§40
Wittgenstein points out problems with the explanation from §39. He disputes the claim that 'a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it'. - As he has already pointed out earlier, we should not conflate the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. It is mistaken to claim that 'meaning' signifies something corresponding to the word.
When someone (e.g. N. N.) dies the bearer of the name is gone but the meaning does not die/go away.
Wittgenstein says that "if the name ceased to have meaning then it would make no sense to say 'N. N. is dead'" - but it does make sense, and so the name does not cease to have meaning.
This suggests that Wittgenstein thinks that names - proper names - have meanings. - Or is this just a reductio ad absurdum of the position he opposes? - Either way it seems clear that Wittgenstein is making an argument here.
I've read commentators who suggest that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein - I'd be grateful if someone could say who it is that makes these claims because I can't remember. It has been claimed that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein for various reasons:
- (i) Because the Investigations is written in something like a dialectical form - with different 'voices' in it. It isn't always clear which, if any, of the voices, is Wittgenstein's position (Stern).
- (ii) Because the positions which Wittgenstein opposes are not coherent/do not make sense - and so Wittgenstein cannot argue for the opposite. He can just 'assemble reminders' which show that his opponent is unsuccessful in making sense.
Regarding the meaning thing, maybe the answer is to remember the variety of ways that 'meaning' is used? I think there are similarities and differences to other words, so maybe language doesn't force us to say that proper names do or don't have meaning.
ReplyDeleteOn the one hand we might say that (some) names do have meanings - by contrast to pure nonsense. And note that you can learn the use of a name, just as you can learn the use of another word, and it's also possible to misuse a name.
On the other hand, if you know that "Jay-Z" is a name then you won't ask "What does Jay-Z mean?" but rather "Who is Jay-Z"? And "Jay-Z means..." sounds weird.
So does there need to be an answer to whether proper names have meanings?
I think all that Wittgenstein's argument here requires is: if you say names do have meanings then, if you say the meaning is the bearer you're committed to saying 'empty' names are meaningless. Which is false.