§64

Wittgenstein comes up with a parallel case to the broom/broomstick-brush case. He imagines a language where names signify rectangles consisting of two coloured squares. - This is like the language game of §48 except in this case there are no names for individual colours. You could order someone to construct an arrangement of rectangles, perhaps, - like in §48. In this case you could, perhaps, say that the language game of §64 has the advantage of using shorter orders to achieve the same sort of results as in §48.
Wittgenstein asks 'in what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?'.
You could respond, perhaps, by saying that no such 'analysis' can be given in this case. The objects referred to are not complex, exactly, because there are no concepts for the coloured squares that make up the rectangles. But you might also respond by saying that it perhaps depends on your purposes. If you wanted to construct a square made up of nine squares (like in §48) you couldn't do so in the language of §64.