§100
We shouldn't be dazzled by what seems to be an ideal of, say, the rules of language or the rules of games. - e.g. Rules lacking any vagueness.
Wednesday 27 February 2013
§99
Wittgenstein presents a rationale for his earlier view.
A sentence must have a determinate sense because an indeterminate sense would not be a sense at all.
This is like saying that a boundary that is not sharply defined is not really a boundary. - But Wittgenstein objects to this - a boundary that is not sharp is not much the same as no boundary at all.
Wittgenstein presents a rationale for his earlier view.
A sentence must have a determinate sense because an indeterminate sense would not be a sense at all.
This is like saying that a boundary that is not sharply defined is not really a boundary. - But Wittgenstein objects to this - a boundary that is not sharp is not much the same as no boundary at all.
§98
Wittgenstein has already suggested that we cannot find the essence of language. This is not because it is too difficult but because there is no essence of language. 'Language' and 'proposition' are family resemblance concepts.
Wittgenstein presents his views from the Tractatus. - There must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence (determinate indeterminacy).
Wittgenstein has already suggested that we cannot find the essence of language. This is not because it is too difficult but because there is no essence of language. 'Language' and 'proposition' are family resemblance concepts.
Wittgenstein presents his views from the Tractatus. - There must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence (determinate indeterminacy).
§97
"Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus." (Does he mean that thinking is cloudy (unclear/vague) or that in thinking about thinking we have to get past cloudiness/vagueness - to get to the order of logic?)
The world does not contain vague objects and logic, as mirror of the world, must then be utterly crystal clear and certain (this kind of reasoning appealed to Wittgenstein when he was caught up in the Tractarian picture/model). - In this passage Wittgenstein is not stating his mature view, he is looking at his own earlier way of thinking.
"Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus." (Does he mean that thinking is cloudy (unclear/vague) or that in thinking about thinking we have to get past cloudiness/vagueness - to get to the order of logic?)
The world does not contain vague objects and logic, as mirror of the world, must then be utterly crystal clear and certain (this kind of reasoning appealed to Wittgenstein when he was caught up in the Tractarian picture/model). - In this passage Wittgenstein is not stating his mature view, he is looking at his own earlier way of thinking.
§95
The misunderstanding referred to in §93 arises from thinking that it is remarkable that one can think what is not the case. (Could the 'problem' be put like this? - How can you refer to something that is not the case? (is it even something?)
Wittgenstein attempted (in the Tractatus) to guarantee no failure of reference by suggesting that the world was made up of simple objects which are indestuctible and which were the constituents of states of affairs (possible concatenations of objects) - which names referred to. - So even states of affairs which didn't exist could be referred to by statements made up of names - all of which had referents.
The misunderstanding referred to in §93 arises from thinking that it is remarkable that one can think what is not the case. (Could the 'problem' be put like this? - How can you refer to something that is not the case? (is it even something?)
Wittgenstein attempted (in the Tractatus) to guarantee no failure of reference by suggesting that the world was made up of simple objects which are indestuctible and which were the constituents of states of affairs (possible concatenations of objects) - which names referred to. - So even states of affairs which didn't exist could be referred to by statements made up of names - all of which had referents.
§93
The people who say that a proposition is something remarkable have not looked and seen how propositions work.
Why think a proposition is remarkable?
- Because it is important (correct, says Wittgenstein).
- It may be because someone had misunderstood the logic of language. Wittgenstein doesn't make clear here what the misunderstanding is. I imagine he has his own earlier ideas in mind (from the Tractatus).
The people who say that a proposition is something remarkable have not looked and seen how propositions work.
Why think a proposition is remarkable?
- Because it is important (correct, says Wittgenstein).
- It may be because someone had misunderstood the logic of language. Wittgenstein doesn't make clear here what the misunderstanding is. I imagine he has his own earlier ideas in mind (from the Tractatus).
§92
There is a problem with thinking that the essence of language is hidden from us.
Wittgenstein says, "We ask: 'what is language?' 'what is a proposition?' And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all and independently of any future experience."
The suggestion is that this approach is mistaken. - Language games are like games in that there are (family) resemblances between them 'overlapping and criss-crossing' - and new language games come into existence and some may become redundant.
There is a problem with thinking that the essence of language is hidden from us.
Wittgenstein says, "We ask: 'what is language?' 'what is a proposition?' And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all and independently of any future experience."
The suggestion is that this approach is mistaken. - Language games are like games in that there are (family) resemblances between them 'overlapping and criss-crossing' - and new language games come into existence and some may become redundant.
§91
(Following on from §90) - Wittgenstein doesn't think there is any kind of final analysis of our language or that we are aiming/should aim at complete exactness.
Wittgenstein has already made it clear with the broom/broomstick-brush case that he thinks there are problems with the idea of a final analysis, and he has discussed exactness in the course of discussing games.
(Following on from §90) - Wittgenstein doesn't think there is any kind of final analysis of our language or that we are aiming/should aim at complete exactness.
Wittgenstein has already made it clear with the broom/broomstick-brush case that he thinks there are problems with the idea of a final analysis, and he has discussed exactness in the course of discussing games.
§90
Our investigation (the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy/the investigation into the concept of time) is not directed at phenomena (the things we experience in the world) - it isn't empirical. What we do is call to mind "the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena".
The query about time and other philosophical problems are grammatical (Wittgenstein is using the term 'grammar/grammatical' is a slightly idiosyncratic way here). We clear away/dissolve problems by exposing misleading analogies (is the misleading analogy in this case thinking of time as analogous to space? - We talk about something taking a certain length of time, etc.) - or by substituting one form of expression for another. Is Wittgensteinian philosophy 'conceptual analysis'? - Not really, although sometimes the procedure of substituting one form of expression for another resembles taking a thing apart (Wittgenstein clearly rejects the kind of analysis engaged in by the likes of Russell).
Our investigation (the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy/the investigation into the concept of time) is not directed at phenomena (the things we experience in the world) - it isn't empirical. What we do is call to mind "the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena".
The query about time and other philosophical problems are grammatical (Wittgenstein is using the term 'grammar/grammatical' is a slightly idiosyncratic way here). We clear away/dissolve problems by exposing misleading analogies (is the misleading analogy in this case thinking of time as analogous to space? - We talk about something taking a certain length of time, etc.) - or by substituting one form of expression for another. Is Wittgensteinian philosophy 'conceptual analysis'? - Not really, although sometimes the procedure of substituting one form of expression for another resembles taking a thing apart (Wittgenstein clearly rejects the kind of analysis engaged in by the likes of Russell).
§89
So (following from §88) to think that logical formulations might make language perfectly exact is peculiar. What goal do you have in mind? Our language as we use it may well be fit for purpose even if we can imagine someone not understanding us or a situation in which what we say is not sufficiently exact.
Wittgenstein here gives a quote from Augustine, "what, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled." Wittgenstein suggests that what one has to do if one is baffled in this way is to call it to mind. He suggests that the confusion here is conceptual - not empirical (it's a confusion about the use of the word 'time' or of temporal concepts more generally).
This 'philosophical' question about time can be answered by considering something that is in plain view (the correct use of the word 'time' and of related temporal concepts).
Is it worth thinking about this in relation to the earlier remark about knowing and saying (§78)? Being able to explain time is not like being able to say how high Mont Blanc is.
Is the problem thinking that 'time' refers to some object (or that it refers to a concatenation of objects upon analysis)? I assume that Wittgenstein thinks that 'what is time?' is an ill-formed question.
So (following from §88) to think that logical formulations might make language perfectly exact is peculiar. What goal do you have in mind? Our language as we use it may well be fit for purpose even if we can imagine someone not understanding us or a situation in which what we say is not sufficiently exact.
Wittgenstein here gives a quote from Augustine, "what, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled." Wittgenstein suggests that what one has to do if one is baffled in this way is to call it to mind. He suggests that the confusion here is conceptual - not empirical (it's a confusion about the use of the word 'time' or of temporal concepts more generally).
This 'philosophical' question about time can be answered by considering something that is in plain view (the correct use of the word 'time' and of related temporal concepts).
Is it worth thinking about this in relation to the earlier remark about knowing and saying (§78)? Being able to explain time is not like being able to say how high Mont Blanc is.
Is the problem thinking that 'time' refers to some object (or that it refers to a concatenation of objects upon analysis)? I assume that Wittgenstein thinks that 'what is time?' is an ill-formed question.
§87
Words like 'red', 'dark', and 'sweet' are not 'indefinables' (the 'simple ideas' of the classical empiricists).
Re: Moses: In §79 Wittgenstein suggested that "Moses did not exist" may mean various things (depending on which definite descriptions we 'lean upon'). But in §87 Wittgenstein suggests that I might specify what I mean (to remove doubts about what I mean) - I could say, "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever else he might have done". But, having removed this doubt, further explanations might be needed (about what 'Egypt' means, about who the Israelites are, and so on). Does this mean explanations are to go on forever to remove all doubts? - No. Explanations could be used to remove misunderstandings but we need not go on giving explanations unless we require one to avoid misunderstanding. - We don't need explanations to remove every misunderstanding imaginable.
Explanation of meaning = rule for the use (a use) of a word.
Wittgenstein is not a sceptic. Something like a signpost or a rule is perfectly in order ('complete') as long as it fulfils its purpose.
Words like 'red', 'dark', and 'sweet' are not 'indefinables' (the 'simple ideas' of the classical empiricists).
Re: Moses: In §79 Wittgenstein suggested that "Moses did not exist" may mean various things (depending on which definite descriptions we 'lean upon'). But in §87 Wittgenstein suggests that I might specify what I mean (to remove doubts about what I mean) - I could say, "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever else he might have done". But, having removed this doubt, further explanations might be needed (about what 'Egypt' means, about who the Israelites are, and so on). Does this mean explanations are to go on forever to remove all doubts? - No. Explanations could be used to remove misunderstandings but we need not go on giving explanations unless we require one to avoid misunderstanding. - We don't need explanations to remove every misunderstanding imaginable.
Explanation of meaning = rule for the use (a use) of a word.
Wittgenstein is not a sceptic. Something like a signpost or a rule is perfectly in order ('complete') as long as it fulfils its purpose.
§86
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the language game of §2 (the block/slab language) but with a chart. A gives B written signs ('block', 'slab') and B looks up the signs in a chart and finds a corresponding picture of a shape of a building stone.
B learns to look up the picture in the chart through training - by passing his finger from left to right (from sign to picture).
You could draw in arrows (to explain how you are to pass from sign to picture). But the chart was not incomplete without this schema of arrows.
Wittgenstein has been making several points in these passages - (i) rules can be misinterpreted (ii) we can introduce new rules/new explanations to 'reinforce' the existing rules but these, in turn, can be misinterpreted (iii) however, what can be misinterpreted can also be interpreted correctly (iv) - so there need be no infinite regress of rules to achieve perfect clarity (v) we introduce rules/explanations as we need them/to suit our purposes - if they have served their purpose then there need not be 'back-up' (vi) language does not need to be everywhere bounded by rules (vii) we need not follow definite rules in every utterance that we make (viii) it is possible that what we say might be vague (and not analysable then into a disjunction of elements with determinate meaning).
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the language game of §2 (the block/slab language) but with a chart. A gives B written signs ('block', 'slab') and B looks up the signs in a chart and finds a corresponding picture of a shape of a building stone.
B learns to look up the picture in the chart through training - by passing his finger from left to right (from sign to picture).
You could draw in arrows (to explain how you are to pass from sign to picture). But the chart was not incomplete without this schema of arrows.
Wittgenstein has been making several points in these passages - (i) rules can be misinterpreted (ii) we can introduce new rules/new explanations to 'reinforce' the existing rules but these, in turn, can be misinterpreted (iii) however, what can be misinterpreted can also be interpreted correctly (iv) - so there need be no infinite regress of rules to achieve perfect clarity (v) we introduce rules/explanations as we need them/to suit our purposes - if they have served their purpose then there need not be 'back-up' (vi) language does not need to be everywhere bounded by rules (vii) we need not follow definite rules in every utterance that we make (viii) it is possible that what we say might be vague (and not analysable then into a disjunction of elements with determinate meaning).
§85
A signpost doesn't signpost how it is to be taken. So you might say that they leave room for doubt - the can be misinterpreted.
"So I can say that the signpost does after all leave room for doubt. Or rather it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."
"The signpost leaves room for doubt" is a 'philosophical proposition' then. I assume this means that it is a grammatical proposition - it points to an internal/conceptual relation. - If something counts as a signpost then it is the kind of thing taht might be misinterpreted (we might have doubts about how to follow it).
BUT "it [the signpost] sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not" is empirical. - As a matter of fact people sometimes have doubts about how a sign is to be taken and sometimes they are quite certain that it is to be taken in a particular way.
(Here, when Wittgenstein is talking about signposts, he also, I imagine, has rules in mind - that a rule is like a signpost).
A signpost doesn't signpost how it is to be taken. So you might say that they leave room for doubt - the can be misinterpreted.
"So I can say that the signpost does after all leave room for doubt. Or rather it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."
"The signpost leaves room for doubt" is a 'philosophical proposition' then. I assume this means that it is a grammatical proposition - it points to an internal/conceptual relation. - If something counts as a signpost then it is the kind of thing taht might be misinterpreted (we might have doubts about how to follow it).
BUT "it [the signpost] sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not" is empirical. - As a matter of fact people sometimes have doubts about how a sign is to be taken and sometimes they are quite certain that it is to be taken in a particular way.
(Here, when Wittgenstein is talking about signposts, he also, I imagine, has rules in mind - that a rule is like a signpost).
§84
What would a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? - We could imagine tightening up the rules of tennis. We could specify that the ball must not be thrown more than four metres into the air when serving. But that would leave various other aspects unbounded by rules. How many times is someone allowed to bounce the ball on the ground before they serve?
Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the possibility that this might lead to an infinite regress. We could have a rule to regulate the application of a rule which removes some doubt but would this then stand in need of a further rule to regulate its application?
But it need not be that we are in doubt because we could imagine a doubt. (-Interesting epistemological point here which could serve as a reminder in other areas - relevant to Descartes' method of doubt).
What would a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? - We could imagine tightening up the rules of tennis. We could specify that the ball must not be thrown more than four metres into the air when serving. But that would leave various other aspects unbounded by rules. How many times is someone allowed to bounce the ball on the ground before they serve?
Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the possibility that this might lead to an infinite regress. We could have a rule to regulate the application of a rule which removes some doubt but would this then stand in need of a further rule to regulate its application?
But it need not be that we are in doubt because we could imagine a doubt. (-Interesting epistemological point here which could serve as a reminder in other areas - relevant to Descartes' method of doubt).
§83
Language could perhaps illuminatingly be compared to people going out and having fun with a ball. They might start playing an existing game but not complete it and then throw the ball aimlessly into the air. They might throw the ball at one another for a joke, and so on. They are not following definite rules at every throw - just as people uttering words/sentences are not following definite rules with every utterance. The analogy between language games and games is illuminating but we should not think that language always involves following definite rules.
Language could perhaps illuminatingly be compared to people going out and having fun with a ball. They might start playing an existing game but not complete it and then throw the ball aimlessly into the air. They might throw the ball at one another for a joke, and so on. They are not following definite rules at every throw - just as people uttering words/sentences are not following definite rules with every utterance. The analogy between language games and games is illuminating but we should not think that language always involves following definite rules.
§82
"What do I call 'the rule according to which he proceeds'? - The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe..."
I assume the answer Wittgenstein would want to give to this would be 'no'. A rule is not a hypothesis - not the kind of thing that might be tested. However, it presumably does make sense to talk about gleaning rules from observed behaviour. You might get to grips with the rules of chess by observing people playing and correcting each other.
"What do I call 'the rule according to which he proceeds'? - The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe..."
I assume the answer Wittgenstein would want to give to this would be 'no'. A rule is not a hypothesis - not the kind of thing that might be tested. However, it presumably does make sense to talk about gleaning rules from observed behaviour. You might get to grips with the rules of chess by observing people playing and correcting each other.
§81
In §81 Wittgenstein mentions one of his influences - F. P. Ramsey.
Wittgenstein says he is now opposed to the conception of the logical analysis of language and of constructing ideal languages in the manner of Frege, Russell (and himself, years before). We are not getting a more precise or scientific understanding of language (or the world) by doing such things.
It is interesting that games also appear in the list of things (including calculi) that language is compared to. Does this suggest that the comparison with games could be a misleading picture? - Presumably it could. Wittgenstein is particularly talking about things (games, calculi) with fixed rules. To get clear about language, meaning and understanding we need to get clearer about the concepts of meaning something, understanding, and thinking (rather than producing a 'sublime' conception to fit with a model).
In §81 Wittgenstein mentions one of his influences - F. P. Ramsey.
Wittgenstein says he is now opposed to the conception of the logical analysis of language and of constructing ideal languages in the manner of Frege, Russell (and himself, years before). We are not getting a more precise or scientific understanding of language (or the world) by doing such things.
It is interesting that games also appear in the list of things (including calculi) that language is compared to. Does this suggest that the comparison with games could be a misleading picture? - Presumably it could. Wittgenstein is particularly talking about things (games, calculi) with fixed rules. To get clear about language, meaning and understanding we need to get clearer about the concepts of meaning something, understanding, and thinking (rather than producing a 'sublime' conception to fit with a model).
Sunday 24 February 2013
§80
Wittgenstein suggests that certain 'thought experiments' in which we search for the boundaries of a concept should not be taken to show that a concept has such-and-such boundaries or that it is nonsensical/unusable. If we saw something that appeared to be a chair disappear and reappear repeatedly would we say it was a chair? - This hasn't been decided given our current rule-governed use of the term 'chair' - but this doesn't mean that something has been missed.
Is this just a repetition of the point made earlier about concepts not being unsatisfactory in some way just because they are not everywhere bounded by rules (just like the fact that tennis is just fine as a game despite having no rules concerning how high a ball is to be thrown when serving)?
Wittgenstein suggests that certain 'thought experiments' in which we search for the boundaries of a concept should not be taken to show that a concept has such-and-such boundaries or that it is nonsensical/unusable. If we saw something that appeared to be a chair disappear and reappear repeatedly would we say it was a chair? - This hasn't been decided given our current rule-governed use of the term 'chair' - but this doesn't mean that something has been missed.
Is this just a repetition of the point made earlier about concepts not being unsatisfactory in some way just because they are not everywhere bounded by rules (just like the fact that tennis is just fine as a game despite having no rules concerning how high a ball is to be thrown when serving)?
§79
Is Wittgenstein presenting a 'cluster-concept' theory of names here? It doesn't seem to me to follow from this passage that Wittgenstein need even commit himself to the view that names have a meaning. Isn't the question of whether names have a meaning independent of the considerations here? I might well claim that no names, including the name 'Moses', mean anything at all but still indulge in a discussion about which descriptions would have to be true in order for me to be happy to say that Moses existed.
I don't think that every claim made about Moses is true. I don't think that anyone has been handed stone tablets from God, for example. But that doesn't mean I'm unwilling to contemplate the possibility that Moses existed. It may well be that Moses existed but that many of the things said about Moses are untrue.
I can refer to someone successfully even without saying anything true about them (I might get my embassies/nations mixed up and say "Julian Assange is that guy who is living in the Bolivian embassy" - and somebody might still know who it is I'm talking about). Is that of relevance here?
Wittgenstein suggests that in the case of Moses I might be willing to say that Moses exists if many of the things said of him are true - without even committing myself to which of the things are true. If one thing turns out not to be true I might 'lean on' another description (or set of descriptions).
Wittgenstein himself does connect up the considerations about which definite descriptions would have to be true with the meaning of the name ("I use the name 'N' without a fixed meaning").
Wittgenstein also suggests that a claim might move from being empirical/reporting a contingent relationship to being a definition (which seems right to me).
Is Wittgenstein presenting a 'cluster-concept' theory of names here? It doesn't seem to me to follow from this passage that Wittgenstein need even commit himself to the view that names have a meaning. Isn't the question of whether names have a meaning independent of the considerations here? I might well claim that no names, including the name 'Moses', mean anything at all but still indulge in a discussion about which descriptions would have to be true in order for me to be happy to say that Moses existed.
I don't think that every claim made about Moses is true. I don't think that anyone has been handed stone tablets from God, for example. But that doesn't mean I'm unwilling to contemplate the possibility that Moses existed. It may well be that Moses existed but that many of the things said about Moses are untrue.
I can refer to someone successfully even without saying anything true about them (I might get my embassies/nations mixed up and say "Julian Assange is that guy who is living in the Bolivian embassy" - and somebody might still know who it is I'm talking about). Is that of relevance here?
Wittgenstein suggests that in the case of Moses I might be willing to say that Moses exists if many of the things said of him are true - without even committing myself to which of the things are true. If one thing turns out not to be true I might 'lean on' another description (or set of descriptions).
Wittgenstein himself does connect up the considerations about which definite descriptions would have to be true with the meaning of the name ("I use the name 'N' without a fixed meaning").
Wittgenstein also suggests that a claim might move from being empirical/reporting a contingent relationship to being a definition (which seems right to me).
Saturday 23 February 2013
§78
Wittgenstein presents us with three cases:
(i) how many metres high Mont Blanc is.
(ii) how the word 'game' is used.
(iii) how a clarinet sounds.
In the first case it seems clear that if you know it then you can say it (if you know how many metres high Mont Blanc is then you can say it).
In the second case - again - if you know it you should be able to say it (although given that it is a family resemblance concept you might have to say a bit more).
In the third case it is less clear that if you know it you can say it. - You would most likely compare the sound to some other sound.
Note: §75 makes it clear that Wittgenstein does not think that (ii) is a case of knowing but not benig able to say it. In this passage we can know how many metres high Mont Blanc is, we can know how the word 'game' is used, and we can know how a clarinet sounds. We can also say how many metres high Mont Blanc is ('Mont Blanc is 4,260 metres high'), we can talk about how the word 'game' is used ('the word 'game' is used to refer to things like monopoly, Halo, football, and poker') and we can say how a clarinet sounds ('it sounds like this [play a note on a clarinet]').
What this passage makes clear is that there are various different kinds of explanations (although it perhaps sounds a bit strange to say that in saying 'Mont Blanc is 4,260m' I'm explaining how high it is).
Wittgenstein presents us with three cases:
(i) how many metres high Mont Blanc is.
(ii) how the word 'game' is used.
(iii) how a clarinet sounds.
In the first case it seems clear that if you know it then you can say it (if you know how many metres high Mont Blanc is then you can say it).
In the second case - again - if you know it you should be able to say it (although given that it is a family resemblance concept you might have to say a bit more).
In the third case it is less clear that if you know it you can say it. - You would most likely compare the sound to some other sound.
Note: §75 makes it clear that Wittgenstein does not think that (ii) is a case of knowing but not benig able to say it. In this passage we can know how many metres high Mont Blanc is, we can know how the word 'game' is used, and we can know how a clarinet sounds. We can also say how many metres high Mont Blanc is ('Mont Blanc is 4,260 metres high'), we can talk about how the word 'game' is used ('the word 'game' is used to refer to things like monopoly, Halo, football, and poker') and we can say how a clarinet sounds ('it sounds like this [play a note on a clarinet]').
What this passage makes clear is that there are various different kinds of explanations (although it perhaps sounds a bit strange to say that in saying 'Mont Blanc is 4,260m' I'm explaining how high it is).
§77
Ethical and aesthetic concepts are so lacking in sharpness that it is an impossible task to draw sharp boundaries to them - you could, but you might just as well have drawn the boundaries elsewhere (does the same apply to the concept 'game'?)
Wittgenstein's example is 'good'. He suggests that if one wants to get clear about what 'good' means you'd do well to look at how you learnt it - in which language games.
I'm not sure what the 'moral' we're supposed to draw here is. Thinking about how I learnt the word 'good' - I probably would have heard my parents using it in contrast to 'bad' or 'naughty'. If they endorsed/liked/wanted to encourage behaviour in me then they would say 'good boy'. They might also have asked me questions about my toys - 'is that a good car? Do you like it?'. - It was used in praising and in Q&As.
Ethical and aesthetic concepts are so lacking in sharpness that it is an impossible task to draw sharp boundaries to them - you could, but you might just as well have drawn the boundaries elsewhere (does the same apply to the concept 'game'?)
Wittgenstein's example is 'good'. He suggests that if one wants to get clear about what 'good' means you'd do well to look at how you learnt it - in which language games.
I'm not sure what the 'moral' we're supposed to draw here is. Thinking about how I learnt the word 'good' - I probably would have heard my parents using it in contrast to 'bad' or 'naughty'. If they endorsed/liked/wanted to encourage behaviour in me then they would say 'good boy'. They might also have asked me questions about my toys - 'is that a good car? Do you like it?'. - It was used in praising and in Q&As.
§76
Someone could draw a sharp boundary to the concept 'game'. If they did then I couldn't acknowledge it as the one I always wanted to draw, says Wittgenstein, because I didn't want to draw one at all.
The word 'game' as it is ordinarily used and the concept 'game' given sharp boundaries would be like each other but also different.
Someone could draw a sharp boundary to the concept 'game'. If they did then I couldn't acknowledge it as the one I always wanted to draw, says Wittgenstein, because I didn't want to draw one at all.
The word 'game' as it is ordinarily used and the concept 'game' given sharp boundaries would be like each other but also different.
§74
How one conceptualises something may well affect the way you use it.
"...someone who sees the schematic drawing of a cube as a plan figure consisting of a square and two rhombi will perhaps carry out the order, 'bring me something like this!' differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally".
The person who sees it as a plane figure might bring a flat object in the shape of the outline of the image above.
Presumably, given the context of this comment, Wittgenstein wants to make a point about how we take explanations of what a word means. - That there is a connection between the way in which someone understands a word and how they use it.
How one conceptualises something may well affect the way you use it.
"...someone who sees the schematic drawing of a cube as a plan figure consisting of a square and two rhombi will perhaps carry out the order, 'bring me something like this!' differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally".
The person who sees it as a plane figure might bring a flat object in the shape of the outline of the image above.
Presumably, given the context of this comment, Wittgenstein wants to make a point about how we take explanations of what a word means. - That there is a connection between the way in which someone understands a word and how they use it.
§72
The activity of looking for something in common between different samples in an ostensive definition given to you might be different in different cases.
(i) In the first case the person is told, "the colour you see in all these is called 'yellow ochre'". What are the distinctive features of this case?
(a) The definite article is used (unlike (ii)).
(b) The phrase 'the colour' is used which tells the person what kind of thing it is they are looking for.
(c) The person might look at various colours and see that some of them are not featured in all of the samples - they could use a process of elimination.
(ii) In the second case the person is shown samples of various shapes all painted the same colour and told, "what these have in common is called 'yellow ochre'. In this case the person will most likely recognise that the common feature is not the shape given that the samples are various shapes. If the person is familiar with other colour terms they might well recognise that what they are looking for is 'yellow -[something]' and so be pointing in the direction of looking at the colour. Given that there are no other colours involved they won't go through the same kind of process of elimination as in (i).
What can we take from this?
Suggestions:
- That ostensive definitions might take various different forms.
- Perhaps it also draws attention to the idea of seeing-as.
- It could serve as a reminder of the fact that ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
The activity of looking for something in common between different samples in an ostensive definition given to you might be different in different cases.
(i) In the first case the person is told, "the colour you see in all these is called 'yellow ochre'". What are the distinctive features of this case?
(a) The definite article is used (unlike (ii)).
(b) The phrase 'the colour' is used which tells the person what kind of thing it is they are looking for.
(c) The person might look at various colours and see that some of them are not featured in all of the samples - they could use a process of elimination.
(ii) In the second case the person is shown samples of various shapes all painted the same colour and told, "what these have in common is called 'yellow ochre'. In this case the person will most likely recognise that the common feature is not the shape given that the samples are various shapes. If the person is familiar with other colour terms they might well recognise that what they are looking for is 'yellow -[something]' and so be pointing in the direction of looking at the colour. Given that there are no other colours involved they won't go through the same kind of process of elimination as in (i).
What can we take from this?
Suggestions:
- That ostensive definitions might take various different forms.
- Perhaps it also draws attention to the idea of seeing-as.
- It could serve as a reminder of the fact that ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
Friday 22 February 2013
§71
Although someone may misunderstand your definition of 'game' that does not mean that there is something unsatisfactory with the concept or that it is not a concept or that there is something wrong with ostensive definitions more generally. Any kind of explanation can be misunderstood.
There are other cases where we do not draw a sharp boundary but where what we say is 'fit for purpose' (and perhaps drawing a sharp boundary would not suit our purpose). I might go shopping with a friend and then agree to go off individually and meet up later. I could say, "let's meet outside Sainsburys at about 2pm". - I haven't specified an exact spot to meet - and it isn't even clear what specifying an exact spot would amount to (latitude-longitude coordinates which pick out a precise point? - But then where should we stand in relation to the point specified?)
Although someone may misunderstand your definition of 'game' that does not mean that there is something unsatisfactory with the concept or that it is not a concept or that there is something wrong with ostensive definitions more generally. Any kind of explanation can be misunderstood.
There are other cases where we do not draw a sharp boundary but where what we say is 'fit for purpose' (and perhaps drawing a sharp boundary would not suit our purpose). I might go shopping with a friend and then agree to go off individually and meet up later. I could say, "let's meet outside Sainsburys at about 2pm". - I haven't specified an exact spot to meet - and it isn't even clear what specifying an exact spot would amount to (latitude-longitude coordinates which pick out a precise point? - But then where should we stand in relation to the point specified?)
§70
Wittgenstein wants to say that there are no clear criteria for exactness that apply in every case. What counts as exact depends on our purposes and the kind of thing that is in question. Perhaps you could say that you've told someone exactly what 'game' means when you've pointed to quite a few games and added a similarity rider and are satisfied that they've understood.
Is it that what counts as exact depends on circumstances or is it that we'll be satisfied with a certain degree of exactness in certain circumstances and want to be more exact in others? (Or both?) - I think both.
Wittgenstein wants to say that there are no clear criteria for exactness that apply in every case. What counts as exact depends on our purposes and the kind of thing that is in question. Perhaps you could say that you've told someone exactly what 'game' means when you've pointed to quite a few games and added a similarity rider and are satisfied that they've understood.
Is it that what counts as exact depends on circumstances or is it that we'll be satisfied with a certain degree of exactness in certain circumstances and want to be more exact in others? (Or both?) - I think both.
§69
We are not ignorant of the boundaries of the concept 'game' because no boundaries have been drawn (the meaning of a word is not something hidden from us that we might uncover/discover).
We can't tell others exactly what a game is (where exactly the boundary lies between games and non-games) but this should not worry us - the term is clearly usable. What we can do is point to a variety of things that are games (monopoly, football, chess, Halo) and say, 'this is a game, this is a game, and this is a game - and other similar things are called games'.
We are not ignorant of the boundaries of the concept 'game' because no boundaries have been drawn (the meaning of a word is not something hidden from us that we might uncover/discover).
We can't tell others exactly what a game is (where exactly the boundary lies between games and non-games) but this should not worry us - the term is clearly usable. What we can do is point to a variety of things that are games (monopoly, football, chess, Halo) and say, 'this is a game, this is a game, and this is a game - and other similar things are called games'.
§68
We could draw a boundary to the concepts 'number' or 'game'. BUT as it stands they do not have clear boundaries and this doesn't worry us.
We might want to draw a boundary for some purpose (e.g. if there was a 'great-tournament of games' then we might want to draw a limit to which activities will be admitted to the great tournament and which won't).
You might think it a problem that our concept 'game' does not have clear boundaries as it is ordinarily used - that there are not rules which determine exactly what is to count as a game in every instance. But we don't worry about the fact that many activities are not completely bounded by rules e.g. there are aspects of the game of tennis which are not bounded by rules - there is no rule that says you can't throw a ball above a certain height when serving.
We could draw a boundary to the concepts 'number' or 'game'. BUT as it stands they do not have clear boundaries and this doesn't worry us.
We might want to draw a boundary for some purpose (e.g. if there was a 'great-tournament of games' then we might want to draw a limit to which activities will be admitted to the great tournament and which won't).
You might think it a problem that our concept 'game' does not have clear boundaries as it is ordinarily used - that there are not rules which determine exactly what is to count as a game in every instance. But we don't worry about the fact that many activities are not completely bounded by rules e.g. there are aspects of the game of tennis which are not bounded by rules - there is no rule that says you can't throw a ball above a certain height when serving.
§67
Wittgenstein suggests that the 'similarities overlapping and criss-crossing' in the case of games are a bit like the similarities between family members. They might not always resemble each other in exactly the same way. A son might have his mother's mouth and his father's hair (his mouth resembles his mother's mouth and his hair resembles his father's hair).
'Game' is a family resemblance concept. Similarly 'number' is a family resemblance concept.
Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a thread made up of fibres. Where there is a resemblance between members of a family (numbers, games, language-games) we might picture this as the fibres coming together in a thread. But there isn't any one fibre that runs through the entire thread. - There are various overlapping similarities (various fibres bounded together in a single thread).
Someone might respond to this that there is in fact something in common throughout all games - the disjunction of all their common properties. (So 'game' could be defined as something entertaining OR competitive OR involving an element of luck OR involving a particular kind of skill).
BUT this response is no more satisfactory than saying 'there is a common element to the whole thread - the continuous overlapping of fibres'.
Wittgenstein suggests that the 'similarities overlapping and criss-crossing' in the case of games are a bit like the similarities between family members. They might not always resemble each other in exactly the same way. A son might have his mother's mouth and his father's hair (his mouth resembles his mother's mouth and his hair resembles his father's hair).
'Game' is a family resemblance concept. Similarly 'number' is a family resemblance concept.
Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a thread made up of fibres. Where there is a resemblance between members of a family (numbers, games, language-games) we might picture this as the fibres coming together in a thread. But there isn't any one fibre that runs through the entire thread. - There are various overlapping similarities (various fibres bounded together in a single thread).
Someone might respond to this that there is in fact something in common throughout all games - the disjunction of all their common properties. (So 'game' could be defined as something entertaining OR competitive OR involving an element of luck OR involving a particular kind of skill).
BUT this response is no more satisfactory than saying 'there is a common element to the whole thread - the continuous overlapping of fibres'.
§66
Board-games, card games, athletic games, etc. do not have something in common by which they are defined. 'Game' cannot be given a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - and this should not worry us. What you've got in the case of the concept 'game' is, "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small."
Given that this passage follows immediately from the one about the essence of language it seems clear that one point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we cannot find the essence of language and this should not worry us. This is not because the task is a particularly difficult task of discovery but because 'language' cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Another point we can take from this passage is that we should not always think that definitions in terms of necessary conditions can be given. So if we've been struggling to come up with a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of some term we should not take this as clear evidence that we've failed to define/explain the meaning of the term in question. We should keep in mind that some concepts are 'family resemblance' concepts.
Board-games, card games, athletic games, etc. do not have something in common by which they are defined. 'Game' cannot be given a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - and this should not worry us. What you've got in the case of the concept 'game' is, "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small."
Given that this passage follows immediately from the one about the essence of language it seems clear that one point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we cannot find the essence of language and this should not worry us. This is not because the task is a particularly difficult task of discovery but because 'language' cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Another point we can take from this passage is that we should not always think that definitions in terms of necessary conditions can be given. So if we've been struggling to come up with a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of some term we should not take this as clear evidence that we've failed to define/explain the meaning of the term in question. We should keep in mind that some concepts are 'family resemblance' concepts.
§65
We might imagine an objection which is something along the lines of - you're good at criticising my account of the essence of language but it's much easier to criticise than to offer a positive account of your own. Where's your account of the essence of language?
Wittgenstein's response is to say that to think that there is something essential - common to all language-games - or to think that there must be something common to all language-games (in virtue of which they count as language-games) is mistaken and misleading.
Language-games do not have a single feature in common but there are various similarities between language-games. - Much like games (§66).
We might imagine an objection which is something along the lines of - you're good at criticising my account of the essence of language but it's much easier to criticise than to offer a positive account of your own. Where's your account of the essence of language?
Wittgenstein's response is to say that to think that there is something essential - common to all language-games - or to think that there must be something common to all language-games (in virtue of which they count as language-games) is mistaken and misleading.
Language-games do not have a single feature in common but there are various similarities between language-games. - Much like games (§66).
§64
Wittgenstein comes up with a parallel case to the broom/broomstick-brush case. He imagines a language where names signify rectangles consisting of two coloured squares. - This is like the language game of §48 except in this case there are no names for individual colours. You could order someone to construct an arrangement of rectangles, perhaps, - like in §48. In this case you could, perhaps, say that the language game of §64 has the advantage of using shorter orders to achieve the same sort of results as in §48.
Wittgenstein asks 'in what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?'.
You could respond, perhaps, by saying that no such 'analysis' can be given in this case. The objects referred to are not complex, exactly, because there are no concepts for the coloured squares that make up the rectangles. But you might also respond by saying that it perhaps depends on your purposes. If you wanted to construct a square made up of nine squares (like in §48) you couldn't do so in the language of §64.
Wittgenstein comes up with a parallel case to the broom/broomstick-brush case. He imagines a language where names signify rectangles consisting of two coloured squares. - This is like the language game of §48 except in this case there are no names for individual colours. You could order someone to construct an arrangement of rectangles, perhaps, - like in §48. In this case you could, perhaps, say that the language game of §64 has the advantage of using shorter orders to achieve the same sort of results as in §48.
Wittgenstein asks 'in what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?'.
You could respond, perhaps, by saying that no such 'analysis' can be given in this case. The objects referred to are not complex, exactly, because there are no concepts for the coloured squares that make up the rectangles. But you might also respond by saying that it perhaps depends on your purposes. If you wanted to construct a square made up of nine squares (like in §48) you couldn't do so in the language of §64.
Wednesday 20 February 2013
§63
Wittgenstein imagines that the defender of analysis might claim that the person who is given the second order (for broomstick-and-brush) is being given more - something more fundamental. The person who is given the 'unanalysed' order (for the broom) lacks the analysis. But you could perhaps say that the person given the 'analysed' order lacks something too (the perspicuity presented to the person ordered to bring a broom?)
Wittgenstein imagines that the defender of analysis might claim that the person who is given the second order (for broomstick-and-brush) is being given more - something more fundamental. The person who is given the 'unanalysed' order (for the broom) lacks the analysis. But you could perhaps say that the person given the 'analysed' order lacks something too (the perspicuity presented to the person ordered to bring a broom?)
§62
Wittgenstein presents us with an imagined situation in which the two orders ((i) for broom (ii) for broomstick and attached brush) are given. In this situation the person has a table coordinating names ('brush', 'broomstick', 'broom' etc.) and pictures. Does the person do the same when he carries out each order?
- 'Yes and no' Wittgenstein says.
You might say 'yes' because in both cases the person does as instructed and brings the broom (or the broomstick with brush attached, which amounts to the same thing).
You might say 'no' because in one case the person looks for the word 'broom' and finds the corresponding picture whereas in the second case they look for two words - 'broomstick' and 'brush' - and find (different) pictures correlated. We do not use the words 'the same' in the same way always and everywhere.
Wittgenstein presents us with an imagined situation in which the two orders ((i) for broom (ii) for broomstick and attached brush) are given. In this situation the person has a table coordinating names ('brush', 'broomstick', 'broom' etc.) and pictures. Does the person do the same when he carries out each order?
- 'Yes and no' Wittgenstein says.
You might say 'yes' because in both cases the person does as instructed and brings the broom (or the broomstick with brush attached, which amounts to the same thing).
You might say 'no' because in one case the person looks for the word 'broom' and finds the corresponding picture whereas in the second case they look for two words - 'broomstick' and 'brush' - and find (different) pictures correlated. We do not use the words 'the same' in the same way always and everywhere.
§61
Wittgenstein grants that the order for a broom and the order for a broomstick-and-attached-brush 'come to the same thing' but seems to hesitate to say that the second is an analysed form of the first. Does he hesitate because he wants us to recognise that relationships between concepts (conceptual/logical) aren't like relationships between bits of objects (or between objects)?
I think, in §61, Wittgenstein wants to bring our attention to context's role in deciding whether two sentences play the same role/mean the same thing (see §62 too).
Wittgenstein grants that the order for a broom and the order for a broomstick-and-attached-brush 'come to the same thing' but seems to hesitate to say that the second is an analysed form of the first. Does he hesitate because he wants us to recognise that relationships between concepts (conceptual/logical) aren't like relationships between bits of objects (or between objects)?
I think, in §61, Wittgenstein wants to bring our attention to context's role in deciding whether two sentences play the same role/mean the same thing (see §62 too).
§60
People like Russell and Frege think that they are making language more clear/perspicuous by presenting us with 'analyses' of sentences which 'break down' denoting expressions into constituent parts which are isomorphic with the reality referred to. BUT Wittgenstein suggests that it is no more clear - in fact a bit odd/obscure - to say, "bring me the broomstick with the brush which is fitted to it" rather than "bring me the broom".
Wittgenstein asks the (rhetorical) question, "the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of constituent parts?". I assume his answer to this is 'no'.
So he is making two claims here:
(1) That analysis, which aims at clarity, actually leads to obscurity in at least some instances. It might help to think about the purpose of ordering someone to bring a broom here. Simply saying, "bring me the broom" serves one's purpose whereas saying, "bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it!" is likely to confuse people. The 'analysed' sentence is more obscure/strange.
(2) It's a mistake to think in terms of language and reality being isomorphic in the first place anyway.
People like Russell and Frege think that they are making language more clear/perspicuous by presenting us with 'analyses' of sentences which 'break down' denoting expressions into constituent parts which are isomorphic with the reality referred to. BUT Wittgenstein suggests that it is no more clear - in fact a bit odd/obscure - to say, "bring me the broomstick with the brush which is fitted to it" rather than "bring me the broom".
Wittgenstein asks the (rhetorical) question, "the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of constituent parts?". I assume his answer to this is 'no'.
So he is making two claims here:
(1) That analysis, which aims at clarity, actually leads to obscurity in at least some instances. It might help to think about the purpose of ordering someone to bring a broom here. Simply saying, "bring me the broom" serves one's purpose whereas saying, "bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it!" is likely to confuse people. The 'analysed' sentence is more obscure/strange.
(2) It's a mistake to think in terms of language and reality being isomorphic in the first place anyway.
§59
Wittgenstein suggests that those who claim that names each only signify an element of reality are captivated by a certain picture/model.
Wittgenstein suggests that we do not experience these elements ("...experience does not show us these elements."). What is Wittgenstein's point here? - Is it that we don't encounter redness, as an element, - only red things?
We can see constituent parts, say, of a chair. We can also see a whole (chair) destroyed while its constituent parts remain unchanged (the back and legs might be removed from a chair). "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality", Wittgenstein says. I'm not quite sure what he's getting at here. I assume that the 'picture' he's referring to is something like the Tractarian metaphyics and philosophy of language. We get to this picture by reflecting on cases like the chair case, I suppose. We think of things like chairs being made up of constituents that might survive their destruction. Is Wittgenstein's suggestion that we then extrapolate from this that reality is made up of things which are complex and destructible and that these things are made up of parts/elements which are ultimately indestructible (must be). How do we get to this?
Wittgenstein suggests that those who claim that names each only signify an element of reality are captivated by a certain picture/model.
Wittgenstein suggests that we do not experience these elements ("...experience does not show us these elements."). What is Wittgenstein's point here? - Is it that we don't encounter redness, as an element, - only red things?
We can see constituent parts, say, of a chair. We can also see a whole (chair) destroyed while its constituent parts remain unchanged (the back and legs might be removed from a chair). "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality", Wittgenstein says. I'm not quite sure what he's getting at here. I assume that the 'picture' he's referring to is something like the Tractarian metaphyics and philosophy of language. We get to this picture by reflecting on cases like the chair case, I suppose. We think of things like chairs being made up of constituents that might survive their destruction. Is Wittgenstein's suggestion that we then extrapolate from this that reality is made up of things which are complex and destructible and that these things are made up of parts/elements which are ultimately indestructible (must be). How do we get to this?
Monday 18 February 2013
§58
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is saying here. He suggests that we might want to say that 'red exists' does not make sense. Is the reason for this that propositions that make sense must be bipolar and 'red exists' is not bipolar (because 'red', as a simple object, must exist)? - This sounds as though Wittgenstein is attacking the 'metaphysical' claims of the Tractatus.
(Here's Hacker's summary of the argument of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in §58: "The argument is that one cannot say 'red exists', since one cannot assert its negation 'red does not exist', because if red didn't exist, one could not speak of it in order to say that it does not exist.)
Wittgenstein suggests that this isn't far from being correct but in fact the reason we're tempted to say this is that red things play the role of samples - and so belong to language (am I getting him right here?).
All we're saying when we say that 'red exists' is that there are things with that colour.
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is saying here. He suggests that we might want to say that 'red exists' does not make sense. Is the reason for this that propositions that make sense must be bipolar and 'red exists' is not bipolar (because 'red', as a simple object, must exist)? - This sounds as though Wittgenstein is attacking the 'metaphysical' claims of the Tractatus.
(Here's Hacker's summary of the argument of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in §58: "The argument is that one cannot say 'red exists', since one cannot assert its negation 'red does not exist', because if red didn't exist, one could not speak of it in order to say that it does not exist.)
Wittgenstein suggests that this isn't far from being correct but in fact the reason we're tempted to say this is that red things play the role of samples - and so belong to language (am I getting him right here?).
All we're saying when we say that 'red exists' is that there are things with that colour.
§57
Someone might claim that red things can be destroyed (e.g. a fire engine might be blown up by a bomb) but red cannot be destroyed. This is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing. - This sounds like someone trying to cling on to some version of the Augustinian theory - where words have a meaning because they refer to some 'object' (in a broad sense - incorporating properties/universals) - but not to particular instances of some property (e.g. the redness of a fire engine).
Wittgenstein (kind-of) agrees - he says that it make no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded into bits. But presumably Wittgenstein would want to say that this is a grammatical point rather than, say, a comment on the nature of redness. - He's not doing metaphysics here.
Wittgenstein nonetheless wants to claim that a name (such as 'red') might lose its meaning if all of the red things were destroyed and we forgot which colour the word referred to (amongst the colours that we could bring before our minds). In that case what has happened is that we've lost a paradigm. - We've lost a sample that played a role in the language game (i.e. it functioned as something like a rule - a standard by which we could decide whether something was red).
In §57 then, Wittgenstein is challenging metaphysical claims about simple objects being indestructible things which guarantee that a word has a meaning.
Someone might claim that red things can be destroyed (e.g. a fire engine might be blown up by a bomb) but red cannot be destroyed. This is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing. - This sounds like someone trying to cling on to some version of the Augustinian theory - where words have a meaning because they refer to some 'object' (in a broad sense - incorporating properties/universals) - but not to particular instances of some property (e.g. the redness of a fire engine).
Wittgenstein (kind-of) agrees - he says that it make no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded into bits. But presumably Wittgenstein would want to say that this is a grammatical point rather than, say, a comment on the nature of redness. - He's not doing metaphysics here.
Wittgenstein nonetheless wants to claim that a name (such as 'red') might lose its meaning if all of the red things were destroyed and we forgot which colour the word referred to (amongst the colours that we could bring before our minds). In that case what has happened is that we've lost a paradigm. - We've lost a sample that played a role in the language game (i.e. it functioned as something like a rule - a standard by which we could decide whether something was red).
In §57 then, Wittgenstein is challenging metaphysical claims about simple objects being indestructible things which guarantee that a word has a meaning.
§56
I'm not totally sure what point Wittgenstein is making in §56. Is he challenging the view that simples/universals such as red must exist?
What if all of the samples of red were to be destroyed? - What if all of the red things in the world vanished? (Is this the kind of case Wittgenstein wants us to imagine?) Would the word 'red' continue to have a meaning? - Perhaps it would if we called to mind/remembered the colour - produced an image in our mind's eye.
But in that case it is unclear whether we've remembered correctly. - We have no standard of correctness in place. Isn't this enough to make Wittgenstein's point? - Why does Wittgenstein go on here?
Wittgenstein goes on to make the point that we would sometimes say that we must have misremembered something - even if something appears a different shade to us one day - if we make a colour out of a particular combination of chemical substances. There you might appeal to the fact that the colour has been produced by the same chemical combination as a reason for thinking that what you've produced is the same colour as before - even if your memory tells you different. In which case your memory does not always produce 'the verdict of the highest court of appeal'.
I'm not totally sure what point Wittgenstein is making in §56. Is he challenging the view that simples/universals such as red must exist?
What if all of the samples of red were to be destroyed? - What if all of the red things in the world vanished? (Is this the kind of case Wittgenstein wants us to imagine?) Would the word 'red' continue to have a meaning? - Perhaps it would if we called to mind/remembered the colour - produced an image in our mind's eye.
But in that case it is unclear whether we've remembered correctly. - We have no standard of correctness in place. Isn't this enough to make Wittgenstein's point? - Why does Wittgenstein go on here?
Wittgenstein goes on to make the point that we would sometimes say that we must have misremembered something - even if something appears a different shade to us one day - if we make a colour out of a particular combination of chemical substances. There you might appeal to the fact that the colour has been produced by the same chemical combination as a reason for thinking that what you've produced is the same colour as before - even if your memory tells you different. In which case your memory does not always produce 'the verdict of the highest court of appeal'.
§55
- This passage might help in getting clearer about §50.
Someone might make the following argument:
1. It must be possible to describe the state of affairs where everything destructible is destroyed.
2. The description from 1. will contain words.
3. What corresponds to the words in the description of 1. cannot be destroyed (because everything destructible has been destroyed and so what remains must be indestructible) - the words would have no meaning if nothing corresponded to them.
So
C. What the names in language signify must be indestructible.
Wittgenstein makes several points in response to this:
(i) Wouldn't the description be composite and so destructible?
(ii) Names don't lose their meaning when their bearer is destroyed.
BUT
(iii) Paradigms/samples - if they are destroyed then the corresponding phrase/name loses its meaning.
Presumably Wittgenstein is thinking here of something like the standard metre. If our use of the phrase '1 metre long' is used in accordance with the standard of the standard metre in Paris then ni destroying the standard metre we would no longer be able to say that anything was one metre long.
- This passage might help in getting clearer about §50.
Someone might make the following argument:
1. It must be possible to describe the state of affairs where everything destructible is destroyed.
2. The description from 1. will contain words.
3. What corresponds to the words in the description of 1. cannot be destroyed (because everything destructible has been destroyed and so what remains must be indestructible) - the words would have no meaning if nothing corresponded to them.
So
C. What the names in language signify must be indestructible.
Wittgenstein makes several points in response to this:
(i) Wouldn't the description be composite and so destructible?
(ii) Names don't lose their meaning when their bearer is destroyed.
BUT
(iii) Paradigms/samples - if they are destroyed then the corresponding phrase/name loses its meaning.
Presumably Wittgenstein is thinking here of something like the standard metre. If our use of the phrase '1 metre long' is used in accordance with the standard of the standard metre in Paris then ni destroying the standard metre we would no longer be able to say that anything was one metre long.
§54
Rules in games have various roles:
- teaching aid
- tool of the game
Rules can be gleaned from the behaviour of the players of the game. We can recognise the behaviour of someone correcting a mistake. Is Wittgenstein claiming here that language learning involves us being able to recognise natural/characteristic forms of behaviour?
Rules in games have various roles:
- teaching aid
- tool of the game
Rules can be gleaned from the behaviour of the players of the game. We can recognise the behaviour of someone correcting a mistake. Is Wittgenstein claiming here that language learning involves us being able to recognise natural/characteristic forms of behaviour?
§53
We would say that a sign e.g. 'R' is the name of a square of such and such a colour e.g. red, if the signs were taught to people in a certain way (I assume Wittgenstein's point here is that there is an internal connection between the meaning of 'R' and it being taught in a certain way - R's having the meaning it does is tied up with the language game). - Or it could be laid down in a chart (here I assume Wittgenstein is pointing to the normativity of meaning - that the chart is a kind of standard/rule against which we can decide whether a term is used correctly).
Wittgenstein makes the point that a rule may have different roles in the language game. He uses the example of someone using the chart to see which letters (words in this language game) correspond to which coloured squares. Someone might also use the chart in composing a complex of squares according to the words uttered by someone else. - Are these two different roles for the rule?
We would say that a sign e.g. 'R' is the name of a square of such and such a colour e.g. red, if the signs were taught to people in a certain way (I assume Wittgenstein's point here is that there is an internal connection between the meaning of 'R' and it being taught in a certain way - R's having the meaning it does is tied up with the language game). - Or it could be laid down in a chart (here I assume Wittgenstein is pointing to the normativity of meaning - that the chart is a kind of standard/rule against which we can decide whether a term is used correctly).
Wittgenstein makes the point that a rule may have different roles in the language game. He uses the example of someone using the chart to see which letters (words in this language game) correspond to which coloured squares. Someone might also use the chart in composing a complex of squares according to the words uttered by someone else. - Are these two different roles for the rule?
§52
In philosophy we tend to think that things must be a certain way - misled by 'grammar'. Because we think that things must be a certain way we are not inclined to closely examine the details. - But this is what we need to do in philosophy - carefully examine the ordinary use of words. (Wittgenstein uses a strange analogy with a mouse (apparently) coming into being by spontaneous generation out of grey rags).
In philosophy we tend to think that things must be a certain way - misled by 'grammar'. Because we think that things must be a certain way we are not inclined to closely examine the details. - But this is what we need to do in philosophy - carefully examine the ordinary use of words. (Wittgenstein uses a strange analogy with a mouse (apparently) coming into being by spontaneous generation out of grey rags).
§51
What does 'R's signifying a red square consist in? - NOT that people, when they are describing squares, always say 'R' when there is a red square - because someone might go wrong in their description - they might make a mistake. - Is this parallel to the point that the meaning of a word is not how it is, in fact, always used - but it's correct use?
It needn't be that people using the language always have a red square come before their mind when they say 'R'. - Meaning 'red square' by 'R' then does not consist in having some particular thing before one's mind.
What does 'R's signifying a red square consist in? - NOT that people, when they are describing squares, always say 'R' when there is a red square - because someone might go wrong in their description - they might make a mistake. - Is this parallel to the point that the meaning of a word is not how it is, in fact, always used - but it's correct use?
It needn't be that people using the language always have a red square come before their mind when they say 'R'. - Meaning 'red square' by 'R' then does not consist in having some particular thing before one's mind.
§50
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long. Why say this? - Because it plays the role of being the standard by which we determine whether other things are one metre or not (or by which we calibrate metre sticks). You might say that 'the standard metre is one metre long is true' - but if we can say that it is true then it is not true in the same way that descriptions/empirical claims are.
Wittgenstein uses the standard metre case to make a point about the metaphysics of the Tractatus. Just as we cannot say that the standard metre is either one metre long or not one metre long, we can attribute neither being nor non-being to the elements. This is because by definition within the system 'being' and 'non-being' consist in the obtaining and non-obtaining of connections between elements. In the standard metre case the standard metre plays a normative function - it is a standard by which metre sticks are calibrated. Similarly, in the elements/destruction case - it is a grammatical rule that destruction = something obtaining/not-obtaining between elements - and so an element on its own cannot (according to the rule) be destroyed.
It's a mistake to think of this as some kind of metaphysical oddity.
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long. Why say this? - Because it plays the role of being the standard by which we determine whether other things are one metre or not (or by which we calibrate metre sticks). You might say that 'the standard metre is one metre long is true' - but if we can say that it is true then it is not true in the same way that descriptions/empirical claims are.
Wittgenstein uses the standard metre case to make a point about the metaphysics of the Tractatus. Just as we cannot say that the standard metre is either one metre long or not one metre long, we can attribute neither being nor non-being to the elements. This is because by definition within the system 'being' and 'non-being' consist in the obtaining and non-obtaining of connections between elements. In the standard metre case the standard metre plays a normative function - it is a standard by which metre sticks are calibrated. Similarly, in the elements/destruction case - it is a grammatical rule that destruction = something obtaining/not-obtaining between elements - and so an element on its own cannot (according to the rule) be destroyed.
It's a mistake to think of this as some kind of metaphysical oddity.
Sunday 17 February 2013
§49
It is wrong to contrast naming (a simple element) with describing (a composite thing) because, "naming and describing do not stand on the same level". As Wittgenstein had pointed out in §26, naming is preparation for the use of a word - perhaps in describing.
A name only functions as a name in the context of a lanaguage game - naming itself is not a move in the language game.
It is wrong to contrast naming (a simple element) with describing (a composite thing) because, "naming and describing do not stand on the same level". As Wittgenstein had pointed out in §26, naming is preparation for the use of a word - perhaps in describing.
A name only functions as a name in the context of a lanaguage game - naming itself is not a move in the language game.
§48
Wittgenstein introduces a new language game in §48. He refers to the 'method of 2' here. I assume he is talking about using a language game (i.e. a 'primitive langauge') to highlight something about language/meaning.
In this language/language game words ('R', 'G', 'W', 'B') correspond to elements - coloured squares. I assume that he is constructing a language like this because he wants to come up with a language that approximates to the account of language given in the Tractatus - with names corresponding to (simple) elements. - This is a bit like the language constructed in §2, which was supposed to 'fit' with the Augustinian picture.
It seems natural to say, in this case, that a coloured square is a simple element BUT you could say that a square consists of two rectangles or that it consists of a colour and a shape as elements. It could be that something smaller was composed of something greater (e.g. that a square was composed of two squares minus one square). - This might sound strange but there are cases where we talk in this way (e.g. about the 'composition' of forces). - What is 'simple' is relative to the kind of thing that we are talking about and our purposes in talking about that kind of thing.
It doesn't matter how we think about how things are made up of other things as long as we avoid misunderstanding.
(What applies to the language game of §48 presumably applies to a greater extent to our own language).
Wittgenstein introduces a new language game in §48. He refers to the 'method of 2' here. I assume he is talking about using a language game (i.e. a 'primitive langauge') to highlight something about language/meaning.
In this language/language game words ('R', 'G', 'W', 'B') correspond to elements - coloured squares. I assume that he is constructing a language like this because he wants to come up with a language that approximates to the account of language given in the Tractatus - with names corresponding to (simple) elements. - This is a bit like the language constructed in §2, which was supposed to 'fit' with the Augustinian picture.
It seems natural to say, in this case, that a coloured square is a simple element BUT you could say that a square consists of two rectangles or that it consists of a colour and a shape as elements. It could be that something smaller was composed of something greater (e.g. that a square was composed of two squares minus one square). - This might sound strange but there are cases where we talk in this way (e.g. about the 'composition' of forces). - What is 'simple' is relative to the kind of thing that we are talking about and our purposes in talking about that kind of thing.
It doesn't matter how we think about how things are made up of other things as long as we avoid misunderstanding.
(What applies to the language game of §48 presumably applies to a greater extent to our own language).
§47
In §47 Wittgenstein suggests that his own earlier view (and the views of Plato and Russell) was mistaken. - He wants to challenge the view that reality is composed of simple constituent parts with certain combinatorial possibilities that are refelcted in language.
He points out that it is unclear what the simple (i.e. not composite) parts of a chair are. Would it be the seat, the legs, the back? Individual pieces of wood? Molecules? Atoms?
It makes no sense to ask whether what you see before you (a visual image?) is composite unless it is already clear what kind of compositeness is in question. Wittgenstein has already pointed out that words can be compared to tools - and that there is a great variety of different kinds of word. Similarly there are different kinds of compositeness that might be in question.
The word 'composite' is used in many different ways - and there will be a corresponding sense in which something is simple/unanalysable relative to these different ways in which we use 'composite'/
Wittgenstein leaves alone the question of visual images in the 'theory of perception' here. Do we see trees or visual images of trees?
In §47 Wittgenstein suggests that his own earlier view (and the views of Plato and Russell) was mistaken. - He wants to challenge the view that reality is composed of simple constituent parts with certain combinatorial possibilities that are refelcted in language.
He points out that it is unclear what the simple (i.e. not composite) parts of a chair are. Would it be the seat, the legs, the back? Individual pieces of wood? Molecules? Atoms?
It makes no sense to ask whether what you see before you (a visual image?) is composite unless it is already clear what kind of compositeness is in question. Wittgenstein has already pointed out that words can be compared to tools - and that there is a great variety of different kinds of word. Similarly there are different kinds of compositeness that might be in question.
The word 'composite' is used in many different ways - and there will be a corresponding sense in which something is simple/unanalysable relative to these different ways in which we use 'composite'/
Wittgenstein leaves alone the question of visual images in the 'theory of perception' here. Do we see trees or visual images of trees?
§46
Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, had claimed that names correspond to simple objects - 'primary elements'. Anything more complex must correspond to an 'interweaving of names' according to his earlier view (which he now wants to reject). Presumably his earlier view was due to his commitment to there being a one-to-one correspondence between language and world.
(This is still part of undermining the Augustianian picture - "...the words in the language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names").
Wittgenstein clearly thinks that the Augustinian picture is tempting to people across cultures and across time. He has picked Augustine as someone in whom he detects the picture and in §46 he looks to Plato for an account of what lies behind the idea that names signify simples. Plato, Russell, and Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) all share the idea that the meaning of expressions corresponds to the ontological category of the item referred to by the word. The simple elements of reality - the 'objects' or 'individuals' can only be named - they cannot be described because descriptions only apply to complexes. - Descriptions are combinations of names. This is a kind of extension of the Augustinian picture - that sentences are primarily for describing and other kinds of sentence that do not seem to be descriptive (e.g. questions) have a descriptive component.
Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, had claimed that names correspond to simple objects - 'primary elements'. Anything more complex must correspond to an 'interweaving of names' according to his earlier view (which he now wants to reject). Presumably his earlier view was due to his commitment to there being a one-to-one correspondence between language and world.
(This is still part of undermining the Augustianian picture - "...the words in the language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names").
Wittgenstein clearly thinks that the Augustinian picture is tempting to people across cultures and across time. He has picked Augustine as someone in whom he detects the picture and in §46 he looks to Plato for an account of what lies behind the idea that names signify simples. Plato, Russell, and Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) all share the idea that the meaning of expressions corresponds to the ontological category of the item referred to by the word. The simple elements of reality - the 'objects' or 'individuals' can only be named - they cannot be described because descriptions only apply to complexes. - Descriptions are combinations of names. This is a kind of extension of the Augustinian picture - that sentences are primarily for describing and other kinds of sentence that do not seem to be descriptive (e.g. questions) have a descriptive component.
§44
Wittgenstein makes the point again that whether a sign loses its meaning when its bearer is gone depends upon the language game - whether it has a use in the language game when the bearer is gone. We could imagine a language game where names are always used only in the presence of the bearer and so could be replaced by 'this' or 'that' in every case.
Wittgenstein makes the point again that whether a sign loses its meaning when its bearer is gone depends upon the language game - whether it has a use in the language game when the bearer is gone. We could imagine a language game where names are always used only in the presence of the bearer and so could be replaced by 'this' or 'that' in every case.
§43
Wittgenstein presents us with his famous claim that, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language".
It's worth noting, I think, that Wittgenstein qualifies this by saying that this is true in a large class of cases but not all cases. - It is no objection to Wittgenstein to find cases where 'use' and 'meaning' do not overlap.
It seems to me that Wittgenstein is right here. If someone asked 'what does 'dog' mean?' it would be appropriate to respond by telling them how the term 'dog' is used. You could show them dogs and say 'the word 'dog' is used to refer to things like these, namely furry things that bark. Alternatively someone might ask how the expression 'dog' is used and you could respond, appropriately by saying that when we use the expression 'dog' we mean these things (pointing at dogs).
Wittgenstein had claimed in §40 that it was a mistake to conflate the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. Nonetheless, he says that the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
Note: There is a good article on meaning and use here: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/58204/1/The_use_of_use_-_Daniel_Whiting.pdf
Wittgenstein presents us with his famous claim that, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language".
It's worth noting, I think, that Wittgenstein qualifies this by saying that this is true in a large class of cases but not all cases. - It is no objection to Wittgenstein to find cases where 'use' and 'meaning' do not overlap.
It seems to me that Wittgenstein is right here. If someone asked 'what does 'dog' mean?' it would be appropriate to respond by telling them how the term 'dog' is used. You could show them dogs and say 'the word 'dog' is used to refer to things like these, namely furry things that bark. Alternatively someone might ask how the expression 'dog' is used and you could respond, appropriately by saying that when we use the expression 'dog' we mean these things (pointing at dogs).
Wittgenstein had claimed in §40 that it was a mistake to conflate the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. Nonetheless, he says that the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
Note: There is a good article on meaning and use here: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/58204/1/The_use_of_use_-_Daniel_Whiting.pdf
§40
Wittgenstein points out problems with the explanation from §39. He disputes the claim that 'a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it'. - As he has already pointed out earlier, we should not conflate the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. It is mistaken to claim that 'meaning' signifies something corresponding to the word.
When someone (e.g. N. N.) dies the bearer of the name is gone but the meaning does not die/go away.
Wittgenstein says that "if the name ceased to have meaning then it would make no sense to say 'N. N. is dead'" - but it does make sense, and so the name does not cease to have meaning.
This suggests that Wittgenstein thinks that names - proper names - have meanings. - Or is this just a reductio ad absurdum of the position he opposes? - Either way it seems clear that Wittgenstein is making an argument here.
I've read commentators who suggest that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein - I'd be grateful if someone could say who it is that makes these claims because I can't remember. It has been claimed that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein for various reasons:
- (i) Because the Investigations is written in something like a dialectical form - with different 'voices' in it. It isn't always clear which, if any, of the voices, is Wittgenstein's position (Stern).
- (ii) Because the positions which Wittgenstein opposes are not coherent/do not make sense - and so Wittgenstein cannot argue for the opposite. He can just 'assemble reminders' which show that his opponent is unsuccessful in making sense.
Wittgenstein points out problems with the explanation from §39. He disputes the claim that 'a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it'. - As he has already pointed out earlier, we should not conflate the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. It is mistaken to claim that 'meaning' signifies something corresponding to the word.
When someone (e.g. N. N.) dies the bearer of the name is gone but the meaning does not die/go away.
Wittgenstein says that "if the name ceased to have meaning then it would make no sense to say 'N. N. is dead'" - but it does make sense, and so the name does not cease to have meaning.
This suggests that Wittgenstein thinks that names - proper names - have meanings. - Or is this just a reductio ad absurdum of the position he opposes? - Either way it seems clear that Wittgenstein is making an argument here.
I've read commentators who suggest that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein - I'd be grateful if someone could say who it is that makes these claims because I can't remember. It has been claimed that we should be wary of attributing arguments to Wittgenstein for various reasons:
- (i) Because the Investigations is written in something like a dialectical form - with different 'voices' in it. It isn't always clear which, if any, of the voices, is Wittgenstein's position (Stern).
- (ii) Because the positions which Wittgenstein opposes are not coherent/do not make sense - and so Wittgenstein cannot argue for the opposite. He can just 'assemble reminders' which show that his opponent is unsuccessful in making sense.
§39
Wittgenstein explains why it is that someone might be tempted to say that words that are clearly not names, such as 'this' are names (and also claim that words that clearly are names, e.g. Walter Scott, are not in fact names). - Wittgenstein has people like Bertrand Russell in mind here, I assume.
What is the explanation?
- It is explained by someone (e.g. Russell) thinking that names ought really to signify simples (something is simple if it is unanalysable/not complex).
- Why think that names ought to signify simples? - 'Nothung' case. Nothung is a sword. We think that 'Nothung' still names something even if the sword named by it is shattered. - The word must still correspond to something, we might think. One way in which we might get started along this route is to think that the role of words in general is to refer to something beyond themselves - words don't 'stand alone' - they stand for something, always.
Wittgenstein explains why it is that someone might be tempted to say that words that are clearly not names, such as 'this' are names (and also claim that words that clearly are names, e.g. Walter Scott, are not in fact names). - Wittgenstein has people like Bertrand Russell in mind here, I assume.
What is the explanation?
- It is explained by someone (e.g. Russell) thinking that names ought really to signify simples (something is simple if it is unanalysable/not complex).
- Why think that names ought to signify simples? - 'Nothung' case. Nothung is a sword. We think that 'Nothung' still names something even if the sword named by it is shattered. - The word must still correspond to something, we might think. One way in which we might get started along this route is to think that the role of words in general is to refer to something beyond themselves - words don't 'stand alone' - they stand for something, always.
Tuesday 12 February 2013
§38
In 'On Denoting' Russell argued that demonstratives are the only singular terms http://revueltaredaccion.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/russell_on_denoting.pdf
Wittgenstein thinks this is odd ("...strange to say, the word 'this' has been called the real name; so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate sense."). I assume it sounds odd to most people and not just to Wittgenstein.
It is more than odd - it is completely incorrect. As Wittgenstein pointed out earlier (§9) 'there' and 'this' are used quite differently to number words and the 'names' of things ('block', 'slab'). 'This' is used in ostensively defining other words (like 'slab' perhaps). You might point to something and say 'this is called a slab' or you might point at someone and say 'she is called Emma'. The use of a name is explained by the use of a demonstrative expression - but we don't explain 'that' and 'this' in that way.
Wittgenstein says in §38 that philosophical problems occur when language goes on holiday. Presumably what Wittgenstein has in mind here - in this paragraph - is that philosophical problems about denoting terms occur when we forget about how they are used ordinarily, in practice, and we start to theorise about denoting terms, as Russell did.
In 'On Denoting' Russell argued that demonstratives are the only singular terms http://revueltaredaccion.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/russell_on_denoting.pdf
Wittgenstein thinks this is odd ("...strange to say, the word 'this' has been called the real name; so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate sense."). I assume it sounds odd to most people and not just to Wittgenstein.
It is more than odd - it is completely incorrect. As Wittgenstein pointed out earlier (§9) 'there' and 'this' are used quite differently to number words and the 'names' of things ('block', 'slab'). 'This' is used in ostensively defining other words (like 'slab' perhaps). You might point to something and say 'this is called a slab' or you might point at someone and say 'she is called Emma'. The use of a name is explained by the use of a demonstrative expression - but we don't explain 'that' and 'this' in that way.
Wittgenstein says in §38 that philosophical problems occur when language goes on holiday. Presumably what Wittgenstein has in mind here - in this paragraph - is that philosophical problems about denoting terms occur when we forget about how they are used ordinarily, in practice, and we start to theorise about denoting terms, as Russell did.
§37
"What is the relationship between name and thing named?" Presumably Wittgenstein is wondering about internal relationships here. - He isn't, say, thinking about the distance between a name-tag and the person named on the tag.
He asks us to look at the language game from §2 for an answer. There, you might say that the 'name' 'slab' is tied up with certain forms of behaviour. When someone utters the word 'slab!' they intend for another person to bring them a slab. The second person demonstrates understanding by bringing a slab.
Wittgenstein goes on to say, "[a]mong many other things, this relation may also consist in the fact that hearing a name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and sometimes in the name's being written on the thing named or in its being uttered when the thing named is pointed at".
Does the relationship between name and thing named ever (in fact) consist in the fact that hearing the name calls before our mind the picture of what is named?
"What is the relationship between name and thing named?" Presumably Wittgenstein is wondering about internal relationships here. - He isn't, say, thinking about the distance between a name-tag and the person named on the tag.
He asks us to look at the language game from §2 for an answer. There, you might say that the 'name' 'slab' is tied up with certain forms of behaviour. When someone utters the word 'slab!' they intend for another person to bring them a slab. The second person demonstrates understanding by bringing a slab.
Wittgenstein goes on to say, "[a]mong many other things, this relation may also consist in the fact that hearing a name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and sometimes in the name's being written on the thing named or in its being uttered when the thing named is pointed at".
Does the relationship between name and thing named ever (in fact) consist in the fact that hearing the name calls before our mind the picture of what is named?
§36
Once someone recognises that there is no particular way of pointing at a colour or a shape they might try to look for the essence of meaning something in the mind rather than the body. Is there some mental process that guarantees that I mean this rather than that? - Wittgenstein wants to claim that there isn't.
In §36 Wittgenstein is explaining how one might get drawn into philosophical error.
Once someone recognises that there is no particular way of pointing at a colour or a shape they might try to look for the essence of meaning something in the mind rather than the body. Is there some mental process that guarantees that I mean this rather than that? - Wittgenstein wants to claim that there isn't.
In §36 Wittgenstein is explaining how one might get drawn into philosophical error.
§35
Wittgenstein grants that there may be characteristic experiences of pointing to the shape of something rather than pointing to its colour. But a characteristic-something isn't a necessary connection. A person with a certain character (e.g. friendly) isn't necessarily always friendly.
It is not the characteristic experience - if there is indeed a characteristic experience - of pointing at the colour of something that makes something an instance of pointing at the colour. This depends on the context - what happens before and after.
Wittgenstein grants that there may be characteristic experiences of pointing to the shape of something rather than pointing to its colour. But a characteristic-something isn't a necessary connection. A person with a certain character (e.g. friendly) isn't necessarily always friendly.
It is not the characteristic experience - if there is indeed a characteristic experience - of pointing at the colour of something that makes something an instance of pointing at the colour. This depends on the context - what happens before and after.
§34
Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that "...neither the expression 'to mean the explanation in such-and-such a way' nor the expression 'to interpret the expression in such-and-such a way' signifies a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of an explanation."
It seems to me that 'meaning' here means something like 'intending'. You intend to point to the shape of the object rather than to the colour of the object. What is the relationship between intending and semantic meaning? - If Wittgenstein wants to draw a conclusion about semantic meaning (meaning as use) then it seems he is equivocating here.
- It's like cases of Freudian slips - where you meant to say 'cop' but you said 'cock' or something like that. - In this case what you are talking about is what you intended to say.
Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that "...neither the expression 'to mean the explanation in such-and-such a way' nor the expression 'to interpret the expression in such-and-such a way' signifies a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of an explanation."
It seems to me that 'meaning' here means something like 'intending'. You intend to point to the shape of the object rather than to the colour of the object. What is the relationship between intending and semantic meaning? - If Wittgenstein wants to draw a conclusion about semantic meaning (meaning as use) then it seems he is equivocating here.
- It's like cases of Freudian slips - where you meant to say 'cop' but you said 'cock' or something like that. - In this case what you are talking about is what you intended to say.
Sunday 10 February 2013
§33
Someone might argue, in response to what Wittgenstein has been saying in the past few paragraphs, that somebody could interpret an ostensive explanation without having mastered the relevant language game - by guessing. Wittgenstein points out that there is no particular way of gazing at or pointing at a colour as opposed to the shape of an object. So if you're pointing at a red triangular-shaped thing you could be pointing at it intending for the person to understand that the word 'red' refers to things of this colour or that the word 'triangle' refers to things of this shape.
Wittgenstein points out that it sounds odd to ask someone to point at the number of a piece of paper. - This presumably indicates something about the role/use of number expressions as opposed to colour words or shape words (or other kinds of word).
Wittgenstein again uses a chess analogy. He says that making a move in chess "doesn't consist only in pushing a piece from here to there on the board - nor yet in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move: but in the circumstances that we call 'playing a game of chess', 'solving a chess problem', and the like."
It might be worth spelling out here how this translates into talking about language. - Presumably Wittgenstein wants to claim that making a move in a language game (which might involve uttering a word or several words in combination) doesn't just consist in the utterance of the words or in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the words (your thoughts don't imbue the words with meaning): but in the circumstances that we call "asking for something's name", "giving and responding to orders" etc. etc. - Our utterances are embedded in rule-governed practices - just as one can be said to have made a move in chess only in the context of a rule-governed practice - a game of chess.
Someone might argue, in response to what Wittgenstein has been saying in the past few paragraphs, that somebody could interpret an ostensive explanation without having mastered the relevant language game - by guessing. Wittgenstein points out that there is no particular way of gazing at or pointing at a colour as opposed to the shape of an object. So if you're pointing at a red triangular-shaped thing you could be pointing at it intending for the person to understand that the word 'red' refers to things of this colour or that the word 'triangle' refers to things of this shape.
Wittgenstein points out that it sounds odd to ask someone to point at the number of a piece of paper. - This presumably indicates something about the role/use of number expressions as opposed to colour words or shape words (or other kinds of word).
Wittgenstein again uses a chess analogy. He says that making a move in chess "doesn't consist only in pushing a piece from here to there on the board - nor yet in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move: but in the circumstances that we call 'playing a game of chess', 'solving a chess problem', and the like."
It might be worth spelling out here how this translates into talking about language. - Presumably Wittgenstein wants to claim that making a move in a language game (which might involve uttering a word or several words in combination) doesn't just consist in the utterance of the words or in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the words (your thoughts don't imbue the words with meaning): but in the circumstances that we call "asking for something's name", "giving and responding to orders" etc. etc. - Our utterances are embedded in rule-governed practices - just as one can be said to have made a move in chess only in the context of a rule-governed practice - a game of chess.
§32
Wittgenstein suggests that there is something right about the Augustinian picture. Wittgenstein clearly does not want to claim that ostensive explanations play no role in acquiring a language. But what Wittgenstein does want to claim is that they cannot play the role that Augustine ascribes to them. Ostensive explanations might be used in explaining the meaning of words to a foreigner - i.e. someone who already has a language (who has 'placeholders' in place for the various words).
Augustine suggests that in learning a language the child is a bit like the foreigner - that is they have places laid out in thought and they just need to learn how to speak. But to be able to talk to oneself in ones head one must already have a language.
Wittgenstein suggests that there is something right about the Augustinian picture. Wittgenstein clearly does not want to claim that ostensive explanations play no role in acquiring a language. But what Wittgenstein does want to claim is that they cannot play the role that Augustine ascribes to them. Ostensive explanations might be used in explaining the meaning of words to a foreigner - i.e. someone who already has a language (who has 'placeholders' in place for the various words).
Augustine suggests that in learning a language the child is a bit like the foreigner - that is they have places laid out in thought and they just need to learn how to speak. But to be able to talk to oneself in ones head one must already have a language.
§31
In §31 Wittgenstein provides some sort of an answer to the questions raised in §30. To understand an explanation like 'this is the king' Wittgenstein suggests that you must have already mastered he relevant game. So presumably Wittgenstein, in §30, was suggesting that to be able to ask what something is called you must already have mastered the relevant language-game.
David Stern: To sum up: ostensive explanation cannot be the foundation for learning a first language, because ostensive explanation presupposes a knowledge of how names work, and more generally, a grasp of their place in language, a grasp which will include familiarity with how they are used in a variety of cases. (Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations an introduction.)
In §31 Wittgenstein provides some sort of an answer to the questions raised in §30. To understand an explanation like 'this is the king' Wittgenstein suggests that you must have already mastered he relevant game. So presumably Wittgenstein, in §30, was suggesting that to be able to ask what something is called you must already have mastered the relevant language-game.
David Stern: To sum up: ostensive explanation cannot be the foundation for learning a first language, because ostensive explanation presupposes a knowledge of how names work, and more generally, a grasp of their place in language, a grasp which will include familiarity with how they are used in a variety of cases. (Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations an introduction.)
§30
§30 continues where §29 left off. In §29 Wittgenstein claimed that using terms like 'number' or 'colour' in an ostensive definition might help to clear up misunderstandings. BUT they can only be helpful if one already knows or is clear about what these words mean. Wittgenstein is also referring back to the problem raised in §28 about possible misinterpretation of ostensive definitions. - The problem is that in pointing to a (red) apple and saying 'this is red' you could be interpreted to be saying that this is one apple, or that this is an apple.
Being able to ask what something is called presupposes that one is able to do something. What is it exactly that we're supposed to be able to do? - Recognise that something belongs to a certain category? Recognise that different kinds of 'items' in the world belong to different categories (properties, colours, numbers, things/substances etc.)?
§30 continues where §29 left off. In §29 Wittgenstein claimed that using terms like 'number' or 'colour' in an ostensive definition might help to clear up misunderstandings. BUT they can only be helpful if one already knows or is clear about what these words mean. Wittgenstein is also referring back to the problem raised in §28 about possible misinterpretation of ostensive definitions. - The problem is that in pointing to a (red) apple and saying 'this is red' you could be interpreted to be saying that this is one apple, or that this is an apple.
Being able to ask what something is called presupposes that one is able to do something. What is it exactly that we're supposed to be able to do? - Recognise that something belongs to a certain category? Recognise that different kinds of 'items' in the world belong to different categories (properties, colours, numbers, things/substances etc.)?
§29
In §28 Wittgenstein had made the point that ostensive definitions can be misinterpreted. In §29 he suggests that misinterpretations might be averted by saying 'this number is called 2" (as opposed to "this is 2". This has the advantage of giving the 'place in language' (i.e. locating it as a number word rather than a colour word or some other kind of word). However, Wittgenstein points out that in order for this to be effective the word 'number' must be defined first.
Wittgenstein grants that misunderstandings can be averted in this way - but one still has to explain the meaning of the categorial terms. - And you explain them in terms of other words, which themselves need explaining. This sounds as if it will lead to an infinite regress or to circularity - either you'll end up defining terms in terms of other terms which you'd defined earlier in the chain or you'll end up continually explaining terms in terms of other terms.
Wittgenstein suggests, though, that it would be a mistake to think that the chain does not have an end. Just because you could go on explaining words in terms of other words does not mean that there is no end to the explanations. (Just because you could build another house at the end of a row of houses does not mean that the row of houses has no end).
Wittgenstein says that explanations can come to an end when you're satisfied that the other person has taken the definition as you wish them to - and they will demonstrate that in how they use the word.
I'm not sure that this is entirely satisfactory in itself. People start out with no language at all and they must have some way of acquiring it other than through linguistic explanations it seems. Is the answer that they begin to learn through ostensive training? I'm not sure.
In §28 Wittgenstein had made the point that ostensive definitions can be misinterpreted. In §29 he suggests that misinterpretations might be averted by saying 'this number is called 2" (as opposed to "this is 2". This has the advantage of giving the 'place in language' (i.e. locating it as a number word rather than a colour word or some other kind of word). However, Wittgenstein points out that in order for this to be effective the word 'number' must be defined first.
Wittgenstein grants that misunderstandings can be averted in this way - but one still has to explain the meaning of the categorial terms. - And you explain them in terms of other words, which themselves need explaining. This sounds as if it will lead to an infinite regress or to circularity - either you'll end up defining terms in terms of other terms which you'd defined earlier in the chain or you'll end up continually explaining terms in terms of other terms.
Wittgenstein suggests, though, that it would be a mistake to think that the chain does not have an end. Just because you could go on explaining words in terms of other words does not mean that there is no end to the explanations. (Just because you could build another house at the end of a row of houses does not mean that the row of houses has no end).
Wittgenstein says that explanations can come to an end when you're satisfied that the other person has taken the definition as you wish them to - and they will demonstrate that in how they use the word.
I'm not sure that this is entirely satisfactory in itself. People start out with no language at all and they must have some way of acquiring it other than through linguistic explanations it seems. Is the answer that they begin to learn through ostensive training? I'm not sure.
Saturday 9 February 2013
§28
Wittgenstein distinguishes ostensive definition from ostensive explanation (§§27-28). Ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
Ostensive explanation is the correlate of asking something's name (§27).
We could explain the meaning of a word by pointing to something that is not the thing in question (e.g. we could point to an arrogant person and say 'that person is not modest' - where what we want to explain is the meaning of the word 'modest'). There is the possibility of the explanation going awry here - but that is possible in other kinds of cases too.
--Having said that he makes a distinction here I have to say I'm not clear what the distinction amounts to.
Wittgenstein distinguishes ostensive definition from ostensive explanation (§§27-28). Ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted.
Ostensive explanation is the correlate of asking something's name (§27).
We could explain the meaning of a word by pointing to something that is not the thing in question (e.g. we could point to an arrogant person and say 'that person is not modest' - where what we want to explain is the meaning of the word 'modest'). There is the possibility of the explanation going awry here - but that is possible in other kinds of cases too.
--Having said that he makes a distinction here I have to say I'm not clear what the distinction amounts to.
§27
Simply naming things does not tell us what we are to do with words - and it is what we do with words that is really significant.
Exclamations have very different functions. Why point this out?
- One point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we are not inclined to call the word 'away', as it is used in an exclamation ('away!') the name of an object. - In fact are we ever inclined to call the word 'away' the name of an object!
Simply naming things does not tell us what we are to do with words - and it is what we do with words that is really significant.
Exclamations have very different functions. Why point this out?
- One point Wittgenstein wants to make is that we are not inclined to call the word 'away', as it is used in an exclamation ('away!') the name of an object. - In fact are we ever inclined to call the word 'away' the name of an object!
§25
Wittgenstein suggests that it is wrong to say that animals do not talk because they do not think.
Would it be better to say that they do not think because they do not talk?
I was a little unclear about what Wittgenstein was getting at here.
Here are a few thoughts:
1. Wittgenstein wants to claim that words are not imbued with meaning by their mental accompaniments. For one thing, when we say the same thing in the same sort of circumstances on two different occasions two different things might be going on in our minds. But this does not imply that we mean something different on the two different occasions.
2. I'm not sure that it is a mistake to attribute thought to animals - and I'm not sure that's Wittgenstein's position either. What does seem correct to me is to claim that no animal has sentences passing through its mind which it reflects upon. Human beings might have words pass through their minds as they as speaking - but for someone to speak does not mean that they have words passing through their minds. You don't need to formulate what you're going to say in your mind before you say it (although you might).
3. What is necessary for human beings to say something meaningful is for the words they use to have an established use - not that their words have some sort of mental accompaniment.
Wittgenstein suggests that it is wrong to say that animals do not talk because they do not think.
Would it be better to say that they do not think because they do not talk?
I was a little unclear about what Wittgenstein was getting at here.
Here are a few thoughts:
1. Wittgenstein wants to claim that words are not imbued with meaning by their mental accompaniments. For one thing, when we say the same thing in the same sort of circumstances on two different occasions two different things might be going on in our minds. But this does not imply that we mean something different on the two different occasions.
2. I'm not sure that it is a mistake to attribute thought to animals - and I'm not sure that's Wittgenstein's position either. What does seem correct to me is to claim that no animal has sentences passing through its mind which it reflects upon. Human beings might have words pass through their minds as they as speaking - but for someone to speak does not mean that they have words passing through their minds. You don't need to formulate what you're going to say in your mind before you say it (although you might).
3. What is necessary for human beings to say something meaningful is for the words they use to have an established use - not that their words have some sort of mental accompaniment.
§24
§24 is a continuation of §23. Wittgenstein had said in §23 that it is worth comparing his later view - that there is a great diversity of language-games which might be added to - with his earlier view (and with the view of 'logicians').
In §24 he tells us where failure to recognise the diversity of language-games might lead someone. If someone thinks that one 'language game' e.g. assertion is fundamental then they will try to assimilate other language games to that. You might claim, for example, that language is fundmentally about communicating truths to other people. If you take this view then you still have to account for other aspects of language which don't seem to be about communicating truths (e.g. telling jokes, or greeting people).
Wittgenstein says that we shouldn't be tempted to assimilate one sentence form to another - even if we can substitute one for another. I assume you can justify this partly by reference to Wittgenstein's earlier point that the form of a sentence is not it's essential distinguishing feature. Assertions can be distinguished from questions and orders by their role in the language game. We should recognise that sentences play a variety of roles in the activites that make up our lives.
Even within what is apparently a single language-game - description - we can distinguish many different kinds of description.
I'm not sure what the reference to solipsism is all about - but hopefully, as Wittgenstein says, the significance of his point will become clearer later.
§24 is a continuation of §23. Wittgenstein had said in §23 that it is worth comparing his later view - that there is a great diversity of language-games which might be added to - with his earlier view (and with the view of 'logicians').
In §24 he tells us where failure to recognise the diversity of language-games might lead someone. If someone thinks that one 'language game' e.g. assertion is fundamental then they will try to assimilate other language games to that. You might claim, for example, that language is fundmentally about communicating truths to other people. If you take this view then you still have to account for other aspects of language which don't seem to be about communicating truths (e.g. telling jokes, or greeting people).
Wittgenstein says that we shouldn't be tempted to assimilate one sentence form to another - even if we can substitute one for another. I assume you can justify this partly by reference to Wittgenstein's earlier point that the form of a sentence is not it's essential distinguishing feature. Assertions can be distinguished from questions and orders by their role in the language game. We should recognise that sentences play a variety of roles in the activites that make up our lives.
Even within what is apparently a single language-game - description - we can distinguish many different kinds of description.
I'm not sure what the reference to solipsism is all about - but hopefully, as Wittgenstein says, the significance of his point will become clearer later.
Monday 4 February 2013
§23
Wittgenstein says that there are indefinitely many kinds of words, signs, and sentences. New kinds might come into existence and old ones might become obsolete. You could also add the point made in §17 here - that words can be classified in a variety of ways depending on the aims of classification.
Wittgenstein says that it is worth thinking about what logicians have said about language in this light. - Presumably his point is that 'logicians'/philosophers of language have thought about language in abstraction from the activities that speaking a language is part of and that this has distorted their view of language.
Wittgenstein says that there are indefinitely many kinds of words, signs, and sentences. New kinds might come into existence and old ones might become obsolete. You could also add the point made in §17 here - that words can be classified in a variety of ways depending on the aims of classification.
Wittgenstein says that it is worth thinking about what logicians have said about language in this light. - Presumably his point is that 'logicians'/philosophers of language have thought about language in abstraction from the activities that speaking a language is part of and that this has distorted their view of language.
§22
In this passage Wittgenstein wants to undermine Frege's view "...that every assertion contains an assumption which is the thing that is asserted". I don't know whether this is an accurate portrayal of Frege's view - which of Frege's works is he referring to here?
I think Frege's view (or Frege's view according to Wittgenstein) is this:
That different kinds of sentence contain the same content but differ in terms of the 'force-operator'. The 'assumption' in question is an unasserted proposition (is that right? - proposition?). So you could take a proposition like 'there are twelve chairs in this room' and simply contemplate it without asserting it - or you might assert it - or you might ask whether there are twelve chairs in the room. All three cases share 'there are twelve chairs in this room' in common but you might 'add' assertoric force or you might add interrogative force (make it into a question).
Wittgenstein thinks that it is mistaken to think of an assertion as consisting of two acts - (i) entertaining (e.g. entertaining the proposition that 'there are twelve chairs in the room) and (ii) asserting. For one thing, Wittgenstein says, we could write every assertion in the form of a question followed by 'yes' or 'no' but this would not demonstrate that every assertion contains a question.
Wittgenstein's point here - I think - is that assertions are not the primary or prototypical components of language. If we want to understand language and meaning it is important to think about questions, commands, assertions, cracking jokes, and so on - all of the various language games.
Philosophers of language are mistaken to focus on propositions/assertions - including Wittgenstein himself in his earlier work. Language is made up of diverse 'tools'.
In this passage Wittgenstein wants to undermine Frege's view "...that every assertion contains an assumption which is the thing that is asserted". I don't know whether this is an accurate portrayal of Frege's view - which of Frege's works is he referring to here?
I think Frege's view (or Frege's view according to Wittgenstein) is this:
That different kinds of sentence contain the same content but differ in terms of the 'force-operator'. The 'assumption' in question is an unasserted proposition (is that right? - proposition?). So you could take a proposition like 'there are twelve chairs in this room' and simply contemplate it without asserting it - or you might assert it - or you might ask whether there are twelve chairs in the room. All three cases share 'there are twelve chairs in this room' in common but you might 'add' assertoric force or you might add interrogative force (make it into a question).
Wittgenstein thinks that it is mistaken to think of an assertion as consisting of two acts - (i) entertaining (e.g. entertaining the proposition that 'there are twelve chairs in the room) and (ii) asserting. For one thing, Wittgenstein says, we could write every assertion in the form of a question followed by 'yes' or 'no' but this would not demonstrate that every assertion contains a question.
Wittgenstein's point here - I think - is that assertions are not the primary or prototypical components of language. If we want to understand language and meaning it is important to think about questions, commands, assertions, cracking jokes, and so on - all of the various language games.
Philosophers of language are mistaken to focus on propositions/assertions - including Wittgenstein himself in his earlier work. Language is made up of diverse 'tools'.
§21
Wittgenstein says that the difference between 'five slabs' (report/assertion) and 'five slabs!' (order) does not consist in
(i)...the tone of voice - although the tone of voice may well be generally different in the two cases.
(ii) ...nor does it consist in the grammatical form of the sentence (we could imagine a language in which all assertions had the form and tone of rhetorical questions).
What is key when distinguishing reports/assertions from orders is the use to which the sentence is put in the language game.
I suppose it is worth noting that although the language (in which all assertions have the form and tone of rhetorical questions) is imagined, rhetorical questions are not. - That is we do, in our own language, have sentences that are in one form (the form of a question), but which play a different role to the role typically played by questions.
What does Wittgenstein have in mind when he is talking about the use of a sentence in the language game?
Wittgenstein says that the difference between 'five slabs' (report/assertion) and 'five slabs!' (order) does not consist in
(i)...the tone of voice - although the tone of voice may well be generally different in the two cases.
(ii) ...nor does it consist in the grammatical form of the sentence (we could imagine a language in which all assertions had the form and tone of rhetorical questions).
What is key when distinguishing reports/assertions from orders is the use to which the sentence is put in the language game.
I suppose it is worth noting that although the language (in which all assertions have the form and tone of rhetorical questions) is imagined, rhetorical questions are not. - That is we do, in our own language, have sentences that are in one form (the form of a question), but which play a different role to the role typically played by questions.
What does Wittgenstein have in mind when he is talking about the use of a sentence in the language game?
§20
Is Wittgenstein making the point that 'meaning' is not a mental process accompanying your words here?
Someone might say 'bring me a slab' thinking of it as four words, whereas someone else might say 'bringmeaslab' thinking of it as one word.
The person who thinks of it as four words doesn't, as they say it, have all of it's combinatorial possibilities before their mind.
Wittgenstein:
"In Russian one says 'stone red' instead of 'the stone is red'. Does the sense they grasp lack the copula? Or do they add the copula in thought?"
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at here. Presumably the 'is' isn't present in a Russians thought - just as it isn't present in their spoken language. - but they aren't lacking anything.
Is this making some kind of a point about there not being a 'language of thought'. Part of the Augustinian picture was that babies have thoughts but just don't have the means to express them. - Is this passage meant as an attack on that idea?
Is Wittgenstein making the point that 'meaning' is not a mental process accompanying your words here?
Someone might say 'bring me a slab' thinking of it as four words, whereas someone else might say 'bringmeaslab' thinking of it as one word.
The person who thinks of it as four words doesn't, as they say it, have all of it's combinatorial possibilities before their mind.
Wittgenstein:
"In Russian one says 'stone red' instead of 'the stone is red'. Does the sense they grasp lack the copula? Or do they add the copula in thought?"
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at here. Presumably the 'is' isn't present in a Russians thought - just as it isn't present in their spoken language. - but they aren't lacking anything.
Is this making some kind of a point about there not being a 'language of thought'. Part of the Augustinian picture was that babies have thoughts but just don't have the means to express them. - Is this passage meant as an attack on that idea?
§19
Wittgenstein gives some kind of an answer to the question about whether 'slab!' is equivalent to 'bring a slab!'.
One reason for saying that they aren't equivalent is that 'slab' in our language has different combinatorial possibilities - it can be used in a variety of different sentences that are not available to the speakers of the language in §2.
There is also the question of whether 'slab' (in the language of §2) is a sentence or a word. Wittgenstein here is looking at an element of the Augustinian picture - namely that sentences are combinations of names.
Wittgenstein says that you can call 'Slab!' a word and a sentence - or perhaps a 'degenerate sentence'.
'Slab!' is no more a shortening of 'Bring me a slab!' than 'Bring me a slab! is a lengthening of 'Slab!'.
I assume that Wittgenstein is looking at a potential response from the 'Augustinians' -
You could say that 'Slab!' really means 'Bring me a slab!' - (and so it really is a combination of names (or words at least)).
Wittgenstein asks how one does this (mean 'bring a slab' in saying 'slab'). - Is meaning something doing something?
Wittgenstein gives some kind of an answer to the question about whether 'slab!' is equivalent to 'bring a slab!'.
One reason for saying that they aren't equivalent is that 'slab' in our language has different combinatorial possibilities - it can be used in a variety of different sentences that are not available to the speakers of the language in §2.
There is also the question of whether 'slab' (in the language of §2) is a sentence or a word. Wittgenstein here is looking at an element of the Augustinian picture - namely that sentences are combinations of names.
Wittgenstein says that you can call 'Slab!' a word and a sentence - or perhaps a 'degenerate sentence'.
'Slab!' is no more a shortening of 'Bring me a slab!' than 'Bring me a slab! is a lengthening of 'Slab!'.
I assume that Wittgenstein is looking at a potential response from the 'Augustinians' -
You could say that 'Slab!' really means 'Bring me a slab!' - (and so it really is a combination of names (or words at least)).
Wittgenstein asks how one does this (mean 'bring a slab' in saying 'slab'). - Is meaning something doing something?
§18
Wittgenstein gives some kind of an answer to the question raised earlier about whether the 'language' in §2 counts as a language. At the very least we should not be put off by the fact that it only consists of orders. Our own language has come to incorporate new symbolisms/notations. - Language is 'fluid' - it can come to incorporate new language games or old language games can become obsolete.
Wittgenstein gives some kind of an answer to the question raised earlier about whether the 'language' in §2 counts as a language. At the very least we should not be put off by the fact that it only consists of orders. Our own language has come to incorporate new symbolisms/notations. - Language is 'fluid' - it can come to incorporate new language games or old language games can become obsolete.
Sunday 3 February 2013
§16
Are colour samples part of the language?
Wittgenstein says that we might or might not count them as part of the language but that it is natural to count the samples as tools of the language.
He has a kind of argument for this:
1. We wouldn't hesitate to say that the second 'the' in the sentence 'pronounce the word 'the'' is part of the language.
2. The second 'the' in the sentence above is playing the role of a sample - it is being used in the same sort of way that colour samples might be used.
_____________________________________________
C. We shouldn't hesitate to say that colour samples are part of the language.
Another reason for counting them as tools of the language/part of language. - They are used in ostensive explanations of meaning (am I using the right terminology here?). - Colour samples might be used in cases where we say something like 'postbox-red is that colour [pointing at a sample of postbox-red]'. Here we are explaining what 'postbox-red' means - in much the same way that we might do in other definitions which don't include colour samples. - So the colour sample is used in a way that things that clearly are 'tools of the language' are used - and so it is natural to say that colour samples are part of the language/tools of the language.
Are colour samples part of the language?
Wittgenstein says that we might or might not count them as part of the language but that it is natural to count the samples as tools of the language.
He has a kind of argument for this:
1. We wouldn't hesitate to say that the second 'the' in the sentence 'pronounce the word 'the'' is part of the language.
2. The second 'the' in the sentence above is playing the role of a sample - it is being used in the same sort of way that colour samples might be used.
_____________________________________________
C. We shouldn't hesitate to say that colour samples are part of the language.
Another reason for counting them as tools of the language/part of language. - They are used in ostensive explanations of meaning (am I using the right terminology here?). - Colour samples might be used in cases where we say something like 'postbox-red is that colour [pointing at a sample of postbox-red]'. Here we are explaining what 'postbox-red' means - in much the same way that we might do in other definitions which don't include colour samples. - So the colour sample is used in a way that things that clearly are 'tools of the language' are used - and so it is natural to say that colour samples are part of the language/tools of the language.
§15
The word 'signify' is most at home where a name is used to mark an object.
You could imagine a situation in which someone gives out a label to someone else and the second person brings the tool with that mark on it.
Why does Wittgenstein say that 'when philosophizing, it will often prove useful to say to ourselves: naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a thing?'
I'm not totally sure what Wittgenstein has in mind here. When I think about situations in which name-tags are attached to things I think about cases like (i) labelling children's belongings (ii) labelling food/drink in shared student houses.
Given that Wittgenstein thinks it is worthwhile to focus on the use of words it might be worth thinking about the use of the labels in these situations.
A school child might have their pencil-case labelled. This enables the child to be sure which pencil-case is their own - other students might have similar pencil-cases. So the label is used in identifying the pencil-case.
It could also be used, if the pencil-case goes missing, to return the pencil-case to the child.The person who finds the pencil case can return the pencil-case to the child without knowing anything about that child - they could just call out the child's name and when the child responds they can give the pencil-case with their name on it to them.
In terms of thinking about this in philosophical terms I notice I'm using terms like 'identifying' and 'knowledge' - the kinds of things that philosophers are interested in. What 'philosophical' point could these observations be used to make? - Perhaps that names don't function as disguised definite descriptions (the person returning the pencil-case to the child need not know that any description is true of them).
The word 'signify' is most at home where a name is used to mark an object.
You could imagine a situation in which someone gives out a label to someone else and the second person brings the tool with that mark on it.
Why does Wittgenstein say that 'when philosophizing, it will often prove useful to say to ourselves: naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a thing?'
I'm not totally sure what Wittgenstein has in mind here. When I think about situations in which name-tags are attached to things I think about cases like (i) labelling children's belongings (ii) labelling food/drink in shared student houses.
Given that Wittgenstein thinks it is worthwhile to focus on the use of words it might be worth thinking about the use of the labels in these situations.
A school child might have their pencil-case labelled. This enables the child to be sure which pencil-case is their own - other students might have similar pencil-cases. So the label is used in identifying the pencil-case.
It could also be used, if the pencil-case goes missing, to return the pencil-case to the child.The person who finds the pencil case can return the pencil-case to the child without knowing anything about that child - they could just call out the child's name and when the child responds they can give the pencil-case with their name on it to them.
In terms of thinking about this in philosophical terms I notice I'm using terms like 'identifying' and 'knowledge' - the kinds of things that philosophers are interested in. What 'philosophical' point could these observations be used to make? - Perhaps that names don't function as disguised definite descriptions (the person returning the pencil-case to the child need not know that any description is true of them).
§13 and §14
The Augustinian picture - particularly the claim that 'every word in the language signifies something' even if partially true (true of a primitive language in some respects), doesn't tell us anything. You could use the claim 'every word in the language signifies something' to distinguish the words of a language from nonsense words - words without meaning (but this isn't the use Augustine makes of it).
Saying that every word in the language signifies something is as helpful as saying that 'every tool serves to modify something' - i.e. not very helpful at all.
The Augustinian picture - particularly the claim that 'every word in the language signifies something' even if partially true (true of a primitive language in some respects), doesn't tell us anything. You could use the claim 'every word in the language signifies something' to distinguish the words of a language from nonsense words - words without meaning (but this isn't the use Augustine makes of it).
Saying that every word in the language signifies something is as helpful as saying that 'every tool serves to modify something' - i.e. not very helpful at all.
§12
Wittgenstein compares words to handles in a locomotive. They're comparable because words appear alike in print and handles appear alike - but this appearance disguises a variety of uses (one handle can be used to open a valve, one can be used to make the locomotive brake etc.). - Similarly the like appearance of words in print disguises a variety of uses. (Methodological point - Wittgenstein is again using analogy to bring our attention to the diversity of uses of words (and the fact that like-appearance in print disguises this))
Wittgenstein compares words to handles in a locomotive. They're comparable because words appear alike in print and handles appear alike - but this appearance disguises a variety of uses (one handle can be used to open a valve, one can be used to make the locomotive brake etc.). - Similarly the like appearance of words in print disguises a variety of uses. (Methodological point - Wittgenstein is again using analogy to bring our attention to the diversity of uses of words (and the fact that like-appearance in print disguises this))
§11
In §11 Wittgenstein compares the uses of tools to the uses of words. [Methodological point - Wittgenstein uses analogies to bring our attention to the diversity of uses of words). The tools in a toolbox are used for a variety of tasks - tightening nuts, hammering nails etc. The uses of words are similarly diverse - and this is something that isn't brought out by the Augustinian picture.
Why is it significant that the Augustinian picture does not attend to the variety of uses of words?
- Because it thereby distorts the picture of the 'essence of language'.
- Because attending to the variety of uses of words helps to dissolve philosophical problems.
Wittgenstein has already raised a set of philosophical issues surrounding reference and meaning. In §11 he suggests that when doing philosophy we are especially prone to failing to recognise the use of words - and this is a problem.
In §11 Wittgenstein compares the uses of tools to the uses of words. [Methodological point - Wittgenstein uses analogies to bring our attention to the diversity of uses of words). The tools in a toolbox are used for a variety of tasks - tightening nuts, hammering nails etc. The uses of words are similarly diverse - and this is something that isn't brought out by the Augustinian picture.
Why is it significant that the Augustinian picture does not attend to the variety of uses of words?
- Because it thereby distorts the picture of the 'essence of language'.
- Because attending to the variety of uses of words helps to dissolve philosophical problems.
Wittgenstein has already raised a set of philosophical issues surrounding reference and meaning. In §11 he suggests that when doing philosophy we are especially prone to failing to recognise the use of words - and this is a problem.
§10
In §10 Wittgenstein asks what the words in the language (§8) signify. He says that we could, perfectly legitimately, say that 'this word [block] signifies that [said while pointing to a block]' or that ''a' signifies a number' (as opposed to a block or a slab) - the point of saying it signifies a number here is to distinguish it from other kinds of expression. But to suggest that this leads to a theory that words signify objects would be to gloss over the variety of uses of expression. The Augustinian picture is not helpful.
In §10 Wittgenstein asks what the words in the language (§8) signify. He says that we could, perfectly legitimately, say that 'this word [block] signifies that [said while pointing to a block]' or that ''a' signifies a number' (as opposed to a block or a slab) - the point of saying it signifies a number here is to distinguish it from other kinds of expression. But to suggest that this leads to a theory that words signify objects would be to gloss over the variety of uses of expression. The Augustinian picture is not helpful.
§9
In §9 Wittgenstein looks more closely at the expressions introduced into the expanded language from §8. - He asks whether their use is taught ostensively (i.e. by pointing and uttering the word for the thing).
A word like 'this' is unlike words like 'red' and 'apple' in that it is used in ostensive teaching (you might say 'this apple' or 'this colour' and point.)
Wittgenstein is bringing our attention to the fact that words have a variety of quite different uses. - This is not something observed in the Augustinian picture.
In §9 Wittgenstein looks more closely at the expressions introduced into the expanded language from §8. - He asks whether their use is taught ostensively (i.e. by pointing and uttering the word for the thing).
A word like 'this' is unlike words like 'red' and 'apple' in that it is used in ostensive teaching (you might say 'this apple' or 'this colour' and point.)
Wittgenstein is bringing our attention to the fact that words have a variety of quite different uses. - This is not something observed in the Augustinian picture.
Saturday 2 February 2013
§8
In §8 you get an expansion of the language-game/language from §2. The expanded language is to contain number-words, 'there' and 'this' and colour samples. - The last on the list to be included - colour samples - is a bit unusual, perhaps. It isn't obvious that colour samples might count as part of a language. - Wittgenstein looks at this in a later comment.
Presumably the point of saying that the number words could be letters of the alphabet is to bring our attention to the use of number expressions.
In §8 you get an expansion of the language-game/language from §2. The expanded language is to contain number-words, 'there' and 'this' and colour samples. - The last on the list to be included - colour samples - is a bit unusual, perhaps. It isn't obvious that colour samples might count as part of a language. - Wittgenstein looks at this in a later comment.
Presumably the point of saying that the number words could be letters of the alphabet is to bring our attention to the use of number expressions.
§7
A language user come to the practice of speech by doing things like uttering the word for an object when the teacher points at it and repeating words after the teacher. - Speech-like processes.
Why 'speech-like'?
- Is it not full-blown speech because the words uttered do not yet perform their roles in the practice?
In §7 Wittgenstein introduces the term 'language-games' and says that it will be used to speak about:
- (i) the 'games' by which children learn their language (presumably repeating words after a teacher would count as one of these games).
- (ii) primitive languages (e.g. the 'language' from §2)
- (iii) language and the activities into which it is woven.
It occurs to me that it is a bit strange that Wittgenstein would introduce a technical term but use it in three different ways. Why is this? - I'm not sure.
A language user come to the practice of speech by doing things like uttering the word for an object when the teacher points at it and repeating words after the teacher. - Speech-like processes.
Why 'speech-like'?
- Is it not full-blown speech because the words uttered do not yet perform their roles in the practice?
In §7 Wittgenstein introduces the term 'language-games' and says that it will be used to speak about:
- (i) the 'games' by which children learn their language (presumably repeating words after a teacher would count as one of these games).
- (ii) primitive languages (e.g. the 'language' from §2)
- (iii) language and the activities into which it is woven.
It occurs to me that it is a bit strange that Wittgenstein would introduce a technical term but use it in three different ways. Why is this? - I'm not sure.
§6
Wittgenstein suggests that pointing and uttering might form an important part of the training in the use of words in the primitive language §2.
Responding to the call 'slab' by bringing a slab needn't indicate understanding. Is Wittgenstein's point that bringing a 'slab' happens in the context of a wider practice and only makes sense within that?
Wittgenstein suggests that pointing and uttering might form an important part of the training in the use of words in the primitive language §2.
Responding to the call 'slab' by bringing a slab needn't indicate understanding. Is Wittgenstein's point that bringing a 'slab' happens in the context of a wider practice and only makes sense within that?
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