§136
Wittgenstein has previously used analogies with mechanisms (e.g. levers connected up to various different things in a locomotive) in highlighting features of language. But analogies with mechanisms are not always apt. It is mistaken/misleading to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions (as a cog wheel fits another cog wheel). The concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition.
Three kinds of cases
The relation between 'true' and 'proposition' (i) is not like
the relationship between 'male' and 'bachelor' (ii)
or the relationship between 'pain' and VERBAL BEHAVIOURI'm in pain (iii).
It is not a criterion (it cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition).
Why is it not like these cases?
Being male is a necessary condition for being a bachelor but it is not sufficient. - You can be male and not be a bachelor. The concepts 'male' and 'bachelor' are in some sense independent of each other. You could certainly imagine a world in which the institution of marriage did not exist but that the concept 'male' was employed in exactly the same way as in this world.
Someone saying 'I'm in pain' is a criterion for them being in pain. It is not a necessary condition and nor is it a sufficient condition. Someone could say 'I'm in pain' and not be in pain and somebody could be in pain but not say 'I'm in pain'. Nonetheless it is a (defeasible) criterion for someone being in pain.
The relationship between 'true' and 'proposition' is like neither of the above cases. It is not a defeasible criterion because it cannot be defeated. It is unlike the male/bachelor case because the concepts are not independent of each other in the same way. - You cannot imagine a world in which things are true but there are no propositions or one in which there are propositions but nothing is true (or false).
How does the concept 'proposition' differ from the concept 'sentence'? - I think that when I was told what a proposition was I was told that it was something common to different sentences (e.g. 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist Weiss') - and I'd always thought that sentences were the kind of thing that might be true or false.
I'm also confused by this passage (I'm not clear about what it means to look for 'the general form' of X) but here is my attempt.
ReplyDeleteThe concepts 'true' and 'proposition' are part of the same practice. We learn them together, and you can't have one concept without the other.
In the context of W.'s search for 'the general form of the proposition', this relation means that it's unhelpful to use one to define the other. (You can't grasp the concept of truth first and then use it to find out which sentences are propositions.)
E.g. if we were looking for 'the general form of numbers' and someone suggested: a number is something which can be added, subtracted, divided and so on. We might respond that these concepts have to be learned together - it's not like you can learn what adding is, and then go around trying to add things, and find out that way that 2 is a number and a teacup is not.
So - it's not false to say that only propositions can be true or false (I think?), but nor is it like saying that only dalmatians have spots.
Let me know what you think - I'm still sort of confused because I'm not sure what's wrong with stating this kind of conceptual connection, but Wittgenstein seems to think there's something bad about it.
I don't think that he thinks there is something bad about stating this kind of conceptual connection. The problem is misconceiving the connection as being one where one concept -truth - fits another - proposition. - What you've said, and the analogy with numbers sounds right to me. I don't know if he has someone in particular in mind here with this criticism. Did he talk about one fitting the other in the Tractatus?
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ReplyDeleteHmmm... actually... I think someone might look for the essential feature common to numbers (although they'd be confused/misguided in doing so, perhaps) but could they look for the general FORM of numbers? Don't formal features arise out of a relationship between elements (which is why no-one would say that p is the general form of the proposition).
ReplyDeleteYeah, I think you're right that formal features come from relationships between elements. This makes me confused, though, about how W. could have thought 'this is how things are' was the general form of the proposition - it's not like that sentence sets out various elements and how they are related in all propositions.
ReplyDeleteThe other thing that 'general form' makes me think of is 'the general form of the quadratic equation' (y = ax^2 + bx + c) and similar cases from math. Maybe this is where the idea comes from? It states all the elements you could have and their possible relations.
About the 'fitting' issue, I can't recall it being discussed in the Tractatus. Also, a couple sections later than this he says that we could sound it out - "a child might be taught to distinguish between propositions and other expressions by being told "Ask yourself if you can say 'is true' after it". So.... that's not what he's criticizing either. The 'fitting' he's criticizing seems to be the idea that these two independent concepts just happen to fit this way. But who holds this view? Is this the way that metaphysicians typically look at relations between concepts?
Just took a look at Baker & Hacker and I found this really helpful -
ReplyDelete"To think that truth and falsity give the essence of the proposition, and hence disprove that it is a family resemblance concept, is akin to thinking that one gives the essence of games by saying that one plays them."
So one reason it matters that 'true' and 'proposition' are not like 'male' and bachelor' is that if 'true' could be used independently of 'proposition', then we could construct a definition of proposition with necessary and sufficient conditions. Whereas nobody would suggest that you can define a game as 'what can be played'.