§47

In §47 Wittgenstein suggests that his own earlier view (and the views of Plato and Russell) was mistaken. - He wants to challenge the view that reality is composed of simple constituent parts with certain combinatorial possibilities that are refelcted in language.

He points out that it is unclear what the simple (i.e. not composite) parts of a chair are. Would it be the seat, the legs, the back? Individual pieces of wood? Molecules? Atoms?

It makes no sense to ask whether what you see before you (a visual image?) is composite unless it is already clear what kind of compositeness is in question. Wittgenstein has already pointed out that words can be compared to tools - and that there is a great variety of different kinds of word. Similarly there are different kinds of compositeness that might be in question.

The word 'composite' is used in many different ways - and there will be a corresponding sense in which something is simple/unanalysable relative to these different ways in which we use 'composite'/

Wittgenstein leaves alone the question of visual images in the 'theory of perception' here. Do we see trees or visual images of trees?