Sunday, 3 March 2013

§109

Philosophy is not scientific and nor is it in any way theoretical. Philosophers do not advance hypotheses as scientists do.

Wittgenstein says that, "[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." What is it that is described? - The correct use of expressions that have confused philosophers - 'knowledge', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'justice', 'causation', 'necessity', and so on. - And the contexts in which these expressions are used. Couldn't this be deemed a kind of explanation? - Doing so might explain why it was that philosophers have been vexed. - 'Perspicuous representations' could be construed as explanations of meaning, with the upshot being that understanding is achieved. - But these are not like scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
Philosophical problems are to be solved by 'assembling reminders' of the correct use of expressions and this should dispel illusions created by the 'bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language'.
Is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy the only heir of what used to be called philosophy? As Hacker says, clearly not. What used to be called 'philosophy' included the natural sciences, empirical psychology and mathematical logic (p.275 of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1, Analytical Commentary).
In addition to this I would have thought it's fair to say that there are other activities that could be called philosophy that don't just involve Wittgensteinian 'description'. - There are conceptual queries in ethics and politics - and it would be a good idea to be clear about the correct use of the relevant concepts before dealing with ethical and political questions. In ethics and politics, as in other areas, there is the potential for conceptual confusion. But it isn't as though all of the questionsn in ethics and politics are dissolved or resolved once the conceptual problems are out of the way. There are substantial questions to answer in these areas and people answering those questions would not be doing philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it, in opposition to his own earlier view. Yet these people are often called philosophers. - Questions like 'what is the best way to organise society?' and 'is it ever right to engage in warfare to preempt a potential future problem?' are substantial questions.

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