Week 1 summary

Summary of week 1

In week 1 I've read the preface and §§1-33. In these passages Wittgenstein looks at the Augustinian picture of language and it seems clear he also has his own earlier philosophy in view. In the preface he says that it would be a good idea to read his new work alongside the old and says that he made 'grave mistakes' in his earlier work.

The Augustinian picture:

Wittgenstein considers the claims that
(i) the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands,
(ii) words name objects/every word in the language signifies something,
(iii) sentences are combinations of names,
(iv) we learn to speak by seeing adults pointing or gazing at objects and saying the names for those objects - and eventually come to express our wishes using the expressions we have learnt thus.

He challenges claim (i) in several passages. Right at the beginning (§1) he uses the example of a shopkeeper who looks at a slip marked 'five red apples'. The shopkeeper, "opens the drawer marked 'apples'; then he looks up the word 'red' in a chart and finds a colour sample next to it; then he says the series of elementary number-words... up to the word 'five', and for each number word he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer". It seems clear from the example that each of the three words is used differently and that it is not clear that it would be correct to describe each of them as the name of an object. There are five apples in the example and apples are objects but it, at the very least, sounds strange to say that there is an object corresponding to 'five'. He immediately suggests a connection between the meaning of a word and the way in which it is used.

He challenges claim (ii) in §27 where he looks at a variety of exclamations. It certainly seems peculiar to say that 'away!' names an object.

He challenges claim (iii) in §19 - where he suggests that we might say that 'Slab!' from the language introduced in §2 might be a sentence (a 'degenerate sentence'). Even if 'slab' does name an object 'Slab!' is not a combination of names.

He challenges (iv) in several passages. Wittgenstein makes the point that ostensive definitions can be variously interpreted (§28) and that there is no particular way of pointing/gazing at the colour of something as opposed to the shape of a thing.

Wittgenstein's account of language:

In opposition to the Augustinian picture Wittgenstein suggests that language is made up of a variety of 'language-games' (a term he introduces in §7). Language is not simply used to make assertions or to express wishes. In §23 Wittgenstein lists some examples of language-games - "giving orders and acting on them, ...guessing riddles, ...requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying". We should attend to the fact that language is put to a variety of different uses and that words can be used in a variety of ways. Words can be categorised in a variety of ways - depending on our purposes.

Naming - which is viewed as fundamental in the Augustinian picture - is said to be preparation for the use of a word on Wittgenstein's account. Telling someone that 'this is the king' in chess tells them nothing about the use of the king - and this is the 'defining feature' of the king. - Its rule-governed use in the context of a game of chess. Our use of language is situated in various language games and activities/practices.,