§122

In §119 Wittgenstein had talked about bumping our heads up against the limits of language. We might think of the relationship between concepts as being like the relationship between places on a map (does this mean that traditional philosophers have been producing 'faulty maps' or 'maps of fictional places'?). The problems that have arisen in traditional philosophy have arisen partly as a result of not having an overview of the conceptual terrain (like being in a maze, perhaps, without being able to see the dead-ends). We need to produce 'surveyable representations' - we need to look at a range of ordinary and correct uses of the relevant terms.
One way to bring about perspicuity is to construct 'language games' of the sort Wittgenstein constructed in §2 - this is the invention of an 'intermediate link' - a stepping stone to achieving a clear view of the use of concepts.

Note: Gordon Baker makes a lot of this passage http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wittgensteins-Method-Neglected-G-Baker/dp/1405117575/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1362741371&sr=8-7