from Locke:
"Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enought, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind' (Essay, Bk.III, ch.1, sect. 3)... and making words stand for ideas is a matter of intending ' a voluntary imposition whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea" (Bk III, chii, sect 1)
I misremembered 'speaker's meaning' from Kripke (he actually says speaker's reference): http://cla.calpoly.edu/~rgrazian/docs/courses/423/kripkespeakerreference.pdf .
ReplyDeleteThanks for that - I'll have a read of the Kripke at some point. If I've got the stamina I might go through the blog once I'm done and read all of the additional readings that have cropped up in discussion.
ReplyDelete