§156
Sections §156-78 examine reading. Wittgenstein says that 'for purposes of this examination' he won't count the understanding of what is read as part of 'reading'. What are his purposes? - To shed light on the discussion of understanding.
Hacker: "'Reading' is deliberately detached from understanding, since this example is used to illuminate understanding and hence must not invoke understanding of what is read". - If Wittgenstein did invoke understanding of what is read that would assume that 'understanding' was already perspicuous.
Is our concept of reading usually detached from understanding? - In some cases it seems that we would tie the two together. If I were to ask someone if they could read German I would mean 'do you understand written works in German?'. However, you might ask if someone could read Russian and they might say 'in a way I can' - and mean that they could read Cyrillic script but not understand Russian - and this would be a legitimate use of 'read'.
What is to count as reading, for the sake of Wittgenstein's examination?
"...rendering out loud what is written or printed...writing from dictation, copying something printed, playing from sheet music..."
What goes on when someone who has learnt to read reads something? - Their eyes pass along the printed words, they might say the words out loud. We would also say that someone has read something if they are able to repeat the written sentence word for word afterwards even if they haven't said the sentence out loud or to themselves. Someone can read aloud without attending to what they are reading (so attending to what is read is not necessary for reading - in some cases, at the very least).
Two temptations:
If we look at someone beginning to read we might be tempted to say that reading is a conscious mental activity - because this is what seems to be missing when we say that the beginner is not really reading (when they guess words from the context or say bits of the passage they've learnt by heart without looking at the page).
We might also be tempted to say of the beginner that only they really know whether they're (really)reading or saying the words by heart (which again suggests that reading is a conscious mental activity that only the reader 'has access to')
Saturday 23 March 2013
§153
The temptation - now that we've seen that the various 'surface' things that occur don't constitute the understanding - is to say that the understanding must be something beneath the surface. (In what sense are things 'on the surface' here? - It could be that they are on the surface in being observable behaviour or someone might think that they are on the surface in being 'available to consciousness' - something that we are aware of thinking).
The problem with this new temptation is that even if we did find something that happened in all cases what reason would we have to think that it was the understanding?
It must be that we already have criteria of understanding if we are able to correlate cases of understanding with something (e.g. a brain process).
The temptation - now that we've seen that the various 'surface' things that occur don't constitute the understanding - is to say that the understanding must be something beneath the surface. (In what sense are things 'on the surface' here? - It could be that they are on the surface in being observable behaviour or someone might think that they are on the surface in being 'available to consciousness' - something that we are aware of thinking).
The problem with this new temptation is that even if we did find something that happened in all cases what reason would we have to think that it was the understanding?
It must be that we already have criteria of understanding if we are able to correlate cases of understanding with something (e.g. a brain process).
§152
None of the things mentioned in §151 (a formulae occuring to you, having a certain feeling, etc.) is the understanding. Someone might have a formula in mind or written down and yet not understand. They might say, 'That's easy' to themselves and take a sharp intake of breath, but then find that they do not understand.
None of the things mentioned in §151 (a formulae occuring to you, having a certain feeling, etc.) is the understanding. Someone might have a formula in mind or written down and yet not understand. They might say, 'That's easy' to themselves and take a sharp intake of breath, but then find that they do not understand.
§151
'Know' might be used in saying 'Now I know!' (You might be pondering how to continue a series and then exclaim 'Now I know!' (now I know how to continue the series))
If we imagine someone (B) watching someone else (A) writing out a series and saying, 'now I can go on!' when they have worked out the rule it seems that understanding is something that occurs in a moment.
But what occurs?
- Various things might occur.
- B might try out various algebraic formulae and then have it confirmed that one fits the series.
- B might ask himself the difference between each step in the series and find a pattern.
- B might watch A writing out the series and say, 'Yes. I know that series.'
- B might have a certain feeling.
'Know' might be used in saying 'Now I know!' (You might be pondering how to continue a series and then exclaim 'Now I know!' (now I know how to continue the series))
If we imagine someone (B) watching someone else (A) writing out a series and saying, 'now I can go on!' when they have worked out the rule it seems that understanding is something that occurs in a moment.
But what occurs?
- Various things might occur.
- B might try out various algebraic formulae and then have it confirmed that one fits the series.
- B might ask himself the difference between each step in the series and find a pattern.
- B might watch A writing out the series and say, 'Yes. I know that series.'
- B might have a certain feeling.
§149
The criteria for determining whether someone understands something and whether someone is in a certain brain state are different. So, the brain state is not the understanding.
Understanding is not a conscious state/process but nor is it an 'unconscious' state, like a brain state.
Wittgenstein gives examples of mental states - dejection, excitement, and pain. Each of these might be with us all day, uninterruptedly. But we cannot be said to understand uninterruptedly - at least not in the way that we might be in pain uninterruptedly.
An ability, like being able to play chess, does not have genuine duration.
The criteria for determining whether someone understands something and whether someone is in a certain brain state are different. So, the brain state is not the understanding.
Understanding is not a conscious state/process but nor is it an 'unconscious' state, like a brain state.
Wittgenstein gives examples of mental states - dejection, excitement, and pain. Each of these might be with us all day, uninterruptedly. But we cannot be said to understand uninterruptedly - at least not in the way that we might be in pain uninterruptedly.
An ability, like being able to play chess, does not have genuine duration.
§147
Another reason one might be tempted to say that understanding is a mental state - or at least that applying a rule is not a criterion of understanding - is that in your own case you surely don't know that you understand by having experienced yourself applying the rule.and what you have understanding of is a rule which applies to a series that is infinite, whereas any application must be finite.
Is the first person/third person asymmetry here like the case of pain? - No. In the case of understanding it makes sense to say "I think I understand" but find that you do not. In the case of pain it does not make sense to say, "I think I'm in pain", at all (except, perhaps, in cases of very mild pain).
Another reason one might be tempted to say that understanding is a mental state - or at least that applying a rule is not a criterion of understanding - is that in your own case you surely don't know that you understand by having experienced yourself applying the rule.and what you have understanding of is a rule which applies to a series that is infinite, whereas any application must be finite.
Is the first person/third person asymmetry here like the case of pain? - No. In the case of understanding it makes sense to say "I think I understand" but find that you do not. In the case of pain it does not make sense to say, "I think I'm in pain", at all (except, perhaps, in cases of very mild pain).
§146
Wittgenstein points to a temptation to say that understanding is a state from which correct application flows. Considering that there is no clear criterion - no number that they must be able to continue up to (§145) - we might be tempted to say that it isn't the application that counts but the underlying state.
Wittgenstein says that just because we could imagine someone going on differently the application is still a criterion of understanding.
Wittgenstein points to a temptation to say that understanding is a state from which correct application flows. Considering that there is no clear criterion - no number that they must be able to continue up to (§145) - we might be tempted to say that it isn't the application that counts but the underlying state.
Wittgenstein says that just because we could imagine someone going on differently the application is still a criterion of understanding.
§145
To say that the student (B) has understood how to write the series the student would have had to have repeatedly done it successfully themselves. A criterion of understanding is the person correctly writing out the series themselves.
You can then point out to them that the numbers 0-9 recur in the numbers from 10 upwards - in the units and in the tens.
When do we say they've mastered the system? - There is no clear limit up to which they must be able to complete the series in order for us to have a right to say they've understood/mastered it.
To say that the student (B) has understood how to write the series the student would have had to have repeatedly done it successfully themselves. A criterion of understanding is the person correctly writing out the series themselves.
You can then point out to them that the numbers 0-9 recur in the numbers from 10 upwards - in the units and in the tens.
When do we say they've mastered the system? - There is no clear limit up to which they must be able to complete the series in order for us to have a right to say they've understood/mastered it.
§144
Wittgenstein says that the point of him pointing out that learning might come to an end at a certain point is to reorient us. - To change our way of looking at things. His point is to get us to stop thinking about understanding as an inner state or process from which applications flow and to orient us towards thinking of understanding as akin to an ability.
How does he do this? - The language game of §143 draws our attention to the grounding of our conceptual understanding on being able to imitate.
Wittgenstein says that the point of him pointing out that learning might come to an end at a certain point is to reorient us. - To change our way of looking at things. His point is to get us to stop thinking about understanding as an inner state or process from which applications flow and to orient us towards thinking of understanding as akin to an ability.
How does he do this? - The language game of §143 draws our attention to the grounding of our conceptual understanding on being able to imitate.
Monday 18 March 2013
§143
Wittgenstein tells us not to balk at the expression 'series of numbers' in his example. The point, I assume, is that it isn't incorrect to say 'numbers' rather than 'numerals' here. In fact it might be more misleading. Those defending the idea that 'numeral' is correct are in thrall to something like the Augustinian picture (thinking that the number is an object referred to by the numeral).
In his example B has to write down a series of signs according to a formation rule when A gives an order. The series of signs is the series of natural numbers - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
B might come to learn the series by copying it up to 9. B would then need to be able to write them down himself in order for instruction to go on. When would we say B has understood? - This isn't completely clear. Wittgenstein makes the point that there isn't a sharp distinction between a random and a systematic mistake.
Conceptual abilities rest on training. Training can only take place given standard natural reactions of trainees.
Wittgenstein tells us not to balk at the expression 'series of numbers' in his example. The point, I assume, is that it isn't incorrect to say 'numbers' rather than 'numerals' here. In fact it might be more misleading. Those defending the idea that 'numeral' is correct are in thrall to something like the Augustinian picture (thinking that the number is an object referred to by the numeral).
In his example B has to write down a series of signs according to a formation rule when A gives an order. The series of signs is the series of natural numbers - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
B might come to learn the series by copying it up to 9. B would then need to be able to write them down himself in order for instruction to go on. When would we say B has understood? - This isn't completely clear. Wittgenstein makes the point that there isn't a sharp distinction between a random and a systematic mistake.
Conceptual abilities rest on training. Training can only take place given standard natural reactions of trainees.
§142
The rules for the use of words prescribe their use in normal circumstances. If circumstances were to change dramatically then we might well be at a loss about what to say. The disappearing/reappearing chair (§80) is an example of this kind of thing (is it correct to call it a chair? - We would be at a loss about what to say.)
Similarly, if people in pain didn't typically say "my ___ hurts!" or wince or say "arrgh!" but behaved differently half the time (perhaps they might say "Mmmm. I'm in pain" and look completely serene/contented/smile) - then we'd be unsure about whether the word 'pain' was being used correctly.
Presumably a similar point could be made about understanding. - If someone went on to use an expression in accordance with the rules for its correct use for the most part but used it differently on some occasions we might be unsure about whether to say that they understood it.
The rules for the use of words prescribe their use in normal circumstances. If circumstances were to change dramatically then we might well be at a loss about what to say. The disappearing/reappearing chair (§80) is an example of this kind of thing (is it correct to call it a chair? - We would be at a loss about what to say.)
Similarly, if people in pain didn't typically say "my ___ hurts!" or wince or say "arrgh!" but behaved differently half the time (perhaps they might say "Mmmm. I'm in pain" and look completely serene/contented/smile) - then we'd be unsure about whether the word 'pain' was being used correctly.
Presumably a similar point could be made about understanding. - If someone went on to use an expression in accordance with the rules for its correct use for the most part but used it differently on some occasions we might be unsure about whether to say that they understood it.
§140
Pictures don't determine a use. So why are people tempted to think that they do?
- We can understand something in an instant and a mental picture is the kind of thing that might come to us in an instant.
The cube case might lead us to say that although we are not under a logical compulsion to apply a picture in a certain way we must be under a psychological compulsion. This could lead us to distinguish psychological compulsion from logical compulsion. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is something wrong with this distinction. I assume the problem is with the idea of logical compulsion.
We might have the same picture before our minds when we hear a word but apply it differently - and a different application means different meaning. Here, presumably, Wittgenstein is emphasising that the use of a word is internally connected to its meaning but a mental picture is not.
Pictures don't determine a use. So why are people tempted to think that they do?
- We can understand something in an instant and a mental picture is the kind of thing that might come to us in an instant.
The cube case might lead us to say that although we are not under a logical compulsion to apply a picture in a certain way we must be under a psychological compulsion. This could lead us to distinguish psychological compulsion from logical compulsion. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is something wrong with this distinction. I assume the problem is with the idea of logical compulsion.
We might have the same picture before our minds when we hear a word but apply it differently - and a different application means different meaning. Here, presumably, Wittgenstein is emphasising that the use of a word is internally connected to its meaning but a mental picture is not.
§138
The idea that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition could be connected to the Augustinian picture. If the meaning of a word is the object it refers to then we could speak of objects fitting together, or we might think that meanings fit together in some way that runs parallel to the way that objects fit together.
An objection to saying that the meaning of a word fits the sense of a sentence is that the meaning is the use of the word and we can't make sense of uses fitting together. However, Wittgenstein then raises a philosophical problem. If the meaning of a word is its use then it seems difficult to understand how we could understand the meaning of a word in an instant. What we understand - the meaning - is something grasped in an instant byt the use of the word is extended in time and so it seems that meaning cannot be use.
(And perhaps it could be said that the Augustinian picture gets around this problem. - We can grasp the meaning of a word in an instant perhaps by perceiving the corresponding object or by forming an image of it in our minds).
The idea that the meanings of words fit together in a proposition could be connected to the Augustinian picture. If the meaning of a word is the object it refers to then we could speak of objects fitting together, or we might think that meanings fit together in some way that runs parallel to the way that objects fit together.
An objection to saying that the meaning of a word fits the sense of a sentence is that the meaning is the use of the word and we can't make sense of uses fitting together. However, Wittgenstein then raises a philosophical problem. If the meaning of a word is its use then it seems difficult to understand how we could understand the meaning of a word in an instant. What we understand - the meaning - is something grasped in an instant byt the use of the word is extended in time and so it seems that meaning cannot be use.
(And perhaps it could be said that the Augustinian picture gets around this problem. - We can grasp the meaning of a word in an instant perhaps by perceiving the corresponding object or by forming an image of it in our minds).
§137
'True' and 'false' might be said to fit the concept of a proposition in the sense that 'l' fits 'k' when we remind ourselves of the order of the alphabet. 'True' and 'false' don't fit the concept 'proposition' in the way that one cogwheel fits another. We might discover that one cogwheel fits another but we don't discover that 'l' comes after 'k'.
'True' and 'false' might be said to fit the concept of a proposition in the sense that 'l' fits 'k' when we remind ourselves of the order of the alphabet. 'True' and 'false' don't fit the concept 'proposition' in the way that one cogwheel fits another. We might discover that one cogwheel fits another but we don't discover that 'l' comes after 'k'.
Saturday 9 March 2013
§136
Wittgenstein has previously used analogies with mechanisms (e.g. levers connected up to various different things in a locomotive) in highlighting features of language. But analogies with mechanisms are not always apt. It is mistaken/misleading to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions (as a cog wheel fits another cog wheel). The concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition.
Three kinds of cases
The relation between 'true' and 'proposition' (i) is not like
the relationship between 'male' and 'bachelor' (ii)
or the relationship between 'pain' and VERBAL BEHAVIOURI'm in pain (iii).
It is not a criterion (it cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition).
Why is it not like these cases?
Being male is a necessary condition for being a bachelor but it is not sufficient. - You can be male and not be a bachelor. The concepts 'male' and 'bachelor' are in some sense independent of each other. You could certainly imagine a world in which the institution of marriage did not exist but that the concept 'male' was employed in exactly the same way as in this world.
Someone saying 'I'm in pain' is a criterion for them being in pain. It is not a necessary condition and nor is it a sufficient condition. Someone could say 'I'm in pain' and not be in pain and somebody could be in pain but not say 'I'm in pain'. Nonetheless it is a (defeasible) criterion for someone being in pain.
The relationship between 'true' and 'proposition' is like neither of the above cases. It is not a defeasible criterion because it cannot be defeated. It is unlike the male/bachelor case because the concepts are not independent of each other in the same way. - You cannot imagine a world in which things are true but there are no propositions or one in which there are propositions but nothing is true (or false).
How does the concept 'proposition' differ from the concept 'sentence'? - I think that when I was told what a proposition was I was told that it was something common to different sentences (e.g. 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist Weiss') - and I'd always thought that sentences were the kind of thing that might be true or false.
Wittgenstein has previously used analogies with mechanisms (e.g. levers connected up to various different things in a locomotive) in highlighting features of language. But analogies with mechanisms are not always apt. It is mistaken/misleading to claim that the concept 'true' fits propositions (as a cog wheel fits another cog wheel). The concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition.
Three kinds of cases
The relation between 'true' and 'proposition' (i) is not like
the relationship between 'male' and 'bachelor' (ii)
or the relationship between 'pain' and VERBAL BEHAVIOURI'm in pain (iii).
It is not a criterion (it cannot be used to determine what is and what is not a proposition).
Why is it not like these cases?
Being male is a necessary condition for being a bachelor but it is not sufficient. - You can be male and not be a bachelor. The concepts 'male' and 'bachelor' are in some sense independent of each other. You could certainly imagine a world in which the institution of marriage did not exist but that the concept 'male' was employed in exactly the same way as in this world.
Someone saying 'I'm in pain' is a criterion for them being in pain. It is not a necessary condition and nor is it a sufficient condition. Someone could say 'I'm in pain' and not be in pain and somebody could be in pain but not say 'I'm in pain'. Nonetheless it is a (defeasible) criterion for someone being in pain.
The relationship between 'true' and 'proposition' is like neither of the above cases. It is not a defeasible criterion because it cannot be defeated. It is unlike the male/bachelor case because the concepts are not independent of each other in the same way. - You cannot imagine a world in which things are true but there are no propositions or one in which there are propositions but nothing is true (or false).
How does the concept 'proposition' differ from the concept 'sentence'? - I think that when I was told what a proposition was I was told that it was something common to different sentences (e.g. 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist Weiss') - and I'd always thought that sentences were the kind of thing that might be true or false.
§135
That 'proposition' is a family resemblance concept does not mean that it is not a genuine/legitimate concept. We've already seen that 'game' is a legitimate concept and also is a family resemblance concept.
We can explain the concept 'proposition' to others by providing them with a series of examples of propositions.
That 'proposition' is a family resemblance concept does not mean that it is not a genuine/legitimate concept. We've already seen that 'game' is a legitimate concept and also is a family resemblance concept.
We can explain the concept 'proposition' to others by providing them with a series of examples of propositions.
§134
Wittgenstein starts discussing a new topic in §134. Up to §133 he had been discussing philosophy but in §134 he discusses the general propositional form. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had said that, "This is how things are" is the general form of propositions.
Wittgenstein wants to reject this:
(i) "This is how things are" is itself a sentence...
(ii) Moreover, it is a sentence that is used in a distinctive way. It is used to allude to some other sentence/proposition. (Wittgenstein is here using the method of looking at how a proposition is used ordinarily and correctly). The variable p might be used to stand in for a proposition in some contexts, and in that case it is being used in a similar way to "That is how things are". But we wouldn't say that p is the general propositional form (and so we should not say that "This is how things are" is the general propositional form).
(iii) 'Proposition' is a family resemblance concept.
Thinking that all propositions agree or disagree with reality is obviously mistaken because "This is how things are" is a proposition and it does not agree or disagree with reality.
Wittgenstein starts discussing a new topic in §134. Up to §133 he had been discussing philosophy but in §134 he discusses the general propositional form. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had said that, "This is how things are" is the general form of propositions.
Wittgenstein wants to reject this:
(i) "This is how things are" is itself a sentence...
(ii) Moreover, it is a sentence that is used in a distinctive way. It is used to allude to some other sentence/proposition. (Wittgenstein is here using the method of looking at how a proposition is used ordinarily and correctly). The variable p might be used to stand in for a proposition in some contexts, and in that case it is being used in a similar way to "That is how things are". But we wouldn't say that p is the general propositional form (and so we should not say that "This is how things are" is the general propositional form).
(iii) 'Proposition' is a family resemblance concept.
Thinking that all propositions agree or disagree with reality is obviously mistaken because "This is how things are" is a proposition and it does not agree or disagree with reality.
§133
Clarity is not achieved by refining or completing the system of rules in language. Wittgenstein has already argued that we can get by perfectly well using words that aren't bound everywhere by rules (just as tennis works perfectly well even though there aren't rules governing every aspect) - and the rules can be said to be complete when they achieve the purpose we have for them (they don't need to be continually supplemented by other rules unless the need arises - unless somebody is unclear about the correct use(s) of an expression).
Philosophy has previously misconceived its tasks - seeking essences/de re necessities, or trying to provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. As long as philosophy is misconceived it can always be brought into question. Wittgenstein has now provided us with methods which allow us to dissolve philosophical problems (conceptual confusions) as they arise.
One way in which philosophy has been misconceived is in thinking of philosophical problems as woven into a complete system or theory - and so undermining one aspect of a system/theory would put the rest into doubt. Wittgenstein now thinks of philosophical problems as more isolated (although presumably some conceptual confusions are intimately related to others) - they can be dissolved in a piecemeal manner.
Clarity is not achieved by refining or completing the system of rules in language. Wittgenstein has already argued that we can get by perfectly well using words that aren't bound everywhere by rules (just as tennis works perfectly well even though there aren't rules governing every aspect) - and the rules can be said to be complete when they achieve the purpose we have for them (they don't need to be continually supplemented by other rules unless the need arises - unless somebody is unclear about the correct use(s) of an expression).
Philosophy has previously misconceived its tasks - seeking essences/de re necessities, or trying to provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. As long as philosophy is misconceived it can always be brought into question. Wittgenstein has now provided us with methods which allow us to dissolve philosophical problems (conceptual confusions) as they arise.
One way in which philosophy has been misconceived is in thinking of philosophical problems as woven into a complete system or theory - and so undermining one aspect of a system/theory would put the rest into doubt. Wittgenstein now thinks of philosophical problems as more isolated (although presumably some conceptual confusions are intimately related to others) - they can be dissolved in a piecemeal manner.
§132
The point of these language games and of other cases of 'assembling reminders' is to resolve/dissolve particular philosophical confusions. In constructing them we are not beginning the construction of a single, ideal language.
The confusions arise when language is idling - What is meant by this?
Wittgenstein previously compared words to levers/handles (§12). The surface similarity between words might deceive. Words have different uses - just as handles do. Problems arise in a locomotive if a handle is not hooked up to the mechanism it is supposed to be hooked up to (if it cannot be used in the way it is supposed to be used). Similarly, philosophical problems (confusions) arise when words are not used as they are supposed to be used (when language is idling) - or, perhaps more accurately, when they are not used at all (because what is said is nonsensical).
The point of these language games and of other cases of 'assembling reminders' is to resolve/dissolve particular philosophical confusions. In constructing them we are not beginning the construction of a single, ideal language.
The confusions arise when language is idling - What is meant by this?
Wittgenstein previously compared words to levers/handles (§12). The surface similarity between words might deceive. Words have different uses - just as handles do. Problems arise in a locomotive if a handle is not hooked up to the mechanism it is supposed to be hooked up to (if it cannot be used in the way it is supposed to be used). Similarly, philosophical problems (confusions) arise when words are not used as they are supposed to be used (when language is idling) - or, perhaps more accurately, when they are not used at all (because what is said is nonsensical).
§130-131
Simple language games (such as the one in §2) are objects of comparison (we compare them to our own, more complicated language) - not approximations of an ideal language (as we might think, given that they help us in getting clear about the correct uses of expressions and how they differ).
They illuminate not by being clear reflections of reality but by being models which highlight certain features of our language which we have failed to recognise (because they are so familiar, perhaps).
Simple language games (such as the one in §2) are objects of comparison (we compare them to our own, more complicated language) - not approximations of an ideal language (as we might think, given that they help us in getting clear about the correct uses of expressions and how they differ).
They illuminate not by being clear reflections of reality but by being models which highlight certain features of our language which we have failed to recognise (because they are so familiar, perhaps).
§129
The important things that are 'hidden' in §129 cannot be the hidden things that are, 'of no interest to us' from §126. What is hidden in §129 is a bit like someone failing to see their glasses because they are wearing them. - We do not notice our ordinary, familiar uses of language (sometimes) because they are right in front of us - the correct uses of various words are open to view.
The important things that are 'hidden' in §129 cannot be the hidden things that are, 'of no interest to us' from §126. What is hidden in §129 is a bit like someone failing to see their glasses because they are wearing them. - We do not notice our ordinary, familiar uses of language (sometimes) because they are right in front of us - the correct uses of various words are open to view.
§128
Theses:
(1) According to the Oxford dictionary on my kindle a thesis is, "a statement or theory that is put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved".
(2) According to PMS Hacker, the word 'thesis' might be used to refer to, "...debatable claims about the nature of things such as are advanced in the Tractatus" or it might be used to refer to,
(3) ...grammmatical propositions.
Why are there no debatable theses in philosophy?
(1) - If a thesis is a statement put forward to be proved (empirically) then philosophy (as Wittgenstein conceives it) does not contain theses at all, let alone debatable ones. According to Wittgenstein philosophy is not an empirical discipline - it doesn't set out to make discoveries about the world or to perform experiments but to dissolve conceptual confusions.
(2) - If a thesis is something like the claims of the Tractatus (e.g. reality consists of facts not things), which are supposed to be pronouncements about essences, then there cannot be any theses because there are no objective, language-independent essences.
(3) - If a thesis is a grammatical statement (e.g. something cannot be red and green all over) then it is quite unlike a (debatable) empirical claim. Empirical claims might be true or false. Their denials make sense. But the denial of a grammatical 'claim' is nonsense. The response to nonsense is to 'assemble reminders' - not to assemble evidence. - So grammatical claims are not debatable as empirical claims are.
So - if 'thesis' means one of the above ((1), (2), (3)) then there are no debatable thesis in philosophy.
Theses:
(1) According to the Oxford dictionary on my kindle a thesis is, "a statement or theory that is put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved".
(2) According to PMS Hacker, the word 'thesis' might be used to refer to, "...debatable claims about the nature of things such as are advanced in the Tractatus" or it might be used to refer to,
(3) ...grammmatical propositions.
Why are there no debatable theses in philosophy?
(1) - If a thesis is a statement put forward to be proved (empirically) then philosophy (as Wittgenstein conceives it) does not contain theses at all, let alone debatable ones. According to Wittgenstein philosophy is not an empirical discipline - it doesn't set out to make discoveries about the world or to perform experiments but to dissolve conceptual confusions.
(2) - If a thesis is something like the claims of the Tractatus (e.g. reality consists of facts not things), which are supposed to be pronouncements about essences, then there cannot be any theses because there are no objective, language-independent essences.
(3) - If a thesis is a grammatical statement (e.g. something cannot be red and green all over) then it is quite unlike a (debatable) empirical claim. Empirical claims might be true or false. Their denials make sense. But the denial of a grammatical 'claim' is nonsense. The response to nonsense is to 'assemble reminders' - not to assemble evidence. - So grammatical claims are not debatable as empirical claims are.
So - if 'thesis' means one of the above ((1), (2), (3)) then there are no debatable thesis in philosophy.
Friday 8 March 2013
§126
Philosophy is concerned with what lies open to view (the correct uses of words and numbers). - This is what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. Is the point here that we must make sense before we can settle what is true? Or is it that more technical enquiries presuppose ordinary, everyday language? (or both)
Philosophy is concerned with what lies open to view (the correct uses of words and numbers). - This is what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. Is the point here that we must make sense before we can settle what is true? Or is it that more technical enquiries presuppose ordinary, everyday language? (or both)
§125
Resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery is not among the tasks of philosophers (is the suggestion here that there is something problematic with the whole idea of resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery? - Is that anyone's task?)
Again - the philosopher's task is to make the conceptual terrain surveyable.
Our problems (in mathematics) result from becoming entangled in rules we have laid down. So what we need to do is to clearly survey the rules and what we find when we follow them.
The philosophical problem is "the civic status of a contradiction". The problem is we misconceive contradictions. (Why 'civic status' here? - Is the point just that most/many people misconceive contradictions).
Resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery is not among the tasks of philosophers (is the suggestion here that there is something problematic with the whole idea of resolving a contradiction by means of mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery? - Is that anyone's task?)
Again - the philosopher's task is to make the conceptual terrain surveyable.
Our problems (in mathematics) result from becoming entangled in rules we have laid down. So what we need to do is to clearly survey the rules and what we find when we follow them.
The philosophical problem is "the civic status of a contradiction". The problem is we misconceive contradictions. (Why 'civic status' here? - Is the point just that most/many people misconceive contradictions).
§124
The point of philosophy is not to alter language to bring it closer to some ideal. Philosophers are not to 'interfere with the actual use of language'. The philosopher's task is to describe the actual use of language so as to achieve clarity - to achieve a clear view of the conceptual terrain (and so to dissolve philosophical problems).
The point of philosophy is not to alter language to bring it closer to some ideal. Philosophers are not to 'interfere with the actual use of language'. The philosopher's task is to describe the actual use of language so as to achieve clarity - to achieve a clear view of the conceptual terrain (and so to dissolve philosophical problems).
§122
In §119 Wittgenstein had talked about bumping our heads up against the limits of language. We might think of the relationship between concepts as being like the relationship between places on a map (does this mean that traditional philosophers have been producing 'faulty maps' or 'maps of fictional places'?). The problems that have arisen in traditional philosophy have arisen partly as a result of not having an overview of the conceptual terrain (like being in a maze, perhaps, without being able to see the dead-ends). We need to produce 'surveyable representations' - we need to look at a range of ordinary and correct uses of the relevant terms.
One way to bring about perspicuity is to construct 'language games' of the sort Wittgenstein constructed in §2 - this is the invention of an 'intermediate link' - a stepping stone to achieving a clear view of the use of concepts.
Note: Gordon Baker makes a lot of this passage http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wittgensteins-Method-Neglected-G-Baker/dp/1405117575/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1362741371&sr=8-7
In §119 Wittgenstein had talked about bumping our heads up against the limits of language. We might think of the relationship between concepts as being like the relationship between places on a map (does this mean that traditional philosophers have been producing 'faulty maps' or 'maps of fictional places'?). The problems that have arisen in traditional philosophy have arisen partly as a result of not having an overview of the conceptual terrain (like being in a maze, perhaps, without being able to see the dead-ends). We need to produce 'surveyable representations' - we need to look at a range of ordinary and correct uses of the relevant terms.
One way to bring about perspicuity is to construct 'language games' of the sort Wittgenstein constructed in §2 - this is the invention of an 'intermediate link' - a stepping stone to achieving a clear view of the use of concepts.
Note: Gordon Baker makes a lot of this passage http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wittgensteins-Method-Neglected-G-Baker/dp/1405117575/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1362741371&sr=8-7
§121
There is no metaphilosophy. We shouldn't think that there is just because one of the words that philosophers might look at the use of is 'philosophy' (and there have been confusions around the correct use of this term similar to confusions surrounding other terms - thinking that there is some essential feature of philosophy).
There is no second-order/meta-orthography - even though 'orthography' is a word that might be looked at in orthography (the study of the conventional spelling system).
Note: I notice Paul Horwich has a new book - Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy - but I haven't read it. Has he acknowledged this passage?
There is no metaphilosophy. We shouldn't think that there is just because one of the words that philosophers might look at the use of is 'philosophy' (and there have been confusions around the correct use of this term similar to confusions surrounding other terms - thinking that there is some essential feature of philosophy).
There is no second-order/meta-orthography - even though 'orthography' is a word that might be looked at in orthography (the study of the conventional spelling system).
Note: I notice Paul Horwich has a new book - Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy - but I haven't read it. Has he acknowledged this passage?
§120
Wittgenstein points to another misconception concerning meaning. People think of the meaning of a word as being something like the word - the same kind of thing as the word, but nonetheless different. -Similar to the relationship between the money and the cow one can buy with it (you could say money and cow are the same kind of thing - commodities - you can buy a certain number of cows for a certain amount of money) but the relationship is more like the relationship between money and what can be done with it (parallel to the word and the use of it).
Wittgenstein also makes the point that philosophy in the 'old style' - the philosophy of traditional philosophers and of referentialists like Russell, Frege and the younger Wittgenstein - cannot be done without using ordinary language. I suppose the point here is to oppose the idea that we should construct ideal languages - it's unavoidable that we will use ordinary language.
Wittgenstein points to another misconception concerning meaning. People think of the meaning of a word as being something like the word - the same kind of thing as the word, but nonetheless different. -Similar to the relationship between the money and the cow one can buy with it (you could say money and cow are the same kind of thing - commodities - you can buy a certain number of cows for a certain amount of money) but the relationship is more like the relationship between money and what can be done with it (parallel to the word and the use of it).
Wittgenstein also makes the point that philosophy in the 'old style' - the philosophy of traditional philosophers and of referentialists like Russell, Frege and the younger Wittgenstein - cannot be done without using ordinary language. I suppose the point here is to oppose the idea that we should construct ideal languages - it's unavoidable that we will use ordinary language.
§119
The results of philosophy - as he conceives it - is the discovery (recognition?) that philosophers of the past have been saying things that are nonsensical. In 'reclaiming' a word from its metaphysical use we might 'bump our heads' against the limits of language. Recognising the limits as the limits - recognising nonsense as nonsense - allows us to get a clear view of the conceptual terrain and dissolves old philosophical problems. This is valuable.
The results of philosophy - as he conceives it - is the discovery (recognition?) that philosophers of the past have been saying things that are nonsensical. In 'reclaiming' a word from its metaphysical use we might 'bump our heads' against the limits of language. Recognising the limits as the limits - recognising nonsense as nonsense - allows us to get a clear view of the conceptual terrain and dissolves old philosophical problems. This is valuable.
§118
The kinds of things that Wittgenstein has been saying - about bringing, "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" - raises a worry. Philosophy had seemed to be dealing with profound and far-reaching issues but the new method seems to only promise the destruction of all of those (apparently?) profound musings.
A couple of responses:
(i) What is being destroyed is confused anyway (houses of cards) and...
(ii) It clears up the 'ground of language'. - It allows us to proceed with genuinely valuable pursuits from a basis of language that makes sense - from a position of clarity.
The kinds of things that Wittgenstein has been saying - about bringing, "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" - raises a worry. Philosophy had seemed to be dealing with profound and far-reaching issues but the new method seems to only promise the destruction of all of those (apparently?) profound musings.
A couple of responses:
(i) What is being destroyed is confused anyway (houses of cards) and...
(ii) It clears up the 'ground of language'. - It allows us to proceed with genuinely valuable pursuits from a basis of language that makes sense - from a position of clarity.
Sunday 3 March 2013
§116
Wittgenstein lists some of the concepts that philosophers have concerned themselves with - thinking that they are grasping the essence of the thing in question. Concepts like 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', and 'name' are ones that philosophers have concerned themselves with. Philosophers have tried to pinpoint the essential features of knowledge, being etc. But an examination of the ways in which these words are actually used would reveal that they have a variety of uses.
Wittgenstein's new method (or methods) is to focus on the everyday use of words and so to remove the illusion that there is some essential feature of each of the items on the list.
Wittgenstein lists some of the concepts that philosophers have concerned themselves with - thinking that they are grasping the essence of the thing in question. Concepts like 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', and 'name' are ones that philosophers have concerned themselves with. Philosophers have tried to pinpoint the essential features of knowledge, being etc. But an examination of the ways in which these words are actually used would reveal that they have a variety of uses.
Wittgenstein's new method (or methods) is to focus on the everyday use of words and so to remove the illusion that there is some essential feature of each of the items on the list.
§§113-115
The philosopher, in the grip of a picture, may well repeat their confused philosophical 'claims' to themselves - perhaps because they feel the conflict between the picture they're held captive by and what they see when they examine the ordinary use of language. What the philosopher is in fact doing here (in repeating the phrase) is reaffirming a conceptual connection they take to hold and projecting it onto reality (perhaps giving the impression that there is an a priori order to the world).
In this case (§114) the philosopher is 'bewitched by language'.
The philosopher, in the grip of a picture, may well repeat their confused philosophical 'claims' to themselves - perhaps because they feel the conflict between the picture they're held captive by and what they see when they examine the ordinary use of language. What the philosopher is in fact doing here (in repeating the phrase) is reaffirming a conceptual connection they take to hold and projecting it onto reality (perhaps giving the impression that there is an a priori order to the world).
In this case (§114) the philosopher is 'bewitched by language'.
§112
Philosophical problems can be the upshot of misconceiving a simile absorbed into language. One the one hand we think that our philosophical conclusions are absurd or incredible (or at least that they don't accord with our ordinary use of language) and yet on the other hand (gripped by the model/picture we've adopted) we think 'this is how things must be'. We project necessary/conceptual connections onto the world - and conceptual connections that do not in fact hold.
Philosophical problems can be the upshot of misconceiving a simile absorbed into language. One the one hand we think that our philosophical conclusions are absurd or incredible (or at least that they don't accord with our ordinary use of language) and yet on the other hand (gripped by the model/picture we've adopted) we think 'this is how things must be'. We project necessary/conceptual connections onto the world - and conceptual connections that do not in fact hold.
§111
Philosophical problems (both as they were conceived in the past and as Wittgenstein conceives them now) seem deep. But we need to reconceive the character of the depth given that past philosophers succumbed to conceptual confusions and what we need to do is to assemble reminders of the correct ordinary uses of problematic terms.
Philosophical problems (both as they were conceived in the past and as Wittgenstein conceives them now) seem deep. But we need to reconceive the character of the depth given that past philosophers succumbed to conceptual confusions and what we need to do is to assemble reminders of the correct ordinary uses of problematic terms.
§110
Wittgenstein claims that it is a 'superstition' to think that, "language (or thinking) is something unique". Is the point here just that 'language' does not have an essential feature and similarly for thinking. And why is it a superstition rather than a mistake? - Is that to do with the fact that conceptual confusion is involved - and so thinking that language or thinking is something unique is to be caught up in an illusion rather than to be mistaken about something? Couldn't you say that someone has made a mistake about the correct use of an expression?
Wittgenstein claims that it is a 'superstition' to think that, "language (or thinking) is something unique". Is the point here just that 'language' does not have an essential feature and similarly for thinking. And why is it a superstition rather than a mistake? - Is that to do with the fact that conceptual confusion is involved - and so thinking that language or thinking is something unique is to be caught up in an illusion rather than to be mistaken about something? Couldn't you say that someone has made a mistake about the correct use of an expression?
§109
Philosophy is not scientific and nor is it in any way theoretical. Philosophers do not advance hypotheses as scientists do.
Wittgenstein says that, "[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." What is it that is described? - The correct use of expressions that have confused philosophers - 'knowledge', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'justice', 'causation', 'necessity', and so on. - And the contexts in which these expressions are used. Couldn't this be deemed a kind of explanation? - Doing so might explain why it was that philosophers have been vexed. - 'Perspicuous representations' could be construed as explanations of meaning, with the upshot being that understanding is achieved. - But these are not like scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
Philosophical problems are to be solved by 'assembling reminders' of the correct use of expressions and this should dispel illusions created by the 'bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language'.
Is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy the only heir of what used to be called philosophy? As Hacker says, clearly not. What used to be called 'philosophy' included the natural sciences, empirical psychology and mathematical logic (p.275 of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1, Analytical Commentary).
In addition to this I would have thought it's fair to say that there are other activities that could be called philosophy that don't just involve Wittgensteinian 'description'. - There are conceptual queries in ethics and politics - and it would be a good idea to be clear about the correct use of the relevant concepts before dealing with ethical and political questions. In ethics and politics, as in other areas, there is the potential for conceptual confusion. But it isn't as though all of the questionsn in ethics and politics are dissolved or resolved once the conceptual problems are out of the way. There are substantial questions to answer in these areas and people answering those questions would not be doing philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it, in opposition to his own earlier view. Yet these people are often called philosophers. - Questions like 'what is the best way to organise society?' and 'is it ever right to engage in warfare to preempt a potential future problem?' are substantial questions.
Philosophy is not scientific and nor is it in any way theoretical. Philosophers do not advance hypotheses as scientists do.
Wittgenstein says that, "[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." What is it that is described? - The correct use of expressions that have confused philosophers - 'knowledge', 'doubt', 'certainty', 'justice', 'causation', 'necessity', and so on. - And the contexts in which these expressions are used. Couldn't this be deemed a kind of explanation? - Doing so might explain why it was that philosophers have been vexed. - 'Perspicuous representations' could be construed as explanations of meaning, with the upshot being that understanding is achieved. - But these are not like scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
Philosophical problems are to be solved by 'assembling reminders' of the correct use of expressions and this should dispel illusions created by the 'bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language'.
Is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy the only heir of what used to be called philosophy? As Hacker says, clearly not. What used to be called 'philosophy' included the natural sciences, empirical psychology and mathematical logic (p.275 of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1, Analytical Commentary).
In addition to this I would have thought it's fair to say that there are other activities that could be called philosophy that don't just involve Wittgensteinian 'description'. - There are conceptual queries in ethics and politics - and it would be a good idea to be clear about the correct use of the relevant concepts before dealing with ethical and political questions. In ethics and politics, as in other areas, there is the potential for conceptual confusion. But it isn't as though all of the questionsn in ethics and politics are dissolved or resolved once the conceptual problems are out of the way. There are substantial questions to answer in these areas and people answering those questions would not be doing philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it, in opposition to his own earlier view. Yet these people are often called philosophers. - Questions like 'what is the best way to organise society?' and 'is it ever right to engage in warfare to preempt a potential future problem?' are substantial questions.
Saturday 2 March 2013
§108
When we do look closely at ordinary language use and at the way in which the concepts 'proposition' and 'language' are employed we see that there is a 'family' of different things. When we see this logic seems to lose its rigour (since logic deals in looking at inferential relations between propositions) and so logic seems to dissolve away. But how can logic lose its rigour?
What we have to do instead of thinking of the discovery of crystalline purity as our end we must turn the investigation around 'on the pivot of our real need' (clarity about the employment of the relevant concepts).
Wittgenstein again uses the analogy of chess. A word is like a piece in chess in that both can be conceived as spatial/temporal phenomena. But words are also rule-governed and employed in a variety of games - just as chess pieces are employed in a rule-governed game.
When we do look closely at ordinary language use and at the way in which the concepts 'proposition' and 'language' are employed we see that there is a 'family' of different things. When we see this logic seems to lose its rigour (since logic deals in looking at inferential relations between propositions) and so logic seems to dissolve away. But how can logic lose its rigour?
What we have to do instead of thinking of the discovery of crystalline purity as our end we must turn the investigation around 'on the pivot of our real need' (clarity about the employment of the relevant concepts).
§107
If we do actually examine our ordinary and correct ways of speaking we find that it is nothing like the ideal of our requirement. The requirement comes to seem vacuous. There is no friction (no grip on the way that language really is) but to get a grip we must get back to looking closely at the way that ordinary language is used (take off the glasses).
If we do actually examine our ordinary and correct ways of speaking we find that it is nothing like the ideal of our requirement. The requirement comes to seem vacuous. There is no friction (no grip on the way that language really is) but to get a grip we must get back to looking closely at the way that ordinary language is used (take off the glasses).
§105
When we look at language as it is ordinarily used we find vagueness, words that seem to resist definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and a great variety of different kinds of sentences. If we think that there must be some kind of crystal clear logic underlying language then we are forced to look for it somewhere hidden beneath the (vague, heterogeneous) surface. Or perhaps we turn to thought rather than language.
What we in fact need to do is to recognise that we have made the ideal a requirement rather than thinking of it as something we might discover hidden somewhere.
When we look at language as it is ordinarily used we find vagueness, words that seem to resist definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and a great variety of different kinds of sentences. If we think that there must be some kind of crystal clear logic underlying language then we are forced to look for it somewhere hidden beneath the (vague, heterogeneous) surface. Or perhaps we turn to thought rather than language.
What we in fact need to do is to recognise that we have made the ideal a requirement rather than thinking of it as something we might discover hidden somewhere.
Friday 1 March 2013
§104
"One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation". Is Wittgenstein thinking of something like de re necessity here? - Or logical form/structure? - I assume he's identifying a problem with the Tractarian picture. - That properties thought to belong to things in the world actually belong to the mode of representation (samples in ostensive definitions, necessary relations)
"One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation". Is Wittgenstein thinking of something like de re necessity here? - Or logical form/structure? - I assume he's identifying a problem with the Tractarian picture. - That properties thought to belong to things in the world actually belong to the mode of representation (samples in ostensive definitions, necessary relations)
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