§5
Wittgenstein makes a methodological point in §5.
He suggests that the concept of the meaning of a word makes it difficult for us to get a clear view of the purpose and function of words. - Does he mean that the Augustinian picture confuses us or is there a problem with the concept of meaning independently of the Augustinian conception?
The methodological point is that we can get clear about the purpose and function of words by examining 'primitive kinds of use' of language where you can clearly survey the functioning of words. - Presumably he is thinking of cases like the block/slab case.
Thursday 31 January 2013
§2-4
Wittgenstein suggests that although the Augustinian picture does not capture the essence of language it could correctly describe a simple/primitive language. In §2 he describes such a language (the block/slab language).
But is the Augustinian picture true even of this language?
- Is the meaning of the expression 'slab' something that you might place on scales and weigh? (The object for which the word stands)
- Does the 'language' described in §2 really amount to a language?
Question:
Does 'slab' mean the same as 'bring a slab!'. (It has the same use)
In §4 Wittgenstein describes a script in which letters stand for sounds and are also used for emphasis and punctuation.
If you said that this is a script in which letters stand for sounds you would not capture the essence of the script. - Similarly Augustine's picture ignores many aspects of language.
Wittgenstein suggests that although the Augustinian picture does not capture the essence of language it could correctly describe a simple/primitive language. In §2 he describes such a language (the block/slab language).
But is the Augustinian picture true even of this language?
- Is the meaning of the expression 'slab' something that you might place on scales and weigh? (The object for which the word stands)
- Does the 'language' described in §2 really amount to a language?
Question:
Does 'slab' mean the same as 'bring a slab!'. (It has the same use)
In §4 Wittgenstein describes a script in which letters stand for sounds and are also used for emphasis and punctuation.
If you said that this is a script in which letters stand for sounds you would not capture the essence of the script. - Similarly Augustine's picture ignores many aspects of language.
Wednesday 30 January 2013
§1
Wittgenstein presents the Augustinian picture of the essence of human language in §1. This is something he wants to criticise. He raises the case of the shopkeeper with the slip of paper marked 'five red apples'.
How can this case be used to think about problems with the Augustinian picture?
- One problem that springs to mind is that you cannot point to the number five but according to Augustine we learn language by observing others pointing to things.
- In pointing at an object, like an apple, and saying 'five' you are pointing at the very same thing you might point to and say 'apple' or 'red'. How is an observer to know what it is that you are pointing to? - It seems that there isn't a particular way of pointing to or gazing at 'five', and there isn't a particular way of gazing at red as opposed to gazing at an apple.
Questions:
It may be that there are problems with learning an expression through observing somebody pointing once at an object and producing an utterance but could someone perhaps pick up the use of a word by observing a series of such gestures?
For example - somebody might point at a series of apples in turn and say 'one, two, three, four, five' - and do the same sort of thing with other objects. Could somebody learn to count by observing behaviour like this?
Or somebody might point at a series of red objects and say 'red' in each case. And point at other (blue) objects and say 'blue'. Could somebody acquire colour words in this way?
Does Wittgenstein want to rule out the possibility of starting to learn a language by observing gazes/pointing combined with utterances? How else could you learn?
Wittgenstein presents the Augustinian picture of the essence of human language in §1. This is something he wants to criticise. He raises the case of the shopkeeper with the slip of paper marked 'five red apples'.
How can this case be used to think about problems with the Augustinian picture?
- One problem that springs to mind is that you cannot point to the number five but according to Augustine we learn language by observing others pointing to things.
- In pointing at an object, like an apple, and saying 'five' you are pointing at the very same thing you might point to and say 'apple' or 'red'. How is an observer to know what it is that you are pointing to? - It seems that there isn't a particular way of pointing to or gazing at 'five', and there isn't a particular way of gazing at red as opposed to gazing at an apple.
Questions:
It may be that there are problems with learning an expression through observing somebody pointing once at an object and producing an utterance but could someone perhaps pick up the use of a word by observing a series of such gestures?
For example - somebody might point at a series of apples in turn and say 'one, two, three, four, five' - and do the same sort of thing with other objects. Could somebody learn to count by observing behaviour like this?
Or somebody might point at a series of red objects and say 'red' in each case. And point at other (blue) objects and say 'blue'. Could somebody acquire colour words in this way?
Does Wittgenstein want to rule out the possibility of starting to learn a language by observing gazes/pointing combined with utterances? How else could you learn?
Preface
Wittgenstein says that the nature of his investigation is such that he could not proceed from one subject to another in a natural, smooth sequence.
What exactly is the problem here? - There are plenty of philosophy books that are organised topic-by-topic or organised into chapters.
Wittgenstein's explanation is that his investigation "compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought".
Questions:
- Is this to do with his conception of philosophy as 'assembling reminders'? - Is it that philosophy is inevitably involved in tackling (conceptual) problems as they arise??
- Is it something to do with the way in which 'perspicuous representations' of particular concepts are laid out?
- Is it that he doesn't want to 'spare other people the trouble of thinking'?
- All of the above?
Also in the preface Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts his way of thinking in the PI with the Tractatus and says that he made 'grave mistakes' in his earlier work. - This seems to me to be of relevance to the debate with the 'new Wittgensteinians' - if the Tractatus were wholly nonsense then how could it contain grave mistakes?
Wittgenstein says that the nature of his investigation is such that he could not proceed from one subject to another in a natural, smooth sequence.
What exactly is the problem here? - There are plenty of philosophy books that are organised topic-by-topic or organised into chapters.
Wittgenstein's explanation is that his investigation "compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought".
Questions:
- Is this to do with his conception of philosophy as 'assembling reminders'? - Is it that philosophy is inevitably involved in tackling (conceptual) problems as they arise??
- Is it something to do with the way in which 'perspicuous representations' of particular concepts are laid out?
- Is it that he doesn't want to 'spare other people the trouble of thinking'?
- All of the above?
Also in the preface Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts his way of thinking in the PI with the Tractatus and says that he made 'grave mistakes' in his earlier work. - This seems to me to be of relevance to the debate with the 'new Wittgensteinians' - if the Tractatus were wholly nonsense then how could it contain grave mistakes?
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