§46

Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, had claimed that names correspond to simple objects - 'primary elements'. Anything more complex must correspond to an 'interweaving of names'  according to his earlier view (which he now wants to reject). Presumably his earlier view was due to his commitment to there being a one-to-one correspondence between language and world.

(This is still part of undermining the Augustianian picture - "...the words in the language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names").

Wittgenstein clearly thinks that the Augustinian picture is tempting to people across cultures and across time. He has picked Augustine as someone in whom he detects the picture and in §46 he looks to Plato for an account of what lies behind the idea that names signify simples. Plato, Russell, and Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) all share the idea that the meaning of expressions corresponds to the ontological category of the item referred to by the word. The simple elements of reality - the 'objects' or 'individuals' can only be named - they cannot be described because descriptions only apply to complexes. - Descriptions are combinations of names. This is a kind of extension of the Augustinian picture - that sentences are primarily for describing and other kinds of sentence that do not seem to be descriptive (e.g. questions) have a descriptive component.