§24

§24 is a continuation of §23. Wittgenstein had said in §23 that it is worth comparing his later view - that there is a great diversity of language-games which might be added to - with his earlier view (and with the view of 'logicians').

In §24 he tells us where failure to recognise the diversity of language-games might lead someone. If someone thinks that one 'language game' e.g. assertion is fundamental then they will try to assimilate other language games to that. You might claim, for example, that language is fundmentally about communicating truths to other people. If you take this view then you still have to account for other aspects of language which don't seem to be about communicating truths (e.g. telling jokes, or greeting people).

Wittgenstein says that we shouldn't be tempted to assimilate one sentence form to another - even if we can substitute one for another. I assume you can justify this partly by reference to Wittgenstein's earlier point that the form of a sentence is not it's essential distinguishing feature. Assertions can be distinguished from questions and orders by their role in the language game. We should recognise that sentences play a variety of roles in the activites that make up our lives.

Even within what is apparently a single language-game - description - we can distinguish many different kinds of description.

I'm not sure what the reference to solipsism is all about - but hopefully, as Wittgenstein says, the significance of his point will become clearer later.