Knowledge and understanding are not mental states because mental states do not persist through being asleep or unconscious. You can, correctly, be said to understand something while you are asleep.
I think Wittgenstein's point is stronger than this - it's not that knowledge and understanding persist through unconsciousness, but rather that their relation to time is altogether different from that of mental states.
If I say I know algebra, it doesn't make any sense for you to ask me when I know it. And I think it at least sounds strange to say you understand something while you're asleep. (Unless you meant it this way - you can point to a sleeping person and say "he understands algebra". I just mean that you can't say "I understood algebra while I was asleep" the way you can say you dreamed.)
I think Wittgenstein's point is stronger than this - it's not that knowledge and understanding persist through unconsciousness, but rather that their relation to time is altogether different from that of mental states.
ReplyDeleteIf I say I know algebra, it doesn't make any sense for you to ask me when I know it. And I think it at least sounds strange to say you understand something while you're asleep. (Unless you meant it this way - you can point to a sleeping person and say "he understands algebra". I just mean that you can't say "I understood algebra while I was asleep" the way you can say you dreamed.)
Whoops, just noticed you made this point in the next post (about abilities not having genuine duration).
ReplyDeleteThanks for the clarification. That has made it a bit clearer to me.
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