§184

Wittgenstein is attacking the reservoir model of the mind found in William James. When you have forgotten a tune and then you are suddenly able to sing it does this mean that the tune was there in your mind in some sense?
- Presumably Wittgenstein wants to deny that the tune is present in the mind in the sense in which water is stored up in a reservoir and can be released at some point.

It certainly wasn't the case that you heard the whole tune in your mind in a flash.
It could be - as in the case of the person who declares 'now I know how to go on' when observing a series being written down - that you think you know the tune but find you don't. - Having a feeling that you know is no guarantee that you do.
Hacker: "The 'presence of the tune to the mind' is not the ground of, and explanation of, the certainty or the exercise of the ability".

§183

'Now I can go on' does not mean the same as 'now the formula has occurred to me'. It may be that the formula occurs to you but you cannot go on or it may be that you can go on but the formula has not occurred to you.

§182

Eager not to spare other people the trouble of thinking, Wittgenstein presents us with some exercises in §182 with the intention of getting us to think about, "[t]he grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able' and 'to understand'."

"Exercises: (1) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only as long as C is inside H? (2) Sometimes one says that: C has ceased to fit in H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for it having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time, if it was not on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask, 'When did I stop knowing it by heart?' (5) Someone asks me, 'Can you lift this weight?' I answer 'yes'. Now he says, 'do it!' - and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would one accept the excuse 'when I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't'?"

(1) We don't only say that a cylinder fits a hollow cylinder when it is inside it. If the two cylinders were very heavy and we didn't want to have to put one inside the other to check that it fits we might measure each of them. This would tell us that one fits inside the other.
(2) It could be that C was heated and expanded between t1 and t2 and H did not expand. If C fitted H very tightly we might say that it ceased to fit as soon as it expanded. - We'd need some way of determining that C had expanded and that H (or the hollow area within H) hadn't expanded to the same extent.
It could be that H was hit with a hammer at 12o'clock and that the shape of it was distorted in such a way that C would no longer go inside H. You could then say that C ceased to fit H at 12o'clock (this might be clearly visible - it could be that H was completed flattened by the blow).
(3) You could see the effect that the body has on other bodies at various times - e.g. that a boat sinks when the body (whatever it is) is placed on it at t2 but hadn't sunk at t1 when the body was placed on it.
You could perhaps see that something has grown significantly and be quite sure that it had grown heavier.
- There are various criteria by which you might determine that a body has changed weight at a particular time.
(4) It may be that you can recall knowing a poem by heart at school but then remember being asked to recite it at some later date and not being able to. You might then say that 'I stopped knowing the poem by heart at some point between when I was at school and the occasion when I was asked to recite it.'
Hacker: "Primarily when one can associate the loss of ability with a temporally identifiable cause (a blow on the head, a sudden shock, etc.)
(5) You could imagine a case where someone is presented with a fairly light weight and asked whether they can lift it. The person is an experienced body-builder and knows the kind of weight they're able to lift. In that case they could quite reasonably say that they are able to lift the weight. But you could then imagine that someone punches them hard in the back (having asked them if they were able to lift the weight).


I found this passage confusing. What kind of philosophical problems does Wittgenstein have in mind when he says that reflecting on cases like these could help us to resolve them? - Presumably, since he has been discussing understanding he thinks that this could help us to resolve philosophical confusions regarding understanding. Do these exercises help us to appreciate that understanding is akin to an ability? Is the intention to help us to recognise the variety of criteria by which we determine whether someone has correctly said that they understand/or are able to go on? - One parallel you could draw is between the cases of B observing A and annoucning that he can go on and the weightlifter saying that they are able to lift the weight (in each case someone is saying that they are able to do something and in each case they might turn out not to be able to do the thing they said they could).

Where does something fitting something else come into all of this? - The last time I remember Wittgenstein talking about fitting was when he was talking about the mistake of thinking that 'true' fits 'proposition' and that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition.

§181

Imagine the case where B says 'now I know how to go on' but then hesitates and cannot do it. It is possible that B was wrong to say 'now I know how to go on' and it's also possible that he was right but now is not able to go on. - This is a grammatical point being made by Wittgenstein. With understanding it is possible that you can think you understand but you don't (unlike being in pain - you cannot think you're in pain and not be in pain) it is also possible that you can understand something but that you are then not able to satisfy one or another behavioural criterion of understanding.

It is possible, in the situation described above, that B realises that he made a mistake in thinking that he could go on. It is also possible that B was able to go on but was distracted or something like that. Wittgenstein says 'we shall say different things in different cases'.

Thinking about cases you could imagine that someone says 'ah! Now I know how to go on!' but then soon afterwards says 'hang on a minute. No. That's not right'. In which case we would suppose that the person had thought they'd understood but hadn't (I suppose it is also the case that someone might say 'no that's not right' when in fact what they'd thought was right and they had understoofd..

§180

'Now I know how to go on' is not a description of a mental state. It is a signal that B understands (defeasible criterion?)

Understanding is not a mental state.

§179

Wittgenstein now returns to the case from §151. This was the case of A writing down a series of numbers while B observes. B then says 'Now I can go on!' when he understands (or thinks he understands) how the series is to be continued.

The formula occurring to B is not sufficient for understanding. In order for him to have the right to say 'now I know how to go on!' experience must show him that there was a connection between the formula occurring to him and him actually continuing the series.

Wittgenstein again emphasises that the circumstances play a role in whether B used the words 'now I know how to go on' correctly ('circumstances' meaning things like - that B had learnt algebra). What exactly is the relationship between the circumstances and B being justified in saying 'now I know how to go on (continue the series)'? - Circumstances cannot be sufficient for justification - it is surely possible for B to have learnt algebra, for a formula to have occurred to him, for him to have said 'now I know how to go on' buit yet still to find that B wasn't able to continue correctly (that B hadn't understood).

Wittgenstein also suggests that we think about the circumstances in which expressions like 'now I know how to go on' are learnt and where they are used.

§178

There is nothing essential to being guided. It might be evident to observation that someone is being guided or it may be that the criterion by which we decide whether someone was being guided is them saying something afterwards. We're tempted to say that one movement or gesture captures the essence of being guided because it captures one form of guidance.

§177

That you drew a line under the influence of the original does not consist in some experience and you should not conflate doing something for a reason with being caused to do something.

§176

There is a temptation, having been guided in some activity, to say that what is essential about the experience of that is that it is an 'experience of being influenced' - 'an experience of the because'. But on the other hand one is reluctant to say that something/a phenomenon is an 'experience of the because'.

§175

In letting yourself be guided - in copying a doodling - you do not have a characteristic/special experience of being guided. Presumably the same can be said of doing something deliberately - that there is no special/characteristic experience of doing something deliberately.

§174

Is there a particular experience of doing something deliberately? We might be tempted to think so because (i) doing something deliberately is different from (ii) the same thing happening but not deliberately. This difference isn't in the movements or gestures so it seems it must be something inner. But what? - This isn't clear.

§173

Being guided is not a particular experience (although you may well think of a particular experience of being guided when thinking about what being guided is - this is a reason you might be tempted to think of being guided as a particular experience).

§172

Could it be that what distinguishes reading from looking at doodles and uttering a sentence is that in the case of reading one is guided by signs?

- There is no single experience of being guided. There is no one experience in common between
(i) being guided by someone whilst blindfolded and responding to their tugs...
(ii) being guided in a dance...
(iii) being guided by a track in a field.

§171

We're especially drawn to the idea of being influenced if we read slowly with the intention of working out the essence of reading.

If one reads normally one does not have 'experiences of unity' between sound and word or 'experiences of being influenced'.

We might think we get a more accurate picture by reading slowly but, "If I'm supposed to describe how an object looks from far off [the case of normal paced reading] I don't make the description any more accurate by saying what can be noticed on closer inspection [the case of reading slowly and attending to accompanying experiences]".

§170

Reading often is experienced differently to associating sounds with doodles but this is not a difference between being influenced and not being influenced.

§169

It seems that if you (i) read a sentence and then (ii) look at a sequence of squiggles and utter a sentence, that in the first case you feel your utterance was connected with seeing the signs whereas in the second you don't. Is the connection a causal one?

It seems not, given that causation is established by experiments/observations where one thing regularly follows another. How can I feel something which is found out by experiment (i.e. your utterance's connection to the signs)?

Is the connection one of justification? - You could justify what you utter by reference to what is written but it makes no sense to say that I felt the justification.

§168

No particular experience is necessary or sufficient for reading. The experience of reading ordinary print is different to the experience of reading words printed entirely in capital letters (or at least it may well be). But both count as reading and so it cannot be that there is some particular experience that makes something into a case of reading.

§167

Wittgenstein grants that there is likely some uniformity in the experience of reading a page of print but the experience is not the reading.

§166

The difference between reading and not reading may lie in the situation circumstances not in the particular experience. What kind of situations/circumstances does Wittgenstein have in mind here? - One's in which the person in question has acquired the relevant skill? - That we would say that someone is reading if they have been taught to read (amongst other things)?

§165

Wittgenstein suggests that we might be resistant to the idea that 'reading' is a family resemblance concept and think that reading is a particular process.

Why?
It can't be that reading is just seeing printed words and uttering words - you can do this and not be reading. It seems there must be something in addition that makes something a case of reading - perhaps that the words come to you in a distinctive way (not like when you're making them up).

However, it is absurd to think that the specific experience of the words coming to you in a distinctive way is the defining feature of reading. If it were then the sounds uttered would be irrelevant.

§§163-164

Someone might, instead of writing out the cursive letter that is horizontally across from the printed letter in a table, write out the cursive letter below (consistently). In this case we'd say that they had derived their version from the table (in a similar way to the case of writing out the letter horizontally across).
Someone might not stick to a single way of transcribing but alter it according to a simple rule. There is no clear boundary between this case and a random one.
Wittgenstein asks - "does this mean that the word 'derive' really has no meaning?" - I assume his answer would be 'no'.
He goes on to say in §164 that there is a family of cases of deriving and similarly for reading.
His example - of the person not sticking to a single way of transcribing - makes it sound as though 'derive' is vague - that there are some cases between clear-cut cases of deriving and randomly moving from one side of the table to the other where is is not clear whether what is going on counts as deriving something from an original. Does it give us reason to think that 'derive' is a family resemblance concept?

§162

If we teach someone the Cyrillic alphabet and then put a passage before them in Cyrillic script which they go on to read, as taught, then we might say that they have derived the sound from the written pattern by a rule we've given them. We'd also call that reading. Does that mean that reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?

How do we know somone has derived something from the original? - by behavioural criteria - such as seeing them consulting a table.
- This doesn't answer the first question (does reading = deriving a reproduction from an original?)

§161

There is a series - a continuous series - of transitional cases between the case of someone repeating words from memory and the person who spells out every word without being helped by guessing from context or knowing by heart.

An 'intermediate' reader could spell out most words but guess some from context. Does this mean that 'reading' is a vague concept? Is it like 'bald'?

Wittgenstein suggests an experiment: - (i) first say the numbers 1 to 12 then (ii) look at the dial of your watch and read them. What was it that was called reading in the latter case?

To read them you'd look at each number in turn on the watch as you said them. But what is unusual about this case is that the number series from 1 - 12 is very familiar. This isn't the same as being asked to read a passage in a book that you aren't familiar with. Would this count as a kind of transitional case? - I think it would. - I think this is what Wittgenstein is bringing our attention to.

§160

We can imagine a case where someone reads a text fluently but with the feelings associated with saying something he has learnt by heart. In this case we would not say that the person is not reading because they don't have the right feelings (this deals with the objection in §159). - It is not necessary that someone has certain feelings in order for them to be reading.

Someone could be presented with signs that don't belong to any existing alphabet and utter words corresponding to the number of signs, as if they were letters. They could do this with the feeling of reading it. - This suggests that having certain feelings is not sufficient for someone to be reading. - In this kind of case it could be that someone has the feelings associated with reading but is not reading.

It might also be that we would say that the person was reading in this case - if they correlated the signs (which don't come from any existing alphabet) with familiar letters consistently then we may well say that they were reading. - But this tells us that it is not the feeling that counts. It isn't by asking the person about their feelings that we determine whether they are reading or not in a case like this.

§159

We could imagine someone learning a Russian sentence by heart in order to convince a friend that they can read Cyrillic script (they can't). They then look at a sentence written in Cyrillic script and say the words they've learnt by heart. In this case their behaviour is just like someone who is reading but they are not reading which suggests that overt behaviour is not the criterion by which we determine whether someone is reading. It then seems that it must be something going on in their head that only they know about - a set of feelings or something like that.

§158

Do we say that we cannot determine the first word read by looking at a physical mechanism or process (say, in the brain) because we don't know what is going on in the brain? - Perhaps if we did know then the brain mechanism would be the criterion.
Wittgenstein rejects this. Those who think that it must be that way (that there must be a brain mechanism that would allow us to determine the first word read) have a certain a priori model. Those who think that way are held captive by a picture - an appealing form of representation. - They are conceptually confused.

§157

We might imagine creatures trained to be reading machines. We could imagine one that hasn't participated in the training producing sounds when presented with written words. The sounds might occasionally come out right. If someone heard the pupil on such an occasion they might say 'he is reading'. The instructor would respond 'no. He isn't. He just got lucky' or something like that. But what if the pupil were to respond correctly to further words presented to him? The instructor, at some point, will grant that the pupil can read. But what of the first sound/word? - Do we now have reason to say that the pupil read that? - It makes no sense to ask which was the first one read.
It would make sense to ask which the first word read was if the criterion was that it was the first time the pupil had a certain feeling. But according to the way reading was defined in §156 ("rendering out loud what is written or printed...") the concept 'reading' is independent of mental or other mechanisms.
I assume that the same point would hold of our own concept of 'reading' - that we don't have criteria for determining the first word read.