§60
People like Russell and Frege think that they are making language more clear/perspicuous by presenting us with 'analyses' of sentences which 'break down' denoting expressions into constituent parts which are isomorphic with the reality referred to. BUT Wittgenstein suggests that it is no more clear - in fact a bit odd/obscure - to say, "bring me the broomstick with the brush which is fitted to it" rather than "bring me the broom".
Wittgenstein asks the (rhetorical) question, "the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of constituent parts?". I assume his answer to this is 'no'.
So he is making two claims here:
(1) That analysis, which aims at clarity, actually leads to obscurity in at least some instances. It might help to think about the purpose of ordering someone to bring a broom here. Simply saying, "bring me the broom" serves one's purpose whereas saying, "bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it!" is likely to confuse people. The 'analysed' sentence is more obscure/strange.
(2) It's a mistake to think in terms of language and reality being isomorphic in the first place anyway.
re: analysis - would it help to get clearer here to think about whether psychological states are reducible to neurophysiological ones? - In this case it is clear, perhaps, that not only is an 'analysis' into neurophysiological language confusing it is entirely incorrect. Mental states are not made up of neurons or grey matter. When I talk about wanting to go for a walk I am not, in any way, saying anything about my brain or parts of it.
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