§19
Wittgenstein gives some kind of an answer to the question about whether 'slab!' is equivalent to 'bring a slab!'.
One reason for saying that they aren't equivalent is that 'slab' in our language has different combinatorial possibilities - it can be used in a variety of different sentences that are not available to the speakers of the language in §2.
There is also the question of whether 'slab' (in the language of §2) is a sentence or a word. Wittgenstein here is looking at an element of the Augustinian picture - namely that sentences are combinations of names.
Wittgenstein says that you can call 'Slab!' a word and a sentence - or perhaps a 'degenerate sentence'.
'Slab!' is no more a shortening of 'Bring me a slab!' than 'Bring me a slab! is a lengthening of 'Slab!'.
I assume that Wittgenstein is looking at a potential response from the 'Augustinians' -
You could say that 'Slab!' really means 'Bring me a slab!' - (and so it really is a combination of names (or words at least)).
Wittgenstein asks how one does this (mean 'bring a slab' in saying 'slab'). - Is meaning something doing something?
The last sentence ("...does 'wanting this' consist in thinking in some form or another a different sentence from the one you utter?") reminds me of the idea of surface and depth grammar, and the thought in some linguistic theories that the real grammar of a sentence might be totally different from what it looks like. E.g. Davidson's views on the logical grammar of "I said that P".
ReplyDeleteI think Wittgenstein is questioning the idea that there's some deep structure to sentences beyond their words.
That makes sense. You're not really disagreeing with me here, are you? - Wittgenstein is both undermining the view that sentences are combinations of names and questioning the idea that there's some deep structure to sentences beyond their words.
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