§189
Wittgenstein does not want to deny that, "the steps are determined by the formula..." makes sense. He just asks how the expression is used. His method, I assume, is to get rid of conceptual confusion by drawing attention to uses of the expression which make sense.
Training/education is mentioned here. Would it be correct to say that the right way to continue the series is the way that people with the right sort of education would continue? Presumably not - people educated in mathematics might make mistakes. But there is the connection with mastery of a technique here - gaining the appropriate abilities.
Wittgenstein suggests that we might say that "for these people [trained to take the same step at the same point] the order '+3' completely determines every step from one number to the next". But this doesn't sound right. Surely it would be correct for someone to write '1006' after '1003' even if they hadn't shared in the training of the relevant group. Or is Wittgenstein's point that another group might have different concepts similar to our number concepts?
"'y = x(squared)' determines a number y for a given value of x' is a grammatical truth - so it's unclear what to make of the question 'is y = x(squared) a formula which determines y for a given x?'
What was incorrect in the interlocutor's view? - It is a mistake to think that the formula makes certain steps correct (as if there is some intermediary between formula and application) a given step is correct - in accord with the rule.
Monday 20 May 2013
§188
At the end of §187 Wittgenstein asked what was wrong with the interlocutor's (A's) idea. What was the interlocutor's idea? - That in meaning the order A had already taken all the various steps- "In meaning it your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one" - meaning something anticipates reality.
In §188, as far as I can tell, Wittgenstein does not say what was wrong with the interlocutor's idea - he just spells out what the idea was.
In 'Accord with a rule' - in the analytical commentary vol.2 - Hacker compares the problem here with 'the mystery of negation'. The problem is that (iii) seems to conflict with (i) and (ii) in the following triad of propositions:
(i) What a true proposition depicts is what is the case.
(ii) What a false proposition depicts is not what is the case.
(iii) What a proposition depicts is the same, no matter whether it is true or false.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had 'solved' this mystery by saying that what a proposition depicts is a state of affairs - which is a possibility, not an actuality. States of affairs mediate between propositions and facts.
Similarly in the case of following a rule meaning the steps in the extension of the series is mediate between the rule and the applications of it - it is what connects the two (this is the confused view of the interlocutor).
At the end of §187 Wittgenstein asked what was wrong with the interlocutor's (A's) idea. What was the interlocutor's idea? - That in meaning the order A had already taken all the various steps- "In meaning it your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one" - meaning something anticipates reality.
In §188, as far as I can tell, Wittgenstein does not say what was wrong with the interlocutor's idea - he just spells out what the idea was.
In 'Accord with a rule' - in the analytical commentary vol.2 - Hacker compares the problem here with 'the mystery of negation'. The problem is that (iii) seems to conflict with (i) and (ii) in the following triad of propositions:
(i) What a true proposition depicts is what is the case.
(ii) What a false proposition depicts is not what is the case.
(iii) What a proposition depicts is the same, no matter whether it is true or false.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had 'solved' this mystery by saying that what a proposition depicts is a state of affairs - which is a possibility, not an actuality. States of affairs mediate between propositions and facts.
Similarly in the case of following a rule meaning the steps in the extension of the series is mediate between the rule and the applications of it - it is what connects the two (this is the confused view of the interlocutor).
§187
Wittgenstein agrees with the interlocutor that it makes sense to say that, "I already knew that B should write 1002 after 1000 when I gave the order". Philosophical/conceptual confusion can arise if this is misconstrued, however.
To say that you meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' when you gave the order '+2' does not mean that you thought of the step when you gave the order.
The interlocutor says that, "if I had been asked what number he [B] should write after 1000 I would have replied '1002'". Wittgenstein says that he doesn't doubt this. Does this mean that meaning something means having certain dispositions?
--Philosophical problem: would it mean that you'd have to have had an infinity of dispositions? - If you were asked what number B should write after 5,016 is it clear that you'd have replied '5,018'? And 10,314 after 10,312 etc. etc.
Wittgenstein wants to get away from the confused idea that knowing something is an event that occurred simultaneously with giving the order (the interlocutor says 'I..knew, at the time when I gave the order...'). Wittgenstein has already made the point, in §150, that the grammar of the word 'know' is closely related to 'can' and 'is able to'.
When Wittgenstein says that it would be correct for A to say, "if I had then been asked what number he should write after 1000, I would have replied '1002'" he says so because he does not doubt that A has mastered basic mathematics - that A is able to add 2 to any number (not because A thought of this case at the time of giving the order).
Wittgenstein agrees with the interlocutor that it makes sense to say that, "I already knew that B should write 1002 after 1000 when I gave the order". Philosophical/conceptual confusion can arise if this is misconstrued, however.
To say that you meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' when you gave the order '+2' does not mean that you thought of the step when you gave the order.
The interlocutor says that, "if I had been asked what number he [B] should write after 1000 I would have replied '1002'". Wittgenstein says that he doesn't doubt this. Does this mean that meaning something means having certain dispositions?
--Philosophical problem: would it mean that you'd have to have had an infinity of dispositions? - If you were asked what number B should write after 5,016 is it clear that you'd have replied '5,018'? And 10,314 after 10,312 etc. etc.
Wittgenstein wants to get away from the confused idea that knowing something is an event that occurred simultaneously with giving the order (the interlocutor says 'I..knew, at the time when I gave the order...'). Wittgenstein has already made the point, in §150, that the grammar of the word 'know' is closely related to 'can' and 'is able to'.
When Wittgenstein says that it would be correct for A to say, "if I had then been asked what number he should write after 1000, I would have replied '1002'" he says so because he does not doubt that A has mastered basic mathematics - that A is able to add 2 to any number (not because A thought of this case at the time of giving the order).
Friday 17 May 2013
§186
In §186 Wittgenstein raises the possibility (in the voice of an interlocutor) that a new intuition is needed at each step to carry out the order correctly. I'm not clear about what is meant by 'intuition' here. In §186 Wittgenstein uses 'intuition' as if it is equivalent to 'insight' (according to the Hacker/Schulte translation). Later on, in §213 Wittgenstein talks about intuition as an 'inner voice'. My dictionary says 'quick and ready insight' or 'hunch'. Is intuition also used to mean something like knowing/feeling sure but without evidence?
If intuition is an 'inner voice' is it your voice? - Presumably there are similar sceptical worries about what you mean by the words which make up your thoughts. - If there are sceptical worries about rule following then there are presumably also sceptical worries about what we mean by our words/what our words mean (because an explanation of the meaning of a word plays the role of a rule for the use of that word).
In §213 Wittgenstein scotches the suggestion that an intuition is needed at each step: "If intuition is an inner voice - how do I know how I am to follow it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong."
In §186 it seems that Wittgenstein also wants to reject the possibility that the correct way to go on is the way that A intended:
(1) ...because if A meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' then A presumably also meant for 'B' to write '15,544' after '15,542' and '89,012,018' after '89,012,016' - but this would mean that A intended an infinity of steps at once, which is impossible.
(2) If A were to respond by saying that they didn't mean an infinity of sentences but rather they meant "that B should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this stage by stage, all those sentences follow." then it seems reasonable to respond that this is not satisfactory either - because if there are worries about '+2' then there are also worries about the sentence in italics.
This does sound as if Wittgenstein is setting up a sceptical problem. But it could be that Wittgenstein is presenting the philosophical problem in a form that those with the relevant vexations/confusions would recognise before he goes on to dissolve the problem - lay out the conceptual terrain in a surveyable representation.
In §186 Wittgenstein raises the possibility (in the voice of an interlocutor) that a new intuition is needed at each step to carry out the order correctly. I'm not clear about what is meant by 'intuition' here. In §186 Wittgenstein uses 'intuition' as if it is equivalent to 'insight' (according to the Hacker/Schulte translation). Later on, in §213 Wittgenstein talks about intuition as an 'inner voice'. My dictionary says 'quick and ready insight' or 'hunch'. Is intuition also used to mean something like knowing/feeling sure but without evidence?
If intuition is an 'inner voice' is it your voice? - Presumably there are similar sceptical worries about what you mean by the words which make up your thoughts. - If there are sceptical worries about rule following then there are presumably also sceptical worries about what we mean by our words/what our words mean (because an explanation of the meaning of a word plays the role of a rule for the use of that word).
In §213 Wittgenstein scotches the suggestion that an intuition is needed at each step: "If intuition is an inner voice - how do I know how I am to follow it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong."
In §186 it seems that Wittgenstein also wants to reject the possibility that the correct way to go on is the way that A intended:
(1) ...because if A meant for B to write '1002' after '1000' then A presumably also meant for 'B' to write '15,544' after '15,542' and '89,012,018' after '89,012,016' - but this would mean that A intended an infinity of steps at once, which is impossible.
(2) If A were to respond by saying that they didn't mean an infinity of sentences but rather they meant "that B should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this stage by stage, all those sentences follow." then it seems reasonable to respond that this is not satisfactory either - because if there are worries about '+2' then there are also worries about the sentence in italics.
This does sound as if Wittgenstein is setting up a sceptical problem. But it could be that Wittgenstein is presenting the philosophical problem in a form that those with the relevant vexations/confusions would recognise before he goes on to dissolve the problem - lay out the conceptual terrain in a surveyable representation.
§185
In §185 Wittgenstein returns to the example from §143 - the language game of A issuing orders to B and B then writing down a series/continuing a series according to a rule.
In sections §§143-184 Wittgenstein clarified the grammar of 'understand'. He raised the question: how can it be that what we understand/grasp in an instant (the meaning of an expression) is its use (which is extended in time)? - This could be understood as a rhetorical question meant as an attack on the claim that meaning is use. Wittgenstein said in those passages that it was a mistake to think that understanding an expression was a mental state from which correct use flowed. Understanding is not a mental state. Unlike mental states it lacks genuine duration.
Now, in §185 he commences a discussion concerning what counts as accord with a rule and what counts as following a rule. His discussing of rule-following parallels his discussion of meaning and understanding from earlier. An explanation of meaning is a kind of rule (it sets a standard of correctness) and a criterion for understanding an expression is correct application. Being able to give a correct explanation of the meaning of a word is also a criterion for understanding it. However, it seems clear that someone might satisfy one criterion but not the other (they might give a correct explanation of meaning and yet go on to use the word in question incorrectly). What are we to say about this?
Similar to the kind of case just mentioned is someone stating a formula (a kind of rule - parallel to an explanation of meaning - both give a standard of correctness and can be used to justify/criticise actions) and someone applying the formula (which parallels someone using a word correctly or incorrectly). So his discussion of rule-following bears upon his discussion of meaning and use.
In §185 the pupil (B) is asked to continue the series '+2' from 1000 upwards. B has previously demonstrated the ability to add 2 to numbers below 1000. B continues the series '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012'. When challenged about this ('you should have added 2!') B says 'I did add 2. - I went on in the same way.' What can we say to B to convince them that they did not go on in the same way? It seems that repeating what has already been said in the course of instructing B would be pointless. They think that they've gone on in the same way despite having had that training. Does the rule 'add 2' determine a correct way to go on in every instance? - It seems that Wittgenstein wants to say 'yes'. 'x + 2 = y' would count as a formula which determines a number, y, for a given value of x according to §189. What Wittgenstein wants to do is to clear up any confusion surrounding what this (the formula determining a value in each case) might amount to.
Some have found in these passages (§185 onwards) a sceptical argument leading to the paradoxical conclusion that "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (§201) i.e. Kripke. - It could be that B interpreted '+2' to mean 'add 2 up to 1000, then add 4 up to 2000, and add 6 up to 3000 and so on'. Is there anything in the rule '+ 2' that rules out this way of interpreting it? A could respond by saying that the correct way to interpret the rule was the way that he (A) meant it. But did A, when giving the rule mean that B should write '1002' after '1000'? - This kind of sceptical concern is examined by Wittgenstein but it isn't clear that what Wittgenstein does is to raise sceptical worries and then proffer a sceptical solution. More likely, I think, is that Wittgenstein wants to expose nonsense and dissolve philosophical problems rather than offer a traditional/Humean solution to them.
Question: Would this be another way of posing the sceptical problem? -- Given that continuing the series '1002, 1004, 1006, 1008' and '1004, 1008, 1012, 1016' are both possible ways of interpreting '+2' how are we to decide which is the correct way of continuing the series?
In §185 Wittgenstein returns to the example from §143 - the language game of A issuing orders to B and B then writing down a series/continuing a series according to a rule.
In sections §§143-184 Wittgenstein clarified the grammar of 'understand'. He raised the question: how can it be that what we understand/grasp in an instant (the meaning of an expression) is its use (which is extended in time)? - This could be understood as a rhetorical question meant as an attack on the claim that meaning is use. Wittgenstein said in those passages that it was a mistake to think that understanding an expression was a mental state from which correct use flowed. Understanding is not a mental state. Unlike mental states it lacks genuine duration.
Now, in §185 he commences a discussion concerning what counts as accord with a rule and what counts as following a rule. His discussing of rule-following parallels his discussion of meaning and understanding from earlier. An explanation of meaning is a kind of rule (it sets a standard of correctness) and a criterion for understanding an expression is correct application. Being able to give a correct explanation of the meaning of a word is also a criterion for understanding it. However, it seems clear that someone might satisfy one criterion but not the other (they might give a correct explanation of meaning and yet go on to use the word in question incorrectly). What are we to say about this?
Similar to the kind of case just mentioned is someone stating a formula (a kind of rule - parallel to an explanation of meaning - both give a standard of correctness and can be used to justify/criticise actions) and someone applying the formula (which parallels someone using a word correctly or incorrectly). So his discussion of rule-following bears upon his discussion of meaning and use.
In §185 the pupil (B) is asked to continue the series '+2' from 1000 upwards. B has previously demonstrated the ability to add 2 to numbers below 1000. B continues the series '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012'. When challenged about this ('you should have added 2!') B says 'I did add 2. - I went on in the same way.' What can we say to B to convince them that they did not go on in the same way? It seems that repeating what has already been said in the course of instructing B would be pointless. They think that they've gone on in the same way despite having had that training. Does the rule 'add 2' determine a correct way to go on in every instance? - It seems that Wittgenstein wants to say 'yes'. 'x + 2 = y' would count as a formula which determines a number, y, for a given value of x according to §189. What Wittgenstein wants to do is to clear up any confusion surrounding what this (the formula determining a value in each case) might amount to.
Some have found in these passages (§185 onwards) a sceptical argument leading to the paradoxical conclusion that "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (§201) i.e. Kripke. - It could be that B interpreted '+2' to mean 'add 2 up to 1000, then add 4 up to 2000, and add 6 up to 3000 and so on'. Is there anything in the rule '+ 2' that rules out this way of interpreting it? A could respond by saying that the correct way to interpret the rule was the way that he (A) meant it. But did A, when giving the rule mean that B should write '1002' after '1000'? - This kind of sceptical concern is examined by Wittgenstein but it isn't clear that what Wittgenstein does is to raise sceptical worries and then proffer a sceptical solution. More likely, I think, is that Wittgenstein wants to expose nonsense and dissolve philosophical problems rather than offer a traditional/Humean solution to them.
Question: Would this be another way of posing the sceptical problem? -- Given that continuing the series '1002, 1004, 1006, 1008' and '1004, 1008, 1012, 1016' are both possible ways of interpreting '+2' how are we to decide which is the correct way of continuing the series?
Sunday 21 April 2013
§184
Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.
It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".
Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.
It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".
§182
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."
"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"
(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).
I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).
Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.
§181
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.
It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.
Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..
§179
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.
The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.
Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).
Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.
§178
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.
§176
There is a temptation, having been guided in some activity, to say that what is essential about the experience of that is that it is an 'experience of being influenced' - 'an experience of the because'. But on the other hand one is reluctant to say that something/a phenomenon is an 'experience of the because'.
There is a temptation, having been guided in some activity, to say that what is essential about the experience of that is that it is an 'experience of being influenced' - 'an experience of the because'. But on the other hand one is reluctant to say that something/a phenomenon is an 'experience of the because'.
Monday 8 April 2013
§174
Is there a particular experience of doing something deliberately? We might be tempted to think so because (i) doing something deliberately is different from (ii) the same thing happening but not deliberately. This difference isn't in the movements or gestures so it seems it must be something inner. But what? - This isn't clear.
Is there a particular experience of doing something deliberately? We might be tempted to think so because (i) doing something deliberately is different from (ii) the same thing happening but not deliberately. This difference isn't in the movements or gestures so it seems it must be something inner. But what? - This isn't clear.
Sunday 7 April 2013
§172
Could it be that what distinguishes reading from looking at doodles and uttering a sentence is that in the case of reading one is guided by signs?
- There is no single experience of being guided. There is no one experience in common between
(i) being guided by someone whilst blindfolded and responding to their tugs...
(ii) being guided in a dance...
(iii) being guided by a track in a field.
Could it be that what distinguishes reading from looking at doodles and uttering a sentence is that in the case of reading one is guided by signs?
- There is no single experience of being guided. There is no one experience in common between
(i) being guided by someone whilst blindfolded and responding to their tugs...
(ii) being guided in a dance...
(iii) being guided by a track in a field.
§171
We're especially drawn to the idea of being influenced if we read slowly with the intention of working out the essence of reading.
If one reads normally one does not have 'experiences of unity' between sound and word or 'experiences of being influenced'.
We might think we get a more accurate picture by reading slowly but, "If I'm supposed to describe how an object looks from far off [the case of normal paced reading] I don't make the description any more accurate by saying what can be noticed on closer inspection [the case of reading slowly and attending to accompanying experiences]".
We're especially drawn to the idea of being influenced if we read slowly with the intention of working out the essence of reading.
If one reads normally one does not have 'experiences of unity' between sound and word or 'experiences of being influenced'.
We might think we get a more accurate picture by reading slowly but, "If I'm supposed to describe how an object looks from far off [the case of normal paced reading] I don't make the description any more accurate by saying what can be noticed on closer inspection [the case of reading slowly and attending to accompanying experiences]".
§169
It seems that if you (i) read a sentence and then (ii) look at a sequence of squiggles and utter a sentence, that in the first case you feel your utterance was connected with seeing the signs whereas in the second you don't. Is the connection a causal one?
It seems not, given that causation is established by experiments/observations where one thing regularly follows another. How can I feel something which is found out by experiment (i.e. your utterance's connection to the signs)?
Is the connection one of justification? - You could justify what you utter by reference to what is written but it makes no sense to say that I felt the justification.
It seems that if you (i) read a sentence and then (ii) look at a sequence of squiggles and utter a sentence, that in the first case you feel your utterance was connected with seeing the signs whereas in the second you don't. Is the connection a causal one?
It seems not, given that causation is established by experiments/observations where one thing regularly follows another. How can I feel something which is found out by experiment (i.e. your utterance's connection to the signs)?
Is the connection one of justification? - You could justify what you utter by reference to what is written but it makes no sense to say that I felt the justification.
§168
No particular experience is necessary or sufficient for reading. The experience of reading ordinary print is different to the experience of reading words printed entirely in capital letters (or at least it may well be). But both count as reading and so it cannot be that there is some particular experience that makes something into a case of reading.
No particular experience is necessary or sufficient for reading. The experience of reading ordinary print is different to the experience of reading words printed entirely in capital letters (or at least it may well be). But both count as reading and so it cannot be that there is some particular experience that makes something into a case of reading.
§166
The difference between reading and not reading may lie in the situation circumstances not in the particular experience. What kind of situations/circumstances does Wittgenstein have in mind here? - One's in which the person in question has acquired the relevant skill? - That we would say that someone is reading if they have been taught to read (amongst other things)?
Saturday 6 April 2013
§165
Wittgenstein suggests that we might be resistant to the idea that 'reading' is a family resemblance concept and think that reading is a particular process.
Why?
It can't be that reading is just seeing printed words and uttering words - you can do this and not be reading. It seems there must be something in addition that makes something a case of reading - perhaps that the words come to you in a distinctive way (not like when you're making them up).
However, it is absurd to think that the specific experience of the words coming to you in a distinctive way is the defining feature of reading. If it were then the sounds uttered would be irrelevant.
Wittgenstein suggests that we might be resistant to the idea that 'reading' is a family resemblance concept and think that reading is a particular process.
Why?
It can't be that reading is just seeing printed words and uttering words - you can do this and not be reading. It seems there must be something in addition that makes something a case of reading - perhaps that the words come to you in a distinctive way (not like when you're making them up).
However, it is absurd to think that the specific experience of the words coming to you in a distinctive way is the defining feature of reading. If it were then the sounds uttered would be irrelevant.
§§163-164
Someone might, instead of writing out the cursive letter that is horizontally across from the printed letter in a table, write out the cursive letter below (consistently). In this case we'd say that they had derived their version from the table (in a similar way to the case of writing out the letter horizontally across).
Someone might not stick to a single way of transcribing but alter it according to a simple rule. There is no clear boundary between this case and a random one.
Wittgenstein asks - "does this mean that the word 'derive' really has no meaning?" - I assume his answer would be 'no'.
He goes on to say in §164 that there is a family of cases of deriving and similarly for reading.
His example - of the person not sticking to a single way of transcribing - makes it sound as though 'derive' is vague - that there are some cases between clear-cut cases of deriving and randomly moving from one side of the table to the other where is is not clear whether what is going on counts as deriving something from an original. Does it give us reason to think that 'derive' is a family resemblance concept?
Someone might, instead of writing out the cursive letter that is horizontally across from the printed letter in a table, write out the cursive letter below (consistently). In this case we'd say that they had derived their version from the table (in a similar way to the case of writing out the letter horizontally across).
Someone might not stick to a single way of transcribing but alter it according to a simple rule. There is no clear boundary between this case and a random one.
Wittgenstein asks - "does this mean that the word 'derive' really has no meaning?" - I assume his answer would be 'no'.
He goes on to say in §164 that there is a family of cases of deriving and similarly for reading.
His example - of the person not sticking to a single way of transcribing - makes it sound as though 'derive' is vague - that there are some cases between clear-cut cases of deriving and randomly moving from one side of the table to the other where is is not clear whether what is going on counts as deriving something from an original. Does it give us reason to think that 'derive' is a family resemblance concept?
§162
If we teach someone the Cyrillic alphabet and then put a passage before them in Cyrillic script which they go on to read, as taught, then we might say that they have derived the sound from the written pattern by a rule we've given them. We'd also call that reading. Does that mean that reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?
How do we know somone has derived something from the original? - by behavioural criteria - such as seeing them consulting a table.
- This doesn't answer the first question (does reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?)
If we teach someone the Cyrillic alphabet and then put a passage before them in Cyrillic script which they go on to read, as taught, then we might say that they have derived the sound from the written pattern by a rule we've given them. We'd also call that reading. Does that mean that reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?
How do we know somone has derived something from the original? - by behavioural criteria - such as seeing them consulting a table.
- This doesn't answer the first question (does reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?)
§161
There is a series - a continuous series - of transitional cases between the case of someone repeating words from memory and the person who spells out every word without being helped by guessing from context or knowing by heart.
An 'intermediate' reader could spell out most words but guess some from context. Does this mean that 'reading' is a vague concept? Is it like 'bald'?
Wittgenstein suggests an experiment: - (i) first say the numbers 1 to 12 then (ii) look at the dial of your watch and read them. What was it that was called reading in the latter case?
To read them you'd look at each number in turn on the watch as you said them. But what is unusual about this case is that the number series from 1 - 12 is very familiar. This isn't the same as being asked to read a passage in a book that you aren't familiar with. Would this count as a kind of transitional case? - I think it would. - I think this is what Wittgenstein is bringing our attention to.
There is a series - a continuous series - of transitional cases between the case of someone repeating words from memory and the person who spells out every word without being helped by guessing from context or knowing by heart.
An 'intermediate' reader could spell out most words but guess some from context. Does this mean that 'reading' is a vague concept? Is it like 'bald'?
Wittgenstein suggests an experiment: - (i) first say the numbers 1 to 12 then (ii) look at the dial of your watch and read them. What was it that was called reading in the latter case?
To read them you'd look at each number in turn on the watch as you said them. But what is unusual about this case is that the number series from 1 - 12 is very familiar. This isn't the same as being asked to read a passage in a book that you aren't familiar with. Would this count as a kind of transitional case? - I think it would. - I think this is what Wittgenstein is bringing our attention to.
§160
We can imagine a case where someone reads a text fluently but with the feelings associated with saying something he has learnt by heart. In this case we would not say that the person is not reading because they don't have the right feelings (this deals with the objection in §159). - It is not necessary that someone has certain feelings in order for them to be reading.
Someone could be presented with signs that don't belong to any existing alphabet and utter words corresponding to the number of signs, as if they were letters. They could do this with the feeling of reading it. - This suggests that having certain feelings is not sufficient for someone to be reading. - In this kind of case it could be that someone has the feelings associated with reading but is not reading.
It might also be that we would say that the person was reading in this case - if they correlated the signs (which don't come from any existing alphabet) with familiar letters consistently then we may well say that they were reading. - But this tells us that it is not the feeling that counts. It isn't by asking the person about their feelings that we determine whether they are reading or not in a case like this.
We can imagine a case where someone reads a text fluently but with the feelings associated with saying something he has learnt by heart. In this case we would not say that the person is not reading because they don't have the right feelings (this deals with the objection in §159). - It is not necessary that someone has certain feelings in order for them to be reading.
Someone could be presented with signs that don't belong to any existing alphabet and utter words corresponding to the number of signs, as if they were letters. They could do this with the feeling of reading it. - This suggests that having certain feelings is not sufficient for someone to be reading. - In this kind of case it could be that someone has the feelings associated with reading but is not reading.
It might also be that we would say that the person was reading in this case - if they correlated the signs (which don't come from any existing alphabet) with familiar letters consistently then we may well say that they were reading. - But this tells us that it is not the feeling that counts. It isn't by asking the person about their feelings that we determine whether they are reading or not in a case like this.
§159
We could imagine someone learning a Russian sentence by heart in order to convince a friend that they can read Cyrillic script (they can't). They then look at a sentence written in Cyrillic script and say the words they've learnt by heart. In this case their behaviour is just like someone who is reading but they are not reading which suggests that overt behaviour is not the criterion by which we determine whether someone is reading. It then seems that it must be something going on in their head that only they know about - a set of feelings or something like that.
We could imagine someone learning a Russian sentence by heart in order to convince a friend that they can read Cyrillic script (they can't). They then look at a sentence written in Cyrillic script and say the words they've learnt by heart. In this case their behaviour is just like someone who is reading but they are not reading which suggests that overt behaviour is not the criterion by which we determine whether someone is reading. It then seems that it must be something going on in their head that only they know about - a set of feelings or something like that.
§158
Do we say that we cannot determine the first word read by looking at a physical mechanism or process (say, in the brain) because we don't know what is going on in the brain? - Perhaps if we did know then the brain mechanism would be the criterion.
Wittgenstein rejects this. Those who think that it must be that way (that there must be a brain mechanism that would allow us to determine the first word read) have a certain a priori model. Those who think that way are held captive by a picture - an appealing form of representation. - They are conceptually confused.
Do we say that we cannot determine the first word read by looking at a physical mechanism or process (say, in the brain) because we don't know what is going on in the brain? - Perhaps if we did know then the brain mechanism would be the criterion.
Wittgenstein rejects this. Those who think that it must be that way (that there must be a brain mechanism that would allow us to determine the first word read) have a certain a priori model. Those who think that way are held captive by a picture - an appealing form of representation. - They are conceptually confused.
§157
We might imagine creatures trained to be reading machines. We could imagine one that hasn't participated in the training producing sounds when presented with written words. The sounds might occasionally come out right. If someone heard the pupil on such an occasion they might say 'he is reading'. The instructor would respond 'no. He isn't. He just got lucky' or something like that. But what if the pupil were to respond correctly to further words presented to him? The instructor, at some point, will grant that the pupil can read. But what of the first sound/word? - Do we now have reason to say that the pupil read that? - It makes no sense to ask which was the first one read.
It would make sense to ask which the first word read was if the criterion was that it was the first time the pupil had a certain feeling. But according to the way reading was defined in §156 ("rendering out loud what is written or printed...") the concept 'reading' is independent of mental or other mechanisms.
I assume that the same point would hold of our own concept of 'reading' - that we don't have criteria for determining the first word read.
We might imagine creatures trained to be reading machines. We could imagine one that hasn't participated in the training producing sounds when presented with written words. The sounds might occasionally come out right. If someone heard the pupil on such an occasion they might say 'he is reading'. The instructor would respond 'no. He isn't. He just got lucky' or something like that. But what if the pupil were to respond correctly to further words presented to him? The instructor, at some point, will grant that the pupil can read. But what of the first sound/word? - Do we now have reason to say that the pupil read that? - It makes no sense to ask which was the first one read.
It would make sense to ask which the first word read was if the criterion was that it was the first time the pupil had a certain feeling. But according to the way reading was defined in §156 ("rendering out loud what is written or printed...") the concept 'reading' is independent of mental or other mechanisms.
I assume that the same point would hold of our own concept of 'reading' - that we don't have criteria for determining the first word read.
Saturday 23 March 2013
§156
Sections §156-78 examine reading. Wittgenstein says that 'for purposes of this examination' he won't count the understanding of what is read as part of 'reading'. What are his purposes? - To shed light on the discussion of understanding.
Hacker: "'Reading' is deliberately detached from understanding, since this example is used to illuminate understanding and hence must not invoke understanding of what is read". - If Wittgenstein did invoke understanding of what is read that would assume that 'understanding' was already perspicuous.
Is our concept of reading usually detached from understanding? - In some cases it seems that we would tie the two together. If I were to ask someone if they could read German I would mean 'do you understand written works in German?'. However, you might ask if someone could read Russian and they might say 'in a way I can' - and mean that they could read Cyrillic script but not understand Russian - and this would be a legitimate use of 'read'.
What is to count as reading, for the sake of Wittgenstein's examination?
"...rendering out loud what is written or printed...writing from dictation, copying something printed, playing from sheet music..."
What goes on when someone who has learnt to read reads something? - Their eyes pass along the printed words, they might say the words out loud. We would also say that someone has read something if they are able to repeat the written sentence word for word afterwards even if they haven't said the sentence out loud or to themselves. Someone can read aloud without attending to what they are reading (so attending to what is read is not necessary for reading - in some cases, at the very least).
Two temptations:
If we look at someone beginning to read we might be tempted to say that reading is a conscious mental activity - because this is what seems to be missing when we say that the beginner is not really reading (when they guess words from the context or say bits of the passage they've learnt by heart without looking at the page).
We might also be tempted to say of the beginner that only they really know whether they're (really)reading or saying the words by heart (which again suggests that reading is a conscious mental activity that only the reader 'has access to')
Sections §156-78 examine reading. Wittgenstein says that 'for purposes of this examination' he won't count the understanding of what is read as part of 'reading'. What are his purposes? - To shed light on the discussion of understanding.
Hacker: "'Reading' is deliberately detached from understanding, since this example is used to illuminate understanding and hence must not invoke understanding of what is read". - If Wittgenstein did invoke understanding of what is read that would assume that 'understanding' was already perspicuous.
Is our concept of reading usually detached from understanding? - In some cases it seems that we would tie the two together. If I were to ask someone if they could read German I would mean 'do you understand written works in German?'. However, you might ask if someone could read Russian and they might say 'in a way I can' - and mean that they could read Cyrillic script but not understand Russian - and this would be a legitimate use of 'read'.
What is to count as reading, for the sake of Wittgenstein's examination?
"...rendering out loud what is written or printed...writing from dictation, copying something printed, playing from sheet music..."
What goes on when someone who has learnt to read reads something? - Their eyes pass along the printed words, they might say the words out loud. We would also say that someone has read something if they are able to repeat the written sentence word for word afterwards even if they haven't said the sentence out loud or to themselves. Someone can read aloud without attending to what they are reading (so attending to what is read is not necessary for reading - in some cases, at the very least).
Two temptations:
If we look at someone beginning to read we might be tempted to say that reading is a conscious mental activity - because this is what seems to be missing when we say that the beginner is not really reading (when they guess words from the context or say bits of the passage they've learnt by heart without looking at the page).
We might also be tempted to say of the beginner that only they really know whether they're (really)reading or saying the words by heart (which again suggests that reading is a conscious mental activity that only the reader 'has access to')
§153
The temptation - now that we've seen that the various 'surface' things that occur don't constitute the understanding - is to say that the understanding must be something beneath the surface. (In what sense are things 'on the surface' here? - It could be that they are on the surface in being observable behaviour or someone might think that they are on the surface in being 'available to consciousness' - something that we are aware of thinking).
The problem with this new temptation is that even if we did find something that happened in all cases what reason would we have to think that it was the understanding?
It must be that we already have criteria of understanding if we are able to correlate cases of understanding with something (e.g. a brain process).
The temptation - now that we've seen that the various 'surface' things that occur don't constitute the understanding - is to say that the understanding must be something beneath the surface. (In what sense are things 'on the surface' here? - It could be that they are on the surface in being observable behaviour or someone might think that they are on the surface in being 'available to consciousness' - something that we are aware of thinking).
The problem with this new temptation is that even if we did find something that happened in all cases what reason would we have to think that it was the understanding?
It must be that we already have criteria of understanding if we are able to correlate cases of understanding with something (e.g. a brain process).
§152
None of the things mentioned in §151 (a formulae occuring to you, having a certain feeling, etc.) is the understanding. Someone might have a formula in mind or written down and yet not understand. They might say, 'That's easy' to themselves and take a sharp intake of breath, but then find that they do not understand.
None of the things mentioned in §151 (a formulae occuring to you, having a certain feeling, etc.) is the understanding. Someone might have a formula in mind or written down and yet not understand. They might say, 'That's easy' to themselves and take a sharp intake of breath, but then find that they do not understand.
§151
'Know' might be used in saying 'Now I know!' (You might be pondering how to continue a series and then exclaim 'Now I know!' (now I know how to continue the series))
If we imagine someone (B) watching someone else (A) writing out a series and saying, 'now I can go on!' when they have worked out the rule it seems that understanding is something that occurs in a moment.
But what occurs?
- Various things might occur.
- B might try out various algebraic formulae and then have it confirmed that one fits the series.
- B might ask himself the difference between each step in the series and find a pattern.
- B might watch A writing out the series and say, 'Yes. I know that series.'
- B might have a certain feeling.
'Know' might be used in saying 'Now I know!' (You might be pondering how to continue a series and then exclaim 'Now I know!' (now I know how to continue the series))
If we imagine someone (B) watching someone else (A) writing out a series and saying, 'now I can go on!' when they have worked out the rule it seems that understanding is something that occurs in a moment.
But what occurs?
- Various things might occur.
- B might try out various algebraic formulae and then have it confirmed that one fits the series.
- B might ask himself the difference between each step in the series and find a pattern.
- B might watch A writing out the series and say, 'Yes. I know that series.'
- B might have a certain feeling.
§149
The criteria for determining whether someone understands something and whether someone is in a certain brain state are different. So, the brain state is not the understanding.
Understanding is not a conscious state/process but nor is it an 'unconscious' state, like a brain state.
Wittgenstein gives examples of mental states - dejection, excitement, and pain. Each of these might be with us all day, uninterruptedly. But we cannot be said to understand uninterruptedly - at least not in the way that we might be in pain uninterruptedly.
An ability, like being able to play chess, does not have genuine duration.
The criteria for determining whether someone understands something and whether someone is in a certain brain state are different. So, the brain state is not the understanding.
Understanding is not a conscious state/process but nor is it an 'unconscious' state, like a brain state.
Wittgenstein gives examples of mental states - dejection, excitement, and pain. Each of these might be with us all day, uninterruptedly. But we cannot be said to understand uninterruptedly - at least not in the way that we might be in pain uninterruptedly.
An ability, like being able to play chess, does not have genuine duration.
§147
Another reason one might be tempted to say that understanding is a mental state - or at least that applying a rule is not a criterion of understanding - is that in your own case you surely don't know that you understand by having experienced yourself applying the rule.and what you have understanding of is a rule which applies to a series that is infinite, whereas any application must be finite.
Is the first person/third person asymmetry here like the case of pain? - No. In the case of understanding it makes sense to say "I think I understand" but find that you do not. In the case of pain it does not make sense to say, "I think I'm in pain", at all (except, perhaps, in cases of very mild pain).
Another reason one might be tempted to say that understanding is a mental state - or at least that applying a rule is not a criterion of understanding - is that in your own case you surely don't know that you understand by having experienced yourself applying the rule.and what you have understanding of is a rule which applies to a series that is infinite, whereas any application must be finite.
Is the first person/third person asymmetry here like the case of pain? - No. In the case of understanding it makes sense to say "I think I understand" but find that you do not. In the case of pain it does not make sense to say, "I think I'm in pain", at all (except, perhaps, in cases of very mild pain).
§146
Wittgenstein points to a temptation to say that understanding is a state from which correct application flows. Considering that there is no clear criterion - no number that they must be able to continue up to (§145) - we might be tempted to say that it isn't the application that counts but the underlying state.
Wittgenstein says that just because we could imagine someone going on differently the application is still a criterion of understanding.
Wittgenstein points to a temptation to say that understanding is a state from which correct application flows. Considering that there is no clear criterion - no number that they must be able to continue up to (§145) - we might be tempted to say that it isn't the application that counts but the underlying state.
Wittgenstein says that just because we could imagine someone going on differently the application is still a criterion of understanding.
§145
To say that the student (B) has understood how to write the series the student would have had to have repeatedly done it successfully themselves. A criterion of understanding is the person correctly writing out the series themselves.
You can then point out to them that the numbers 0-9 recur in the numbers from 10 upwards - in the units and in the tens.
When do we say they've mastered the system? - There is no clear limit up to which they must be able to complete the series in order for us to have a right to say they've understood/mastered it.
To say that the student (B) has understood how to write the series the student would have had to have repeatedly done it successfully themselves. A criterion of understanding is the person correctly writing out the series themselves.
You can then point out to them that the numbers 0-9 recur in the numbers from 10 upwards - in the units and in the tens.
When do we say they've mastered the system? - There is no clear limit up to which they must be able to complete the series in order for us to have a right to say they've understood/mastered it.
§144
Wittgenstein says that the point of him pointing out that learning might come to an end at a certain point is to reorient us. - To change our way of looking at things. His point is to get us to stop thinking about understanding as an inner state or process from which applications flow and to orient us towards thinking of understanding as akin to an ability.
How does he do this? - The language game of §143 draws our attention to the grounding of our conceptual understanding on being able to imitate.
Wittgenstein says that the point of him pointing out that learning might come to an end at a certain point is to reorient us. - To change our way of looking at things. His point is to get us to stop thinking about understanding as an inner state or process from which applications flow and to orient us towards thinking of understanding as akin to an ability.
How does he do this? - The language game of §143 draws our attention to the grounding of our conceptual understanding on being able to imitate.
Monday 18 March 2013
§143
Wittgenstein tells us not to balk at the expression 'series of numbers' in his example. The point, I assume, is that it isn't incorrect to say 'numbers' rather than 'numerals' here. In fact it might be more misleading. Those defending the idea that 'numeral' is correct are in thrall to something like the Augustinian picture (thinking that the number is an object referred to by the numeral).
In his example B has to write down a series of signs according to a formation rule when A gives an order. The series of signs is the series of natural numbers - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
B might come to learn the series by copying it up to 9. B would then need to be able to write them down himself in order for instruction to go on. When would we say B has understood? - This isn't completely clear. Wittgenstein makes the point that there isn't a sharp distinction between a random and a systematic mistake.
Conceptual abilities rest on training. Training can only take place given standard natural reactions of trainees.
Wittgenstein tells us not to balk at the expression 'series of numbers' in his example. The point, I assume, is that it isn't incorrect to say 'numbers' rather than 'numerals' here. In fact it might be more misleading. Those defending the idea that 'numeral' is correct are in thrall to something like the Augustinian picture (thinking that the number is an object referred to by the numeral).
In his example B has to write down a series of signs according to a formation rule when A gives an order. The series of signs is the series of natural numbers - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
B might come to learn the series by copying it up to 9. B would then need to be able to write them down himself in order for instruction to go on. When would we say B has understood? - This isn't completely clear. Wittgenstein makes the point that there isn't a sharp distinction between a random and a systematic mistake.
Conceptual abilities rest on training. Training can only take place given standard natural reactions of trainees.
§142
The rules for the use of words prescribe their use in normal circumstances. If circumstances were to change dramatically then we might well be at a loss about what to say. The disappearing/reappearing chair (§80) is an example of this kind of thing (is it correct to call it a chair? - We would be at a loss about what to say.)
Similarly, if people in pain didn't typically say "my ___ hurts!" or wince or say "arrgh!" but behaved differently half the time (perhaps they might say "Mmmm. I'm in pain" and look completely serene/contented/smile) - then we'd be unsure about whether the word 'pain' was being used correctly.
Presumably a similar point could be made about understanding. - If someone went on to use an expression in accordance with the rules for its correct use for the most part but used it differently on some occasions we might be unsure about whether to say that they understood it.
The rules for the use of words prescribe their use in normal circumstances. If circumstances were to change dramatically then we might well be at a loss about what to say. The disappearing/reappearing chair (§80) is an example of this kind of thing (is it correct to call it a chair? - We would be at a loss about what to say.)
Similarly, if people in pain didn't typically say "my ___ hurts!" or wince or say "arrgh!" but behaved differently half the time (perhaps they might say "Mmmm. I'm in pain" and look completely serene/contented/smile) - then we'd be unsure about whether the word 'pain' was being used correctly.
Presumably a similar point could be made about understanding. - If someone went on to use an expression in accordance with the rules for its correct use for the most part but used it differently on some occasions we might be unsure about whether to say that they understood it.
§140
Pictures don't determine a use. So why are people tempted to think that they do?
- We can understand something in an instant and a mental picture is the kind of thing that might come to us in an instant.
The cube case might lead us to say that although we are not under a logical compulsion to apply a picture in a certain way we must be under a psychological compulsion. This could lead us to distinguish psychological compulsion from logical compulsion. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is something wrong with this distinction. I assume the problem is with the idea of logical compulsion.
We might have the same picture before our minds when we hear a word but apply it differently - and a different application means different meaning. Here, presumably, Wittgenstein is emphasising that the use of a word is internally connected to its meaning but a mental picture is not.
Pictures don't determine a use. So why are people tempted to think that they do?
- We can understand something in an instant and a mental picture is the kind of thing that might come to us in an instant.
The cube case might lead us to say that although we are not under a logical compulsion to apply a picture in a certain way we must be under a psychological compulsion. This could lead us to distinguish psychological compulsion from logical compulsion. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is something wrong with this distinction. I assume the problem is with the idea of logical compulsion.
We might have the same picture before our minds when we hear a word but apply it differently - and a different application means different meaning. Here, presumably, Wittgenstein is emphasising that the use of a word is internally connected to its meaning but a mental picture is not.
§138
The idea that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition could be connected to the Augustinian picture. If the meaning of a word is the object it refers to then we could speak of objects fitting together, or we might think that meanings fit together in some way that runs parallel to the way that objects fit together.
An objection to saying that the meaning of a word fits the sense of a sentence is that the meaning is the use of the word and we can't make sense of uses fitting together. However, Wittgenstein then raises a philosophical problem. If the meaning of a word is its use then it seems difficult to understand how we could understand the meaning of a word in an instant. What we understand - the meaning - is something grasped in an instant byt the use of the word is extended in time and so it seems that meaning cannot be use.
(And perhaps it could be said that the Augustinian picture gets around this problem. - We can grasp the meaning of a word in an instant perhaps by perceiving the corresponding object or by forming an image of it in our minds).
The idea that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition could be connected to the Augustinian picture. If the meaning of a word is the object it refers to then we could speak of objects fitting together, or we might think that meanings fit together in some way that runs parallel to the way that objects fit together.
An objection to saying that the meaning of a word fits the sense of a sentence is that the meaning is the use of the word and we can't make sense of uses fitting together. However, Wittgenstein then raises a philosophical problem. If the meaning of a word is its use then it seems difficult to understand how we could understand the meaning of a word in an instant. What we understand - the meaning - is something grasped in an instant byt the use of the word is extended in time and so it seems that meaning cannot be use.
(And perhaps it could be said that the Augustinian picture gets around this problem. - We can grasp the meaning of a word in an instant perhaps by perceiving the corresponding object or by forming an image of it in our minds).
§137
'True' and 'false' might be said to fit the concept of a proposition in the sense that 'l' fits 'k' when we remind ourselves of the order of the alphabet. 'True' and 'false' don't fit the concept 'proposition' in the way that one cogwheel fits another. We might discover that one cogwheel fits another but we don't discover that 'l' comes after 'k'.
'True' and 'false' might be said to fit the concept of a proposition in the sense that 'l' fits 'k' when we remind ourselves of the order of the alphabet. 'True' and 'false' don't fit the concept 'proposition' in the way that one cogwheel fits another. We might discover that one cogwheel fits another but we don't discover that 'l' comes after 'k'.
Saturday 9 March 2013
§136
Wittgenstein has previously used analogies with mechanisms (e.g. levers connected up to various different things in a locomotive) in highlighting features of language. But analogies with mechanisms are not always apt. It is mistaken/misleading to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions (as a cog wheel fits another cog wheel). The concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition.
Three kinds of cases
The relation between 'true' and 'proposition' (i) is not like
the relationship between 'male' and 'bachelor' (ii)
or the relationship between 'pain' and VERBAL BEHAVIOURI'm in pain (iii).
It is not a criterion (it cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition).
Why is it not like these cases?
Being male is a necessary condition for being a bachelor but it is not sufficient. - You can be male and not be a bachelor. The concepts 'male' and 'bachelor' are in some sense independent of each other. You could certainly imagine a world in which the institution of marriage did not exist but that the concept 'male' was employed in exactly the same way as in this world.
Someone saying 'I'm in pain' is a criterion for them being in pain. It is not a necessary condition and nor is it a sufficient condition. Someone could say 'I'm in pain' and not be in pain and somebody could be in pain but not say 'I'm in pain'. Nonetheless it is a (defeasible) criterion for someone being in pain.
The relationship between 'true' and 'proposition' is like neither of the above cases. It is not a defeasible criterion because it cannot be defeated. It is unlike the male/bachelor case because the concepts are not independent of each other in the same way. - You cannot imagine a world in which things are true but there are no propositions or one in which there are propositions but nothing is true (or false).
How does the concept 'proposition' differ from the concept 'sentence'? - I think that when I was told what a proposition was I was told that it was something common to different sentences (e.g. 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist Weiss') - and I'd always thought that sentences were the kind of thing that might be true or false.
Wittgenstein has previously used analogies with mechanisms (e.g. levers connected up to various different things in a locomotive) in highlighting features of language. But analogies with mechanisms are not always apt. It is mistaken/misleading to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions (as a cog wheel fits another cog wheel). The concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition.
Three kinds of cases
The relation between 'true' and 'proposition' (i) is not like
the relationship between 'male' and 'bachelor' (ii)
or the relationship between 'pain' and VERBAL BEHAVIOURI'm in pain (iii).
It is not a criterion (it cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition).
Why is it not like these cases?
Being male is a necessary condition for being a bachelor but it is not sufficient. - You can be male and not be a bachelor. The concepts 'male' and 'bachelor' are in some sense independent of each other. You could certainly imagine a world in which the institution of marriage did not exist but that the concept 'male' was employed in exactly the same way as in this world.
Someone saying 'I'm in pain' is a criterion for them being in pain. It is not a necessary condition and nor is it a sufficient condition. Someone could say 'I'm in pain' and not be in pain and somebody could be in pain but not say 'I'm in pain'. Nonetheless it is a (defeasible) criterion for someone being in pain.
The relationship between 'true' and 'proposition' is like neither of the above cases. It is not a defeasible criterion because it cannot be defeated. It is unlike the male/bachelor case because the concepts are not independent of each other in the same way. - You cannot imagine a world in which things are true but there are no propositions or one in which there are propositions but nothing is true (or false).
How does the concept 'proposition' differ from the concept 'sentence'? - I think that when I was told what a proposition was I was told that it was something common to different sentences (e.g. 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist Weiss') - and I'd always thought that sentences were the kind of thing that might be true or false.
§135
That 'proposition' is a family resemblance concept does not mean that it is not a genuine/legitimate concept. We've already seen that 'game' is a legitimate concept and also is a family resemblance concept.
We can explain the concept 'proposition' to others by providing them with a series of examples of propositions.
That 'proposition' is a family resemblance concept does not mean that it is not a genuine/legitimate concept. We've already seen that 'game' is a legitimate concept and also is a family resemblance concept.
We can explain the concept 'proposition' to others by providing them with a series of examples of propositions.
§134
Wittgenstein starts discussing a new topic in §134. Up to §133 he had been discussing philosophy but in §134 he discusses the general propositional form. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had said that, "This is how things are" is the general form of propositions.
Wittgenstein wants to reject this:
(i) "This is how things are" is itself a sentence...
(ii) Moreover, it is a sentence that is used in a distinctive way. It is used to allude to some other sentence/proposition. (Wittgenstein is here using the method of looking at how a proposition is used ordinarily and correctly). The variable p might be used to stand in for a proposition in some contexts, and in that case it is being used in a similar way to "That is how things are". But we wouldn't say that p is the general propositional form (and so we should not say that "This is how things are" is the general propositional form).
(iii) 'Proposition' is a family resemblance concept.
Thinking that all propositions agree or disagree with reality is obviously mistaken because "This is how things are" is a proposition and it does not agree or disagree with reality.
Wittgenstein starts discussing a new topic in §134. Up to §133 he had been discussing philosophy but in §134 he discusses the general propositional form. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had said that, "This is how things are" is the general form of propositions.
Wittgenstein wants to reject this:
(i) "This is how things are" is itself a sentence...
(ii) Moreover, it is a sentence that is used in a distinctive way. It is used to allude to some other sentence/proposition. (Wittgenstein is here using the method of looking at how a proposition is used ordinarily and correctly). The variable p might be used to stand in for a proposition in some contexts, and in that case it is being used in a similar way to "That is how things are". But we wouldn't say that p is the general propositional form (and so we should not say that "This is how things are" is the general propositional form).
(iii) 'Proposition' is a family resemblance concept.
Thinking that all propositions agree or disagree with reality is obviously mistaken because "This is how things are" is a proposition and it does not agree or disagree with reality.
§133
Clarity is not achieved by refining or completing the system of rules in language. Wittgenstein has already argued that we can get by perfectly well using words that aren't bound everywhere by rules (just as tennis works perfectly well even though there aren't rules governing every aspect) - and the rules can be said to be complete when they achieve the purpose we have for them (they don't need to be continually supplemented by other rules unless the need arises - unless somebody is unclear about the correct use(s) of an expression).
Philosophy has previously misconceived its tasks - seeking essences/de re necessities, or trying to provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. As long as philosophy is misconceived it can always be brought into question. Wittgenstein has now provided us with methods which allow us to dissolve philosophical problems (conceptual confusions) as they arise.
One way in which philosophy has been misconceived is in thinking of philosophical problems as woven into a complete system or theory - and so undermining one aspect of a system/theory would put the rest into doubt. Wittgenstein now thinks of philosophical problems as more isolated (although presumably some conceptual confusions are intimately related to others) - they can be dissolved in a piecemeal manner.
Clarity is not achieved by refining or completing the system of rules in language. Wittgenstein has already argued that we can get by perfectly well using words that aren't bound everywhere by rules (just as tennis works perfectly well even though there aren't rules governing every aspect) - and the rules can be said to be complete when they achieve the purpose we have for them (they don't need to be continually supplemented by other rules unless the need arises - unless somebody is unclear about the correct use(s) of an expression).
Philosophy has previously misconceived its tasks - seeking essences/de re necessities, or trying to provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. As long as philosophy is misconceived it can always be brought into question. Wittgenstein has now provided us with methods which allow us to dissolve philosophical problems (conceptual confusions) as they arise.
One way in which philosophy has been misconceived is in thinking of philosophical problems as woven into a complete system or theory - and so undermining one aspect of a system/theory would put the rest into doubt. Wittgenstein now thinks of philosophical problems as more isolated (although presumably some conceptual confusions are intimately related to others) - they can be dissolved in a piecemeal manner.
§132
The point of these language games and of other cases of 'assembling reminders' is to resolve/dissolve particular philosophical confusions. In constructing them we are not beginning the construction of a single, ideal language.
The confusions arise when language is idling - What is meant by this?
Wittgenstein previously compared words to levers/handles (§12). The surface similarity between words might deceive. Words have different uses - just as handles do. Problems arise in a locomotive if a handle is not hooked up to the mechanism it is supposed to be hooked up to (if it cannot be used in the way it is supposed to be used). Similarly, philosophical problems (confusions) arise when words are not used as they are supposed to be used (when language is idling) - or, perhaps more accurately, when they are not used at all (because what is said is nonsensical).
The point of these language games and of other cases of 'assembling reminders' is to resolve/dissolve particular philosophical confusions. In constructing them we are not beginning the construction of a single, ideal language.
The confusions arise when language is idling - What is meant by this?
Wittgenstein previously compared words to levers/handles (§12). The surface similarity between words might deceive. Words have different uses - just as handles do. Problems arise in a locomotive if a handle is not hooked up to the mechanism it is supposed to be hooked up to (if it cannot be used in the way it is supposed to be used). Similarly, philosophical problems (confusions) arise when words are not used as they are supposed to be used (when language is idling) - or, perhaps more accurately, when they are not used at all (because what is said is nonsensical).
§130-131
Simple language games (such as the one in §2) are objects of comparison (we compare them to our own, more complicated language) - not approximations of an ideal language (as we might think, given that they help us in getting clear about the correct uses of expressions and how they differ).
They illuminate not by being clear reflections of reality but by being models which highlight certain features of our language which we have failed to recognise (because they are so familiar, perhaps).
Simple language games (such as the one in §2) are objects of comparison (we compare them to our own, more complicated language) - not approximations of an ideal language (as we might think, given that they help us in getting clear about the correct uses of expressions and how they differ).
They illuminate not by being clear reflections of reality but by being models which highlight certain features of our language which we have failed to recognise (because they are so familiar, perhaps).
§129
The important things that are 'hidden' in §129 cannot be the hidden things that are, 'of no interest to us' from §126. What is hidden in §129 is a bit like someone failing to see their glasses because they are wearing them. - We do not notice our ordinary, familiar uses of language (sometimes) because they are right in front of us - the correct uses of various words are open to view.
The important things that are 'hidden' in §129 cannot be the hidden things that are, 'of no interest to us' from §126. What is hidden in §129 is a bit like someone failing to see their glasses because they are wearing them. - We do not notice our ordinary, familiar uses of language (sometimes) because they are right in front of us - the correct uses of various words are open to view.
§128
Theses:
(1) According to the Oxford dictionary on my kindle a thesis is, "a statement or theory that is put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved".
(2) According to PMS Hacker, the word 'thesis' might be used to refer to, "...debatable claims about the nature of things such as are advanced in the Tractatus" or it might be used to refer to,
(3) ...grammmatical propositions.
Why are there no debatable theses in philosophy?
(1) - If a thesis is a statement put forward to be proved (empirically) then philosophy (as Wittgenstein conceives it) does not contain theses at all, let alone debatable ones. According to Wittgenstein philosophy is not an empirical discipline - it doesn't set out to make discoveries about the world or to perform experiments but to dissolve conceptual confusions.
(2) - If a thesis is something like the claims of the Tractatus (e.g. reality consists of facts not things), which are supposed to be pronouncements about essences, then there cannot be any theses because there are no objective, language-independent essences.
(3) - If a thesis is a grammatical statement (e.g. something cannot be red and green all over) then it is quite unlike a (debatable) empirical claim. Empirical claims might be true or false. Their denials make sense. But the denial of a grammatical 'claim' is nonsense. The response to nonsense is to 'assemble reminders' - not to assemble evidence. - So grammatical claims are not debatable as empirical claims are.
So - if 'thesis' means one of the above ((1), (2), (3)) then there are no debatable thesis in philosophy.
Theses:
(1) According to the Oxford dictionary on my kindle a thesis is, "a statement or theory that is put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved".
(2) According to PMS Hacker, the word 'thesis' might be used to refer to, "...debatable claims about the nature of things such as are advanced in the Tractatus" or it might be used to refer to,
(3) ...grammmatical propositions.
Why are there no debatable theses in philosophy?
(1) - If a thesis is a statement put forward to be proved (empirically) then philosophy (as Wittgenstein conceives it) does not contain theses at all, let alone debatable ones. According to Wittgenstein philosophy is not an empirical discipline - it doesn't set out to make discoveries about the world or to perform experiments but to dissolve conceptual confusions.
(2) - If a thesis is something like the claims of the Tractatus (e.g. reality consists of facts not things), which are supposed to be pronouncements about essences, then there cannot be any theses because there are no objective, language-independent essences.
(3) - If a thesis is a grammatical statement (e.g. something cannot be red and green all over) then it is quite unlike a (debatable) empirical claim. Empirical claims might be true or false. Their denials make sense. But the denial of a grammatical 'claim' is nonsense. The response to nonsense is to 'assemble reminders' - not to assemble evidence. - So grammatical claims are not debatable as empirical claims are.
So - if 'thesis' means one of the above ((1), (2), (3)) then there are no debatable thesis in philosophy.
Friday 8 March 2013
§126
Philosophy is concerned with what lies open to view (the correct uses of words and numbers). - This is what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. Is the point here that we must make sense before we can settle what is true? Or is it that more technical enquiries presuppose ordinary, everyday language? (or both)
Philosophy is concerned with what lies open to view (the correct uses of words and numbers). - This is what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. Is the point here that we must make sense before we can settle what is true? Or is it that more technical enquiries presuppose ordinary, everyday language? (or both)
§125
Resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery is not among the tasks of philosophers (is the suggestion here that there is something problematic with the whole idea of resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery? - Is that anyone's task?)
Again - the philosopher's task is to make the conceptual terrain surveyable.
Our problems (in mathematics) result from becoming entangled in rules we have laid down. So what we need to do is to clearly survey the rules and what we find when we follow them.
The philosophical problem is "the civic status of a contradiction". The problem is we misconceive contradictions. (Why 'civic status' here? - Is the point just that most/many people misconceive contradictions).
Resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery is not among the tasks of philosophers (is the suggestion here that there is something problematic with the whole idea of resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery? - Is that anyone's task?)
Again - the philosopher's task is to make the conceptual terrain surveyable.
Our problems (in mathematics) result from becoming entangled in rules we have laid down. So what we need to do is to clearly survey the rules and what we find when we follow them.
The philosophical problem is "the civic status of a contradiction". The problem is we misconceive contradictions. (Why 'civic status' here? - Is the point just that most/many people misconceive contradictions).
§124
The point of philosophy is not to alter language to bring it closer to some ideal. Philosophers are not to 'interfere with the actual use of language'. The philosopher's task is to describe the actual use of language so as to achieve clarity - to achieve a clear view of the conceptual terrain (and so to dissolve philosophical problems).
The point of philosophy is not to alter language to bring it closer to some ideal. Philosophers are not to 'interfere with the actual use of language'. The philosopher's task is to describe the actual use of language so as to achieve clarity - to achieve a clear view of the conceptual terrain (and so to dissolve philosophical problems).
§122
In §119 Wittgenstein had talked about bumping our heads up against the limits of language. We might think of the relationship between concepts as being like the relationship between places on a map (does this mean that traditional philosophers have been producing 'faulty maps' or 'maps of fictional places'?). The problems that have arisen in traditional philosophy have arisen partly as a result of not having an overview of the conceptual terrain (like being in a maze, perhaps, without being able to see the dead-ends). We need to produce 'surveyable representations' - we need to look at a range of ordinary and correct uses of the relevant terms.
One way to bring about perspicuity is to construct 'language games' of the sort Wittgenstein constructed in §2 - this is the invention of an 'intermediate link' - a stepping stone to achieving a clear view of the use of concepts.
Note: Gordon Baker makes a lot of this passage http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wittgensteins-Method-Neglected-G-Baker/dp/1405117575/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1362741371&sr=8-7
In §119 Wittgenstein had talked about bumping our heads up against the limits of language. We might think of the relationship between concepts as being like the relationship between places on a map (does this mean that traditional philosophers have been producing 'faulty maps' or 'maps of fictional places'?). The problems that have arisen in traditional philosophy have arisen partly as a result of not having an overview of the conceptual terrain (like being in a maze, perhaps, without being able to see the dead-ends). We need to produce 'surveyable representations' - we need to look at a range of ordinary and correct uses of the relevant terms.
One way to bring about perspicuity is to construct 'language games' of the sort Wittgenstein constructed in §2 - this is the invention of an 'intermediate link' - a stepping stone to achieving a clear view of the use of concepts.
Note: Gordon Baker makes a lot of this passage http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wittgensteins-Method-Neglected-G-Baker/dp/1405117575/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1362741371&sr=8-7
§121
There is no metaphilosophy. We shouldn't think that there is just because one of the words that philosophers might look at the use of is 'philosophy' (and there have been confusions around the correct use of this term similar to confusions surrounding other terms - thinking that there is some essential feature of philosophy).
There is no second-order/meta-orthography - even though 'orthography' is a word that might be looked at in orthography (the study of the conventional spelling system).
Note: I notice Paul Horwich has a new book - Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy - but I haven't read it. Has he acknowledged this passage?
There is no metaphilosophy. We shouldn't think that there is just because one of the words that philosophers might look at the use of is 'philosophy' (and there have been confusions around the correct use of this term similar to confusions surrounding other terms - thinking that there is some essential feature of philosophy).
There is no second-order/meta-orthography - even though 'orthography' is a word that might be looked at in orthography (the study of the conventional spelling system).
Note: I notice Paul Horwich has a new book - Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy - but I haven't read it. Has he acknowledged this passage?
§120
Wittgenstein points to another misconception concerning meaning. People think of the meaning of a word as being something like the word - the same kind of thing as the word, but nonetheless different. -Similar to the relationship between the money and the cow one can buy with it (you could say money and cow are the same kind of thing - commodities - you can buy a certain number of cows for a certain amount of money) but the relationship is more like the relationship between money and what can be done with it (parallel to the word and the use of it).
Wittgenstein also makes the point that philosophy in the 'old style' - the philosophy of traditional philosophers and of referentialists like Russell, Frege and the younger Wittgenstein - cannot be done without using ordinary language. I suppose the point here is to oppose the idea that we should construct ideal languages - it's unavoidable that we will use ordinary language.
Wittgenstein points to another misconception concerning meaning. People think of the meaning of a word as being something like the word - the same kind of thing as the word, but nonetheless different. -Similar to the relationship between the money and the cow one can buy with it (you could say money and cow are the same kind of thing - commodities - you can buy a certain number of cows for a certain amount of money) but the relationship is more like the relationship between money and what can be done with it (parallel to the word and the use of it).
Wittgenstein also makes the point that philosophy in the 'old style' - the philosophy of traditional philosophers and of referentialists like Russell, Frege and the younger Wittgenstein - cannot be done without using ordinary language. I suppose the point here is to oppose the idea that we should construct ideal languages - it's unavoidable that we will use ordinary language.
§119
The results of philosophy - as he conceives it - is the discovery (recognition?) that philosophers of the past have been saying things that are nonsensical. In 'reclaiming' a word from its metaphysical use we might 'bump our heads' against the limits of language. Recognising the limits as the limits - recognising nonsense as nonsense - allows us to get a clear view of the conceptual terrain and dissolves old philosophical problems. This is valuable.
The results of philosophy - as he conceives it - is the discovery (recognition?) that philosophers of the past have been saying things that are nonsensical. In 'reclaiming' a word from its metaphysical use we might 'bump our heads' against the limits of language. Recognising the limits as the limits - recognising nonsense as nonsense - allows us to get a clear view of the conceptual terrain and dissolves old philosophical problems. This is valuable.
§118
The kinds of things that Wittgenstein has been saying - about bringing, "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" - raises a worry. Philosophy had seemed to be dealing with profound and far-reaching issues but the new method seems to only promise the destruction of all of those (apparently?) profound musings.
A couple of responses:
(i) What is being destroyed is confused anyway (houses of cards) and...
(ii) It clears up the 'ground of language'. - It allows us to proceed with genuinely valuable pursuits from a basis of language that makes sense - from a position of clarity.
The kinds of things that Wittgenstein has been saying - about bringing, "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" - raises a worry. Philosophy had seemed to be dealing with profound and far-reaching issues but the new method seems to only promise the destruction of all of those (apparently?) profound musings.
A couple of responses:
(i) What is being destroyed is confused anyway (houses of cards) and...
(ii) It clears up the 'ground of language'. - It allows us to proceed with genuinely valuable pursuits from a basis of language that makes sense - from a position of clarity.
Sunday 3 March 2013
§116
Wittgenstein lists some of the concepts that philosophers have concerned themselves with - thinking that they are grasping the essence of the thing in question. Concepts like 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', and 'name' are ones that philosophers have concerned themselves with. Philosophers have tried to pinpoint the essential features of knowledge, being etc. But an examination of the ways in which these words are actually used would reveal that they have a variety of uses.
Wittgenstein's new method (or methods) is to focus on the everyday use of words and so to remove the illusion that there is some essential feature of each of the items on the list.
Wittgenstein lists some of the concepts that philosophers have concerned themselves with - thinking that they are grasping the essence of the thing in question. Concepts like 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', and 'name' are ones that philosophers have concerned themselves with. Philosophers have tried to pinpoint the essential features of knowledge, being etc. But an examination of the ways in which these words are actually used would reveal that they have a variety of uses.
Wittgenstein's new method (or methods) is to focus on the everyday use of words and so to remove the illusion that there is some essential feature of each of the items on the list.
§§113-115
The philosopher, in the grip of a picture, may well repeat their confused philosophical 'claims' to themselves - perhaps because they feel the conflict between the picture they're held captive by and what they see when they examine the ordinary use of language. What the philosopher is in fact doing here (in repeating the phrase) is reaffirming a conceptual connection they take to hold and projecting it onto reality (perhaps giving the impression that there is an a priori order to the world).
In this case (§114) the philosopher is 'bewitched by language'.
The philosopher, in the grip of a picture, may well repeat their confused philosophical 'claims' to themselves - perhaps because they feel the conflict between the picture they're held captive by and what they see when they examine the ordinary use of language. What the philosopher is in fact doing here (in repeating the phrase) is reaffirming a conceptual connection they take to hold and projecting it onto reality (perhaps giving the impression that there is an a priori order to the world).
In this case (§114) the philosopher is 'bewitched by language'.
§112
Philosophical problems can be the upshot of misconceiving a simile absorbed into language. One the one hand we think that our philosophical conclusions are absurd or incredible (or at least that they don't accord with our ordinary use of language) and yet on the other hand (gripped by the model/picture we've adopted) we think 'this is how things must be'. We project necessary/conceptual connections onto the world - and conceptual connections that do not in fact hold.
Philosophical problems can be the upshot of misconceiving a simile absorbed into language. One the one hand we think that our philosophical conclusions are absurd or incredible (or at least that they don't accord with our ordinary use of language) and yet on the other hand (gripped by the model/picture we've adopted) we think 'this is how things must be'. We project necessary/conceptual connections onto the world - and conceptual connections that do not in fact hold.
§111
Philosophical problems (both as they were conceived in the past and as Wittgenstein conceives them now) seem deep. But we need to reconceive the character of the depth given that past philosophers succumbed to conceptual confusions and what we need to do is to assemble reminders of the correct ordinary uses of problematic terms.
Philosophical problems (both as they were conceived in the past and as Wittgenstein conceives them now) seem deep. But we need to reconceive the character of the depth given that past philosophers succumbed to conceptual confusions and what we need to do is to assemble reminders of the correct ordinary uses of problematic terms.
§110
Wittgenstein claims that it is a 'superstition' to think that, "language (or thinking) is something unique". Is the point here just that 'language' does not have an essential feature and similarly for thinking. And why is it a superstition rather than a mistake? - Is that to do with the fact that conceptual confusion is involved - and so thinking that language or thinking is something unique is to be caught up in an illusion rather than to be mistaken about something? Couldn't you say that someone has made a mistake about the correct use of an expression?
Wittgenstein claims that it is a 'superstition' to think that, "language (or thinking) is something unique". Is the point here just that 'language' does not have an essential feature and similarly for thinking. And why is it a superstition rather than a mistake? - Is that to do with the fact that conceptual confusion is involved - and so thinking that language or thinking is something unique is to be caught up in an illusion rather than to be mistaken about something? Couldn't you say that someone has made a mistake about the correct use of an expression?
§109
Philosophy is not scientific and nor is it in any way theoretical. Philosophers do not advance hypotheses as scientists do.
Wittgenstein says that, "[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." What is it that is described? - The correct use of expressions that have confused philosophers - 'knowledge', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'justice', 'causation', 'necessity', and so on. - And the contexts in which these expressions are used. Couldn't this be deemed a kind of explanation? - Doing so might explain why it was that philosophers have been vexed. - 'Perspicuous representations' could be construed as explanations of meaning, with the upshot being that understanding is achieved. - But these are not like scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
Philosophical problems are to be solved by 'assembling reminders' of the correct use of expressions and this should dispel illusions created by the 'bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language'.
Is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy the only heir of what used to be called philosophy? As Hacker says, clearly not. What used to be called 'philosophy' included the natural sciences, empirical psychology and mathematical logic (p.275 of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1, Analytical Commentary).
In addition to this I would have thought it's fair to say that there are other activities that could be called philosophy that don't just involve Wittgensteinian 'description'. - There are conceptual queries in ethics and politics - and it would be a good idea to be clear about the correct use of the relevant concepts before dealing with ethical and political questions. In ethics and politics, as in other areas, there is the potential for conceptual confusion. But it isn't as though all of the questionsn in ethics and politics are dissolved or resolved once the conceptual problems are out of the way. There are substantial questions to answer in these areas and people answering those questions would not be doing philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it, in opposition to his own earlier view. Yet these people are often called philosophers. - Questions like 'what is the best way to organise society?' and 'is it ever right to engage in warfare to preempt a potential future problem?' are substantial questions.
Philosophy is not scientific and nor is it in any way theoretical. Philosophers do not advance hypotheses as scientists do.
Wittgenstein says that, "[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." What is it that is described? - The correct use of expressions that have confused philosophers - 'knowledge', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'justice', 'causation', 'necessity', and so on. - And the contexts in which these expressions are used. Couldn't this be deemed a kind of explanation? - Doing so might explain why it was that philosophers have been vexed. - 'Perspicuous representations' could be construed as explanations of meaning, with the upshot being that understanding is achieved. - But these are not like scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
Philosophical problems are to be solved by 'assembling reminders' of the correct use of expressions and this should dispel illusions created by the 'bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language'.
Is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy the only heir of what used to be called philosophy? As Hacker says, clearly not. What used to be called 'philosophy' included the natural sciences, empirical psychology and mathematical logic (p.275 of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1, Analytical Commentary).
In addition to this I would have thought it's fair to say that there are other activities that could be called philosophy that don't just involve Wittgensteinian 'description'. - There are conceptual queries in ethics and politics - and it would be a good idea to be clear about the correct use of the relevant concepts before dealing with ethical and political questions. In ethics and politics, as in other areas, there is the potential for conceptual confusion. But it isn't as though all of the questionsn in ethics and politics are dissolved or resolved once the conceptual problems are out of the way. There are substantial questions to answer in these areas and people answering those questions would not be doing philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it, in opposition to his own earlier view. Yet these people are often called philosophers. - Questions like 'what is the best way to organise society?' and 'is it ever right to engage in warfare to preempt a potential future problem?' are substantial questions.
Saturday 2 March 2013
§108
When we do look closely at ordinary language use and at the way in which the concepts 'proposition' and 'language' are employed we see that there is a 'family' of different things. When we see this logic seems to lose its rigour (since logic deals in looking at inferential relations between propositions) and so logic seems to dissolve away. But how can logic lose its rigour?
What we have to do instead of thinking of the discovery of crystalline purity as our end we must turn the investigation around 'on the pivot of our real need' (clarity about the employment of the relevant concepts).
Wittgenstein again uses the analogy of chess. A word is like a piece in chess in that both can be conceived as spatial/temporal phenomena. But words are also rule-governed and employed in a variety of games - just as chess pieces are employed in a rule-governed game.
When we do look closely at ordinary language use and at the way in which the concepts 'proposition' and 'language' are employed we see that there is a 'family' of different things. When we see this logic seems to lose its rigour (since logic deals in looking at inferential relations between propositions) and so logic seems to dissolve away. But how can logic lose its rigour?
What we have to do instead of thinking of the discovery of crystalline purity as our end we must turn the investigation around 'on the pivot of our real need' (clarity about the employment of the relevant concepts).
§107
If we do actually examine our ordinary and correct ways of speaking we find that it is nothing like the ideal of our requirement. The requirement comes to seem vacuous. There is no friction (no grip on the way that language really is) but to get a grip we must get back to looking closely at the way that ordinary language is used (take off the glasses).
If we do actually examine our ordinary and correct ways of speaking we find that it is nothing like the ideal of our requirement. The requirement comes to seem vacuous. There is no friction (no grip on the way that language really is) but to get a grip we must get back to looking closely at the way that ordinary language is used (take off the glasses).
§105
When we look at language as it is ordinarily used we find vagueness, words that seem to resist definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and a great variety of different kinds of sentences. If we think that there must be some kind of crystal clear logic underlying language then we are forced to look for it somewhere hidden beneath the (vague, heterogeneous) surface. Or perhaps we turn to thought rather than language.
What we in fact need to do is to recognise that we have made the ideal a requirement rather than thinking of it as something we might discover hidden somewhere.
When we look at language as it is ordinarily used we find vagueness, words that seem to resist definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and a great variety of different kinds of sentences. If we think that there must be some kind of crystal clear logic underlying language then we are forced to look for it somewhere hidden beneath the (vague, heterogeneous) surface. Or perhaps we turn to thought rather than language.
What we in fact need to do is to recognise that we have made the ideal a requirement rather than thinking of it as something we might discover hidden somewhere.
Friday 1 March 2013
§104
"One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation". Is Wittgenstein thinking of something like de re necessity here? - Or logical form/structure? - I assume he's identifying a problem with the Tractarian picture. - That properties thought to belong to things in the world actually belong to the mode of representation (samples in ostensive definitions, necessary relations)
"One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation". Is Wittgenstein thinking of something like de re necessity here? - Or logical form/structure? - I assume he's identifying a problem with the Tractarian picture. - That properties thought to belong to things in the world actually belong to the mode of representation (samples in ostensive definitions, necessary relations)
Wednesday 27 February 2013
§99
Wittgenstein presents a rationale for his earlier view.
A sentence must have a determinate sense because an indeterminate sense would not be a sense at all.
This is like saying that a boundary that is not sharply defined is not really a boundary. - But Wittgenstein objects to this - a boundary that is not sharp is not much the same as no boundary at all.
Wittgenstein presents a rationale for his earlier view.
A sentence must have a determinate sense because an indeterminate sense would not be a sense at all.
This is like saying that a boundary that is not sharply defined is not really a boundary. - But Wittgenstein objects to this - a boundary that is not sharp is not much the same as no boundary at all.
§98
Wittgenstein has already suggested that we cannot find the essence of language. This is not because it is too difficult but because there is no essence of language. 'Language' and 'proposition' are family resemblance concepts.
Wittgenstein presents his views from the Tractatus. - There must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence (determinate indeterminacy).
Wittgenstein has already suggested that we cannot find the essence of language. This is not because it is too difficult but because there is no essence of language. 'Language' and 'proposition' are family resemblance concepts.
Wittgenstein presents his views from the Tractatus. - There must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence (determinate indeterminacy).
§97
"Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus." (Does he mean that thinking is cloudy (unclear/vague) or that in thinking about thinking we have to get past cloudiness/vagueness - to get to the order of logic?)
The world does not contain vague objects and logic, as mirror of the world, must then be utterly crystal clear and certain (this kind of reasoning appealed to Wittgenstein when he was caught up in the Tractarian picture/model). - In this passage Wittgenstein is not stating his mature view, he is looking at his own earlier way of thinking.
"Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus." (Does he mean that thinking is cloudy (unclear/vague) or that in thinking about thinking we have to get past cloudiness/vagueness - to get to the order of logic?)
The world does not contain vague objects and logic, as mirror of the world, must then be utterly crystal clear and certain (this kind of reasoning appealed to Wittgenstein when he was caught up in the Tractarian picture/model). - In this passage Wittgenstein is not stating his mature view, he is looking at his own earlier way of thinking.
§95
The misunderstanding referred to in §93 arises from thinking that it is remarkable that one can think what is not the case. (Could the 'problem' be put like this? - How can you refer to something that is not the case? (is it even something?)
Wittgenstein attempted (in the Tractatus) to guarantee no failure of reference by suggesting that the world was made up of simple objects which are indestuctible and which were the constituents of states of affairs (possible concatenations of objects) - which names referred to. - So even states of affairs which didn't exist could be referred to by statements made up of names - all of which had referents.
The misunderstanding referred to in §93 arises from thinking that it is remarkable that one can think what is not the case. (Could the 'problem' be put like this? - How can you refer to something that is not the case? (is it even something?)
Wittgenstein attempted (in the Tractatus) to guarantee no failure of reference by suggesting that the world was made up of simple objects which are indestuctible and which were the constituents of states of affairs (possible concatenations of objects) - which names referred to. - So even states of affairs which didn't exist could be referred to by statements made up of names - all of which had referents.
§93
The people who say that a proposition is something remarkable have not looked and seen how propositions work.
Why think a proposition is remarkable?
- Because it is important (correct, says Wittgenstein).
- It may be because someone had misunderstood the logic of language. Wittgenstein doesn't make clear here what the misunderstanding is. I imagine he has his own earlier ideas in mind (from the Tractatus).
The people who say that a proposition is something remarkable have not looked and seen how propositions work.
Why think a proposition is remarkable?
- Because it is important (correct, says Wittgenstein).
- It may be because someone had misunderstood the logic of language. Wittgenstein doesn't make clear here what the misunderstanding is. I imagine he has his own earlier ideas in mind (from the Tractatus).
§92
There is a problem with thinking that the essence of language is hidden from us.
Wittgenstein says, "We ask: 'what is language?' 'what is a proposition?' And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all and independently of any future experience."
The suggestion is that this approach is mistaken. - Language games are like games in that there are (family) resemblances between them 'overlapping and criss-crossing' - and new language games come into existence and some may become redundant.
There is a problem with thinking that the essence of language is hidden from us.
Wittgenstein says, "We ask: 'what is language?' 'what is a proposition?' And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all and independently of any future experience."
The suggestion is that this approach is mistaken. - Language games are like games in that there are (family) resemblances between them 'overlapping and criss-crossing' - and new language games come into existence and some may become redundant.
§91
(Following on from §90) - Wittgenstein doesn't think there is any kind of final analysis of our language or that we are aiming/should aim at complete exactness.
Wittgenstein has already made it clear with the broom/broomstick-brush case that he thinks there are problems with the idea of a final analysis, and he has discussed exactness in the course of discussing games.
(Following on from §90) - Wittgenstein doesn't think there is any kind of final analysis of our language or that we are aiming/should aim at complete exactness.
Wittgenstein has already made it clear with the broom/broomstick-brush case that he thinks there are problems with the idea of a final analysis, and he has discussed exactness in the course of discussing games.
§90
Our investigation (the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy/the investigation into the concept of time) is not directed at phenomena (the things we experience in the world) - it isn't empirical. What we do is call to mind "the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena".
The query about time and other philosophical problems are grammatical (Wittgenstein is using the term 'grammar/grammatical' is a slightly idiosyncratic way here). We clear away/dissolve problems by exposing misleading analogies (is the misleading analogy in this case thinking of time as analogous to space? - We talk about something taking a certain length of time, etc.) - or by substituting one form of expression for another. Is Wittgensteinian philosophy 'conceptual analysis'? - Not really, although sometimes the procedure of substituting one form of expression for another resembles taking a thing apart (Wittgenstein clearly rejects the kind of analysis engaged in by the likes of Russell).
Our investigation (the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy/the investigation into the concept of time) is not directed at phenomena (the things we experience in the world) - it isn't empirical. What we do is call to mind "the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena".
The query about time and other philosophical problems are grammatical (Wittgenstein is using the term 'grammar/grammatical' is a slightly idiosyncratic way here). We clear away/dissolve problems by exposing misleading analogies (is the misleading analogy in this case thinking of time as analogous to space? - We talk about something taking a certain length of time, etc.) - or by substituting one form of expression for another. Is Wittgensteinian philosophy 'conceptual analysis'? - Not really, although sometimes the procedure of substituting one form of expression for another resembles taking a thing apart (Wittgenstein clearly rejects the kind of analysis engaged in by the likes of Russell).
§89
So (following from §88) to think that logical formulations might make language perfectly exact is peculiar. What goal do you have in mind? Our language as we use it may well be fit for purpose even if we can imagine someone not understanding us or a situation in which what we say is not sufficiently exact.
Wittgenstein here gives a quote from Augustine, "what, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled." Wittgenstein suggests that what one has to do if one is baffled in this way is to call it to mind. He suggests that the confusion here is conceptual - not empirical (it's a confusion about the use of the word 'time' or of temporal concepts more generally).
This 'philosophical' question about time can be answered by considering something that is in plain view (the correct use of the word 'time' and of related temporal concepts).
Is it worth thinking about this in relation to the earlier remark about knowing and saying (§78)? Being able to explain time is not like being able to say how high Mont Blanc is.
Is the problem thinking that 'time' refers to some object (or that it refers to a concatenation of objects upon analysis)? I assume that Wittgenstein thinks that 'what is time?' is an ill-formed question.
So (following from §88) to think that logical formulations might make language perfectly exact is peculiar. What goal do you have in mind? Our language as we use it may well be fit for purpose even if we can imagine someone not understanding us or a situation in which what we say is not sufficiently exact.
Wittgenstein here gives a quote from Augustine, "what, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled." Wittgenstein suggests that what one has to do if one is baffled in this way is to call it to mind. He suggests that the confusion here is conceptual - not empirical (it's a confusion about the use of the word 'time' or of temporal concepts more generally).
This 'philosophical' question about time can be answered by considering something that is in plain view (the correct use of the word 'time' and of related temporal concepts).
Is it worth thinking about this in relation to the earlier remark about knowing and saying (§78)? Being able to explain time is not like being able to say how high Mont Blanc is.
Is the problem thinking that 'time' refers to some object (or that it refers to a concatenation of objects upon analysis)? I assume that Wittgenstein thinks that 'what is time?' is an ill-formed question.
§87
Words like 'red', 'dark', and 'sweet' are not 'indefinables' (the 'simple ideas' of the classical empiricists).
Re: Moses: In §79 Wittgenstein suggested that "Moses did not exist" may mean various things (depending on which definite descriptions we 'lean upon'). But in §87 Wittgenstein suggests that I might specify what I mean (to remove doubts about what I mean) - I could say, "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever else he might have done". But, having removed this doubt, further explanations might be needed (about what 'Egypt' means, about who the Israelites are, and so on). Does this mean explanations are to go on forever to remove all doubts? - No. Explanations could be used to remove misunderstandings but we need not go on giving explanations unless we require one to avoid misunderstanding. - We don't need explanations to remove every misunderstanding imaginable.
Explanation of meaning = rule for the use (a use) of a word.
Wittgenstein is not a sceptic. Something like a signpost or a rule is perfectly in order ('complete') as long as it fulfils its purpose.
Words like 'red', 'dark', and 'sweet' are not 'indefinables' (the 'simple ideas' of the classical empiricists).
Re: Moses: In §79 Wittgenstein suggested that "Moses did not exist" may mean various things (depending on which definite descriptions we 'lean upon'). But in §87 Wittgenstein suggests that I might specify what I mean (to remove doubts about what I mean) - I could say, "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever else he might have done". But, having removed this doubt, further explanations might be needed (about what 'Egypt' means, about who the Israelites are, and so on). Does this mean explanations are to go on forever to remove all doubts? - No. Explanations could be used to remove misunderstandings but we need not go on giving explanations unless we require one to avoid misunderstanding. - We don't need explanations to remove every misunderstanding imaginable.
Explanation of meaning = rule for the use (a use) of a word.
Wittgenstein is not a sceptic. Something like a signpost or a rule is perfectly in order ('complete') as long as it fulfils its purpose.
§86
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the language game of §2 (the block/slab language) but with a chart. A gives B written signs ('block', 'slab') and B looks up the signs in a chart and finds a corresponding picture of a shape of a building stone.
B learns to look up the picture in the chart through training - by passing his finger from left to right (from sign to picture).
You could draw in arrows (to explain how you are to pass from sign to picture). But the chart was not incomplete without this schema of arrows.
Wittgenstein has been making several points in these passages - (i) rules can be misinterpreted (ii) we can introduce new rules/new explanations to 'reinforce' the existing rules but these, in turn, can be misinterpreted (iii) however, what can be misinterpreted can also be interpreted correctly (iv) - so there need be no infinite regress of rules to achieve perfect clarity (v) we introduce rules/explanations as we need them/to suit our purposes - if they have served their purpose then there need not be 'back-up' (vi) language does not need to be everywhere bounded by rules (vii) we need not follow definite rules in every utterance that we make (viii) it is possible that what we say might be vague (and not analysable then into a disjunction of elements with determinate meaning).
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the language game of §2 (the block/slab language) but with a chart. A gives B written signs ('block', 'slab') and B looks up the signs in a chart and finds a corresponding picture of a shape of a building stone.
B learns to look up the picture in the chart through training - by passing his finger from left to right (from sign to picture).
You could draw in arrows (to explain how you are to pass from sign to picture). But the chart was not incomplete without this schema of arrows.
Wittgenstein has been making several points in these passages - (i) rules can be misinterpreted (ii) we can introduce new rules/new explanations to 'reinforce' the existing rules but these, in turn, can be misinterpreted (iii) however, what can be misinterpreted can also be interpreted correctly (iv) - so there need be no infinite regress of rules to achieve perfect clarity (v) we introduce rules/explanations as we need them/to suit our purposes - if they have served their purpose then there need not be 'back-up' (vi) language does not need to be everywhere bounded by rules (vii) we need not follow definite rules in every utterance that we make (viii) it is possible that what we say might be vague (and not analysable then into a disjunction of elements with determinate meaning).
§85
A signpost doesn't signpost how it is to be taken. So you might say that they leave room for doubt - the can be misinterpreted.
"So I can say that the signpost does after all leave room for doubt. Or rather it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."
"The signpost leaves room for doubt" is a 'philosophical proposition' then. I assume this means that it is a grammatical proposition - it points to an internal/conceptual relation. - If something counts as a signpost then it is the kind of thing taht might be misinterpreted (we might have doubts about how to follow it).
BUT "it [the signpost] sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not" is empirical. - As a matter of fact people sometimes have doubts about how a sign is to be taken and sometimes they are quite certain that it is to be taken in a particular way.
(Here, when Wittgenstein is talking about signposts, he also, I imagine, has rules in mind - that a rule is like a signpost).
A signpost doesn't signpost how it is to be taken. So you might say that they leave room for doubt - the can be misinterpreted.
"So I can say that the signpost does after all leave room for doubt. Or rather it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."
"The signpost leaves room for doubt" is a 'philosophical proposition' then. I assume this means that it is a grammatical proposition - it points to an internal/conceptual relation. - If something counts as a signpost then it is the kind of thing taht might be misinterpreted (we might have doubts about how to follow it).
BUT "it [the signpost] sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not" is empirical. - As a matter of fact people sometimes have doubts about how a sign is to be taken and sometimes they are quite certain that it is to be taken in a particular way.
(Here, when Wittgenstein is talking about signposts, he also, I imagine, has rules in mind - that a rule is like a signpost).
§84
What would a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? - We could imagine tightening up the rules of tennis. We could specify that the ball must not be thrown more than four metres into the air when serving. But that would leave various other aspects unbounded by rules. How many times is someone allowed to bounce the ball on the ground before they serve?
Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the possibility that this might lead to an infinite regress. We could have a rule to regulate the application of a rule which removes some doubt but would this then stand in need of a further rule to regulate its application?
But it need not be that we are in doubt because we could imagine a doubt. (-Interesting epistemological point here which could serve as a reminder in other areas - relevant to Descartes' method of doubt).
What would a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? - We could imagine tightening up the rules of tennis. We could specify that the ball must not be thrown more than four metres into the air when serving. But that would leave various other aspects unbounded by rules. How many times is someone allowed to bounce the ball on the ground before they serve?
Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the possibility that this might lead to an infinite regress. We could have a rule to regulate the application of a rule which removes some doubt but would this then stand in need of a further rule to regulate its application?
But it need not be that we are in doubt because we could imagine a doubt. (-Interesting epistemological point here which could serve as a reminder in other areas - relevant to Descartes' method of doubt).
§83
Language could perhaps illuminatingly be compared to people going out and having fun with a ball. They might start playing an existing game but not complete it and then throw the ball aimlessly into the air. They might throw the ball at one another for a joke, and so on. They are not following definite rules at every throw - just as people uttering words/sentences are not following definite rules with every utterance. The analogy between language games and games is illuminating but we should not think that language always involves following definite rules.
Language could perhaps illuminatingly be compared to people going out and having fun with a ball. They might start playing an existing game but not complete it and then throw the ball aimlessly into the air. They might throw the ball at one another for a joke, and so on. They are not following definite rules at every throw - just as people uttering words/sentences are not following definite rules with every utterance. The analogy between language games and games is illuminating but we should not think that language always involves following definite rules.
§82
"What do I call 'the rule according to which he proceeds'? - The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe..."
I assume the answer Wittgenstein would want to give to this would be 'no'. A rule is not a hypothesis - not the kind of thing that might be tested. However, it presumably does make sense to talk about gleaning rules from observed behaviour. You might get to grips with the rules of chess by observing people playing and correcting each other.
"What do I call 'the rule according to which he proceeds'? - The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe..."
I assume the answer Wittgenstein would want to give to this would be 'no'. A rule is not a hypothesis - not the kind of thing that might be tested. However, it presumably does make sense to talk about gleaning rules from observed behaviour. You might get to grips with the rules of chess by observing people playing and correcting each other.
§81
In §81 Wittgenstein mentions one of his influences - F. P. Ramsey.
Wittgenstein says he is now opposed to the conception of the logical analysis of language and of constructing ideal languages in the manner of Frege, Russell (and himself, years before). We are not getting a more precise or scientific understanding of language (or the world) by doing such things.
It is interesting that games also appear in the list of things (including calculi) that language is compared to. Does this suggest that the comparison with games could be a misleading picture? - Presumably it could. Wittgenstein is particularly talking about things (games, calculi) with fixed rules. To get clear about language, meaning and understanding we need to get clearer about the concepts of meaning something, understanding, and thinking (rather than producing a 'sublime' conception to fit with a model).
In §81 Wittgenstein mentions one of his influences - F. P. Ramsey.
Wittgenstein says he is now opposed to the conception of the logical analysis of language and of constructing ideal languages in the manner of Frege, Russell (and himself, years before). We are not getting a more precise or scientific understanding of language (or the world) by doing such things.
It is interesting that games also appear in the list of things (including calculi) that language is compared to. Does this suggest that the comparison with games could be a misleading picture? - Presumably it could. Wittgenstein is particularly talking about things (games, calculi) with fixed rules. To get clear about language, meaning and understanding we need to get clearer about the concepts of meaning something, understanding, and thinking (rather than producing a 'sublime' conception to fit with a model).
Sunday 24 February 2013
§80
Wittgenstein suggests that certain 'thought experiments' in which we search for the boundaries of a concept should not be taken to show that a concept has such-and-such boundaries or that it is nonsensical/unusable. If we saw something that appeared to be a chair disappear and reappear repeatedly would we say it was a chair? - This hasn't been decided given our current rule-governed use of the term 'chair' - but this doesn't mean that something has been missed.
Is this just a repetition of the point made earlier about concepts not being unsatisfactory in some way just because they are not everywhere bounded by rules (just like the fact that tennis is just fine as a game despite having no rules concerning how high a ball is to be thrown when serving)?
Wittgenstein suggests that certain 'thought experiments' in which we search for the boundaries of a concept should not be taken to show that a concept has such-and-such boundaries or that it is nonsensical/unusable. If we saw something that appeared to be a chair disappear and reappear repeatedly would we say it was a chair? - This hasn't been decided given our current rule-governed use of the term 'chair' - but this doesn't mean that something has been missed.
Is this just a repetition of the point made earlier about concepts not being unsatisfactory in some way just because they are not everywhere bounded by rules (just like the fact that tennis is just fine as a game despite having no rules concerning how high a ball is to be thrown when serving)?
§79
Is Wittgenstein presenting a 'cluster-concept' theory of names here? It doesn't seem to me to follow from this passage that Wittgenstein need even commit himself to the view that names have a meaning. Isn't the question of whether names have a meaning independent of the considerations here? I might well claim that no names, including the name 'Moses', mean anything at all but still indulge in a discussion about which descriptions would have to be true in order for me to be happy to say that Moses existed.
I don't think that every claim made about Moses is true. I don't think that anyone has been handed stone tablets from God, for example. But that doesn't mean I'm unwilling to contemplate the possibility that Moses existed. It may well be that Moses existed but that many of the things said about Moses are untrue.
I can refer to someone successfully even without saying anything true about them (I might get my embassies/nations mixed up and say "Julian Assange is that guy who is living in the Bolivian embassy" - and somebody might still know who it is I'm talking about). Is that of relevance here?
Wittgenstein suggests that in the case of Moses I might be willing to say that Moses exists if many of the things said of him are true - without even committing myself to which of the things are true. If one thing turns out not to be true I might 'lean on' another description (or set of descriptions).
Wittgenstein himself does connect up the considerations about which definite descriptions would have to be true with the meaning of the name ("I use the name 'N' without a fixed meaning").
Wittgenstein also suggests that a claim might move from being empirical/reporting a contingent relationship to being a definition (which seems right to me).
Is Wittgenstein presenting a 'cluster-concept' theory of names here? It doesn't seem to me to follow from this passage that Wittgenstein need even commit himself to the view that names have a meaning. Isn't the question of whether names have a meaning independent of the considerations here? I might well claim that no names, including the name 'Moses', mean anything at all but still indulge in a discussion about which descriptions would have to be true in order for me to be happy to say that Moses existed.
I don't think that every claim made about Moses is true. I don't think that anyone has been handed stone tablets from God, for example. But that doesn't mean I'm unwilling to contemplate the possibility that Moses existed. It may well be that Moses existed but that many of the things said about Moses are untrue.
I can refer to someone successfully even without saying anything true about them (I might get my embassies/nations mixed up and say "Julian Assange is that guy who is living in the Bolivian embassy" - and somebody might still know who it is I'm talking about). Is that of relevance here?
Wittgenstein suggests that in the case of Moses I might be willing to say that Moses exists if many of the things said of him are true - without even committing myself to which of the things are true. If one thing turns out not to be true I might 'lean on' another description (or set of descriptions).
Wittgenstein himself does connect up the considerations about which definite descriptions would have to be true with the meaning of the name ("I use the name 'N' without a fixed meaning").
Wittgenstein also suggests that a claim might move from being empirical/reporting a contingent relationship to being a definition (which seems right to me).
Saturday 23 February 2013
§78
Wittgenstein presents us with three cases:
(i) how many metres high Mont Blanc is.
(ii) how the word 'game' is used.
(iii) how a clarinet sounds.
In the first case it seems clear that if you know it then you can say it (if you know how many metres high Mont Blanc is then you can say it).
In the second case - again - if you know it you should be able to say it (although given that it is a family resemblance concept you might have to say a bit more).
In the third case it is less clear that if you know it you can say it. - You would most likely compare the sound to some other sound.
Note: §75 makes it clear that Wittgenstein does not think that (ii) is a case of knowing but not benig able to say it. In this passage we can know how many metres high Mont Blanc is, we can know how the word 'game' is used, and we can know how a clarinet sounds. We can also say how many metres high Mont Blanc is ('Mont Blanc is 4,260 metres high'), we can talk about how the word 'game' is used ('the word 'game' is used to refer to things like monopoly, Halo, football, and poker') and we can say how a clarinet sounds ('it sounds like this [play a note on a clarinet]').
What this passage makes clear is that there are various different kinds of explanations (although it perhaps sounds a bit strange to say that in saying 'Mont Blanc is 4,260m' I'm explaining how high it is).
Wittgenstein presents us with three cases:
(i) how many metres high Mont Blanc is.
(ii) how the word 'game' is used.
(iii) how a clarinet sounds.
In the first case it seems clear that if you know it then you can say it (if you know how many metres high Mont Blanc is then you can say it).
In the second case - again - if you know it you should be able to say it (although given that it is a family resemblance concept you might have to say a bit more).
In the third case it is less clear that if you know it you can say it. - You would most likely compare the sound to some other sound.
Note: §75 makes it clear that Wittgenstein does not think that (ii) is a case of knowing but not benig able to say it. In this passage we can know how many metres high Mont Blanc is, we can know how the word 'game' is used, and we can know how a clarinet sounds. We can also say how many metres high Mont Blanc is ('Mont Blanc is 4,260 metres high'), we can talk about how the word 'game' is used ('the word 'game' is used to refer to things like monopoly, Halo, football, and poker') and we can say how a clarinet sounds ('it sounds like this [play a note on a clarinet]').
What this passage makes clear is that there are various different kinds of explanations (although it perhaps sounds a bit strange to say that in saying 'Mont Blanc is 4,260m' I'm explaining how high it is).
§77
Ethical and aesthetic concepts are so lacking in sharpness that it is an impossible task to draw sharp boundaries to them - you could, but you might just as well have drawn the boundaries elsewhere (does the same apply to the concept 'game'?)
Wittgenstein's example is 'good'. He suggests that if one wants to get clear about what 'good' means you'd do well to look at how you learnt it - in which language games.
I'm not sure what the 'moral' we're supposed to draw here is. Thinking about how I learnt the word 'good' - I probably would have heard my parents using it in contrast to 'bad' or 'naughty'. If they endorsed/liked/wanted to encourage behaviour in me then they would say 'good boy'. They might also have asked me questions about my toys - 'is that a good car? Do you like it?'. - It was used in praising and in Q&As.
Ethical and aesthetic concepts are so lacking in sharpness that it is an impossible task to draw sharp boundaries to them - you could, but you might just as well have drawn the boundaries elsewhere (does the same apply to the concept 'game'?)
Wittgenstein's example is 'good'. He suggests that if one wants to get clear about what 'good' means you'd do well to look at how you learnt it - in which language games.
I'm not sure what the 'moral' we're supposed to draw here is. Thinking about how I learnt the word 'good' - I probably would have heard my parents using it in contrast to 'bad' or 'naughty'. If they endorsed/liked/wanted to encourage behaviour in me then they would say 'good boy'. They might also have asked me questions about my toys - 'is that a good car? Do you like it?'. - It was used in praising and in Q&As.
§76
Someone could draw a sharp boundary to the concept 'game'. If they did then I couldn't acknowledge it as the one I always wanted to draw, says Wittgenstein, because I didn't want to draw one at all.
The word 'game' as it is ordinarily used and the concept 'game' given sharp boundaries would be like each other but also different.
Someone could draw a sharp boundary to the concept 'game'. If they did then I couldn't acknowledge it as the one I always wanted to draw, says Wittgenstein, because I didn't want to draw one at all.
The word 'game' as it is ordinarily used and the concept 'game' given sharp boundaries would be like each other but also different.
§74
How one conceptualises something may well affect the way you use it.
"...someone who sees the schematic drawing of a cube as a plan figure consisting of a square and two rhombi will perhaps carry out the order, 'bring me something like this!' differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally".
The person who sees it as a plane figure might bring a flat object in the shape of the outline of the image above.
Presumably, given the context of this comment, Wittgenstein wants to make a point about how we take explanations of what a word means. - That there is a connection between the way in which someone understands a word and how they use it.
How one conceptualises something may well affect the way you use it.
"...someone who sees the schematic drawing of a cube as a plan figure consisting of a square and two rhombi will perhaps carry out the order, 'bring me something like this!' differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally".
The person who sees it as a plane figure might bring a flat object in the shape of the outline of the image above.
Presumably, given the context of this comment, Wittgenstein wants to make a point about how we take explanations of what a word means. - That there is a connection between the way in which someone understands a word and how they use it.
§72
The activity of looking for something in common between different samples in an ostensive definition given to you might be different in different cases.
(i) In the first case the person is told, "the colour you see in all these is called 'yellow ochre'". What are the distinctive features of this case?
(a) The definite article is used (unlike (ii)).
(b) The phrase 'the colour' is used which tells the person what kind of thing it is they are looking for.
(c) The person might look at various colours and see that some of them are not featured in all of the samples - they could use a process of elimination.
(ii) In the second case the person is shown samples of various shapes all painted the same colour and told, "what these have in common is called 'yellow ochre'. In this case the person will most likely recognise that the common feature is not the shape given that the samples are various shapes. If the person is familiar with other colour terms they might well recognise that what they are looking for is 'yellow -[something]' and so be pointing in the direction of looking at the colour. Given that there are no other colours involved they won't go through the same kind of process of elimination as in (i).
What can we take from this?
Suggestions:
- That ostensive definitions might take various different forms.
- Perhaps it also draws attention to the idea of seeing-as.
- It could serve as a reminder of the fact that ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
The activity of looking for something in common between different samples in an ostensive definition given to you might be different in different cases.
(i) In the first case the person is told, "the colour you see in all these is called 'yellow ochre'". What are the distinctive features of this case?
(a) The definite article is used (unlike (ii)).
(b) The phrase 'the colour' is used which tells the person what kind of thing it is they are looking for.
(c) The person might look at various colours and see that some of them are not featured in all of the samples - they could use a process of elimination.
(ii) In the second case the person is shown samples of various shapes all painted the same colour and told, "what these have in common is called 'yellow ochre'. In this case the person will most likely recognise that the common feature is not the shape given that the samples are various shapes. If the person is familiar with other colour terms they might well recognise that what they are looking for is 'yellow -[something]' and so be pointing in the direction of looking at the colour. Given that there are no other colours involved they won't go through the same kind of process of elimination as in (i).
What can we take from this?
Suggestions:
- That ostensive definitions might take various different forms.
- Perhaps it also draws attention to the idea of seeing-as.
- It could serve as a reminder of the fact that ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
Friday 22 February 2013
§71
Although someone may misunderstand your definition of 'game' that does not mean that there is something unsatisfactory with the concept or that it is not a concept or that there is something wrong with ostensive definitions more generally. Any kind of explanation can be misunderstood.
There are other cases where we do not draw a sharp boundary but where what we say is 'fit for purpose' (and perhaps drawing a sharp boundary would not suit our purpose). I might go shopping with a friend and then agree to go off individually and meet up later. I could say, "let's meet outside Sainsburys at about 2pm". - I haven't specified an exact spot to meet - and it isn't even clear what specifying an exact spot would amount to (latitude-longitude coordinates which pick out a precise point? - But then where should we stand in relation to the point specified?)
Although someone may misunderstand your definition of 'game' that does not mean that there is something unsatisfactory with the concept or that it is not a concept or that there is something wrong with ostensive definitions more generally. Any kind of explanation can be misunderstood.
There are other cases where we do not draw a sharp boundary but where what we say is 'fit for purpose' (and perhaps drawing a sharp boundary would not suit our purpose). I might go shopping with a friend and then agree to go off individually and meet up later. I could say, "let's meet outside Sainsburys at about 2pm". - I haven't specified an exact spot to meet - and it isn't even clear what specifying an exact spot would amount to (latitude-longitude coordinates which pick out a precise point? - But then where should we stand in relation to the point specified?)
§70
Wittgenstein wants to say that there are no clear criteria for exactness that apply in every case. What counts as exact depends on our purposes and the kind of thing that is in question. Perhaps you could say that you've told someone exactly what 'game' means when you've pointed to quite a few games and added a similarity rider and are satisfied that they've understood.
Is it that what counts as exact depends on circumstances or is it that we'll be satisfied with a certain degree of exactness in certain circumstances and want to be more exact in others? (Or both?) - I think both.
Wittgenstein wants to say that there are no clear criteria for exactness that apply in every case. What counts as exact depends on our purposes and the kind of thing that is in question. Perhaps you could say that you've told someone exactly what 'game' means when you've pointed to quite a few games and added a similarity rider and are satisfied that they've understood.
Is it that what counts as exact depends on circumstances or is it that we'll be satisfied with a certain degree of exactness in certain circumstances and want to be more exact in others? (Or both?) - I think both.
§69
We are not ignorant of the boundaries of the concept 'game' because no boundaries have been drawn (the meaning of a word is not something hidden from us that we might uncover/discover).
We can't tell others exactly what a game is (where exactly the boundary lies between games and non-games) but this should not worry us - the term is clearly usable. What we can do is point to a variety of things that are games (monopoly, football, chess, Halo) and say, 'this is a game, this is a game, and this is a game - and other similar things are called games'.
We are not ignorant of the boundaries of the concept 'game' because no boundaries have been drawn (the meaning of a word is not something hidden from us that we might uncover/discover).
We can't tell others exactly what a game is (where exactly the boundary lies between games and non-games) but this should not worry us - the term is clearly usable. What we can do is point to a variety of things that are games (monopoly, football, chess, Halo) and say, 'this is a game, this is a game, and this is a game - and other similar things are called games'.
§68
We could draw a boundary to the concepts 'number' or 'game'. BUT as it stands they do not have clear boundaries and this doesn't worry us.
We might want to draw a boundary for some purpose (e.g. if there was a 'great-tournament of games' then we might want to draw a limit to which activities will be admitted to the great tournament and which won't).
You might think it a problem that our concept 'game' does not have clear boundaries as it is ordinarily used - that there are not rules which determine exactly what is to count as a game in every instance. But we don't worry about the fact that many activities are not completely bounded by rules e.g. there are aspects of the game of tennis which are not bounded by rules - there is no rule that says you can't throw a ball above a certain height when serving.
We could draw a boundary to the concepts 'number' or 'game'. BUT as it stands they do not have clear boundaries and this doesn't worry us.
We might want to draw a boundary for some purpose (e.g. if there was a 'great-tournament of games' then we might want to draw a limit to which activities will be admitted to the great tournament and which won't).
You might think it a problem that our concept 'game' does not have clear boundaries as it is ordinarily used - that there are not rules which determine exactly what is to count as a game in every instance. But we don't worry about the fact that many activities are not completely bounded by rules e.g. there are aspects of the game of tennis which are not bounded by rules - there is no rule that says you can't throw a ball above a certain height when serving.
§67
Wittgenstein suggests that the 'similarities overlapping and criss-crossing' in the case of games are a bit like the similarities between family members. They might not always resemble each other in exactly the same way. A son might have his mother's mouth and his father's hair (his mouth resembles his mother's mouth and his hair resembles his father's hair).
'Game' is a family resemblance concept. Similarly 'number' is a family resemblance concept.
Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a thread made up of fibres. Where there is a resemblance between members of a family (numbers, games, language-games) we might picture this as the fibres coming together in a thread. But there isn't any one fibre that runs through the entire thread. - There are various overlapping similarities (various fibres bounded together in a single thread).
Someone might respond to this that there is in fact something in common throughout all games - the disjunction of all their common properties. (So 'game' could be defined as something entertaining OR competitive OR involving an element of luck OR involving a particular kind of skill).
BUT this response is no more satisfactory than saying 'there is a common element to the whole thread - the continuous overlapping of fibres'.
Wittgenstein suggests that the 'similarities overlapping and criss-crossing' in the case of games are a bit like the similarities between family members. They might not always resemble each other in exactly the same way. A son might have his mother's mouth and his father's hair (his mouth resembles his mother's mouth and his hair resembles his father's hair).
'Game' is a family resemblance concept. Similarly 'number' is a family resemblance concept.
Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a thread made up of fibres. Where there is a resemblance between members of a family (numbers, games, language-games) we might picture this as the fibres coming together in a thread. But there isn't any one fibre that runs through the entire thread. - There are various overlapping similarities (various fibres bounded together in a single thread).
Someone might respond to this that there is in fact something in common throughout all games - the disjunction of all their common properties. (So 'game' could be defined as something entertaining OR competitive OR involving an element of luck OR involving a particular kind of skill).
BUT this response is no more satisfactory than saying 'there is a common element to the whole thread - the continuous overlapping of fibres'.
§66
Board-games, card games, athletic games, etc. do not have something in common by which they are defined. 'Game' cannot be given a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - and this should not worry us. What you've got in the case of the concept 'game' is, "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small."
Given that this passage follows immediately from the one about the essence of language it seems clear that one point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we cannot find the essence of language and this should not worry us. This is not because the task is a particularly difficult task of discovery but because 'language' cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Another point we can take from this passage is that we should not always think that definitions in terms of necessary conditions can be given. So if we've been struggling to come up with a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of some term we should not take this as clear evidence that we've failed to define/explain the meaning of the term in question. We should keep in mind that some concepts are 'family resemblance' concepts.
Board-games, card games, athletic games, etc. do not have something in common by which they are defined. 'Game' cannot be given a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - and this should not worry us. What you've got in the case of the concept 'game' is, "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small."
Given that this passage follows immediately from the one about the essence of language it seems clear that one point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we cannot find the essence of language and this should not worry us. This is not because the task is a particularly difficult task of discovery but because 'language' cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Another point we can take from this passage is that we should not always think that definitions in terms of necessary conditions can be given. So if we've been struggling to come up with a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of some term we should not take this as clear evidence that we've failed to define/explain the meaning of the term in question. We should keep in mind that some concepts are 'family resemblance' concepts.
§65
We might imagine an objection which is something along the lines of - you're good at criticising my account of the essence of language but it's much easier to criticise than to offer a positive account of your own. Where's your account of the essence of language?
Wittgenstein's response is to say that to think that there is something essential - common to all language-games - or to think that there must be something common to all language-games (in virtue of which they count as language-games) is mistaken and misleading.
Language-games do not have a single feature in common but there are various similarities between language-games. - Much like games (§66).
We might imagine an objection which is something along the lines of - you're good at criticising my account of the essence of language but it's much easier to criticise than to offer a positive account of your own. Where's your account of the essence of language?
Wittgenstein's response is to say that to think that there is something essential - common to all language-games - or to think that there must be something common to all language-games (in virtue of which they count as language-games) is mistaken and misleading.
Language-games do not have a single feature in common but there are various similarities between language-games. - Much like games (§66).
§64
Wittgenstein comes up with a parallel case to the broom/broomstick-brush case. He imagines a language where names signify rectangles consisting of two coloured squares. - This is like the language game of §48 except in this case there are no names for individual colours. You could order someone to construct an arrangement of rectangles, perhaps, - like in §48. In this case you could, perhaps, say that the language game of §64 has the advantage of using shorter orders to achieve the same sort of results as in §48.
Wittgenstein asks 'in what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?'.
You could respond, perhaps, by saying that no such 'analysis' can be given in this case. The objects referred to are not complex, exactly, because there are no concepts for the coloured squares that make up the rectangles. But you might also respond by saying that it perhaps depends on your purposes. If you wanted to construct a square made up of nine squares (like in §48) you couldn't do so in the language of §64.
Wittgenstein comes up with a parallel case to the broom/broomstick-brush case. He imagines a language where names signify rectangles consisting of two coloured squares. - This is like the language game of §48 except in this case there are no names for individual colours. You could order someone to construct an arrangement of rectangles, perhaps, - like in §48. In this case you could, perhaps, say that the language game of §64 has the advantage of using shorter orders to achieve the same sort of results as in §48.
Wittgenstein asks 'in what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?'.
You could respond, perhaps, by saying that no such 'analysis' can be given in this case. The objects referred to are not complex, exactly, because there are no concepts for the coloured squares that make up the rectangles. But you might also respond by saying that it perhaps depends on your purposes. If you wanted to construct a square made up of nine squares (like in §48) you couldn't do so in the language of §64.
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