In §§105-184 Wittgenstein discussing issues including the relationship between logic and language, the nature of philosophy, the general form of propositions, reading, knowledge, and understanding.
Logic/language
Wittgenstein suggests that it is a mistake to think of logic as an ideal that language should be brought closer to. He rejects the idea that we should strive to create an ideal language and also rejects his own earlier idea of a logical notation. In §109 he recommends that we "[turn] our whole inquiry around". I take it that he means that we should think of logic as an approximation of language rather than thinking of language as approximating to the ideal of logic. Logic doesn't capture all of the subtleties of language. It is used as a model to help us to get clear about forms of reasoning but the reasoning is at its neatest in language. Logic as a more or less simple model papers over some of the complexities of language.
Similarly, simple language games are objects of comparison (§§130-131) - we compare them to our own, more complex language. They are not approximations of an ideal language. Simple language games illuminate/elucidate not by being clear reflections of reality but by being models which highlight certain features of our own language which we have failed to recognise (perhaps because they are so familiar).
Philosophers are not to, "...interfere with the actual use of language" (§124). The philosophers' task is to describe the actual use of language so as to achieve clarity - to achieve a clear view of the conceptual terrain.
Philosophy
What is philosophy?
Philosophy is not continuous with the sciences. It is not an empirical discipline. It isn't theoretical and is not made up of hypotheses. Philosophical problems are solved by carefully mapping out the correct uses of concepts that are employed in philosophical problems. This might involve observing similarities and differences with similar concepts, giving examples of sentences in which the concept is employed correctly, or by using arguments that are something like a reductio ad absurdum to demonstrate that someone has tried to use a concept in a way that it cannot be correctly used. We can produce 'surveyable representations' of concepts and this might involve coming up with language games/models which help to clarify/dissolve philosophical problems.
Philosophy is, in some sense, prior to other disciplines. The sense in which it is prior to empirical disciplines is that empirical disciplines concern what can truly be said or what is likely to be true whereas philosophy concerns what makes sense. In order for a statement to be true/false/likely to be true it must make sense.
There is no meta-philosophy (§121), just as there is no second-order/meta-orthography, even though 'orthography' is a word that might be looked at in orthography (the study of the conventional spelling system).
What are philosophical problems?
Philosophical problems might be the upshot of scientism. - We might think that we should try to solve all problems by careful obervation or experiment or by constructing theories. Philosophical problems might also be the upshot of us misconceiving the 'grammar' of an expression - 'school grammar', which divides words up into nouns, verbs, pronouns, adverbs, etc. - might lead us into confusion about the meaning of certain words (e.g. 'mind', 'time'). We might also get into philosophical confusion if we think of all words as being defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and spend time trying to pinpoint the essential features of something.
Propositions/the general form of propositions
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein had claimed that there was a general form of propositions. Wittgenstein now wants to rejects this:
(i) 'Proposition' is a family resemblance concept.
(ii) 'This is how things are' (a candidate for the general form of propositions) is itself a sentence expressing a proposition.
(iii) 'This is how things are', as it is used ordinarily, and correctly, has a distinctive use. - It is used to allude to another statement. The variable 'p' plays a similar role - it is used to stand in for propositions in some contexts. But we wouldn't be inclined to say that 'p' is the general form of propositions (it doesn't have a form). - This is an argument against saying that 'this is how things are' is the general form of propositions.
(iv) Thinking that all propositions agree or disagree with reality is mistaken because 'this is how things are' is a proposition and it doesn't agree or disagree with reality.
(v) It is mistaken to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions, and that this is the defining feature of propositions. 'True' and 'false' don't fit the concept 'proposition' in the way that one cogwheel fits another. We might discover that one cogwheel fits another but we don't discover that propositions are the kind of thing that might be true.
Understanding
(i) Wittgenstein makes the point that understanding is not a mental state (p.65e, §149(a)). Examples of mental states include dejection, excitement, concentration, and pain. You can be in a mental state uninterruptedly for a period of time - you might be in pain all day - and mental states can be broken off by sleep. You would not say that you have understood a word uninterruptedly since yesterday, even if you learnt the meaning of the word yesterday (e.g. you looked up 'lordotic' in the dictionary yesterday). - It does not make sense to say "I have understood 'lordotic' uninterruptedly since yesterday".
(ii) Pain (a mental state):
You might have evidence that someone else is in pain or you might see that someone else is in pain but you cannot speak of having evidence that you, yourself, are in pain and nor can you see that you, yourself, are in pain. The words 'I think I'm in pain' don't make sense. However, it does make sense to say 'I think I understand', and it is possible that you might have thought you understood something but you didn't (compare, "I thought I was in pain but I wasn't").
(iii) Understanding is akin to an ability (§150). Understanding is more like a power/potentiality than a state/actuality (§182 might help to get clear about this). If you understand something then you can do certain things but it isn't necessarily the case that you are doing those things (I don't have to be speaking French or responding appropriately to a French speaker in order to be said to understand French). Someone could correctly be said to speak French while they are engaged in activites that have nothing to do with the French language.
(Of course, understanding is not the same thing as an ability. Many things can be said to have powers/abilities of which it doesn't make sense to say of them that they understand something.)
(iv) Understanding something in a flash is something like the dawning of a capacity - not high speed articulation of thought. You can understand, instantly, how to continue a series without the formula occuring to you, and without any kind of characteristic experience. If you understand the system behind a series - if you know how to go on - then that does not mean that the appropriate formula has occurred to you (although it might). Why? - The formula might occur to you and yet you still don't know how to go on/understand. - Same goes for having particular feelings. In order for you, or anyone else, to correctly say that you have understood something you do not have to be having any particular feelings.
(v) There are different kinds of objects of linguistic understanding:
Hacker in Commentary/Essays: "Reflect on the differences between understanding a nonsense poem, understanding an English sentence out of context, understanding the same sentence in context, understanding what is said by its use in context, understanding what is meant by it, and understanding what is meant by uttering it.
Similarly reflect on the different types of lack of understanding manifest in the following sentences:
I cannot understand you, you must speak louder.
I cannot understand you, that is sheer nonsense.
I cannot understand you, I don't speak German.
I cannot understand you, what you said was too complicated to follow.
I cannot understand you, I don't see why you want...
To which one may add:
I understand what he said, but I can't understand the joke.
I understand what he said but I don't understand why he said it.
I understand the words all right, but I don't understand to whom they refer.
I understand what he said, but I can't understand whether it was a threat or a promise."
**An interesting recent article on Wittgenstein and understanding: http://www.academia.edu/1496859/Understanding_the_Lion_For_Real **
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